[PATCH 4.19 62/77] btrfs: fix information leak in btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@xxxxxxx>

commit 2f7ef5bb4a2f3e481ef05fab946edb97c84f67cf upstream.

Syzbot reported the following information leak for in
btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino():

  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:40
   instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:40
   copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]
   btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino+0x440/0x750 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3499
   btrfs_ioctl+0x714/0x1260
   vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x261/0x450 fs/ioctl.c:890
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 fs/ioctl.c:890
   x64_sys_call+0x1883/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

  Uninit was created at:
   __kmalloc_large_node+0x231/0x370 mm/slub.c:3921
   __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3954 [inline]
   __kmalloc_node+0xb07/0x1060 mm/slub.c:3973
   kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline]
   kvmalloc_node+0xc0/0x2d0 mm/util.c:634
   kvmalloc include/linux/slab.h:766 [inline]
   init_data_container+0x49/0x1e0 fs/btrfs/backref.c:2779
   btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino+0x17c/0x750 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3480
   btrfs_ioctl+0x714/0x1260
   vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x261/0x450 fs/ioctl.c:890
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 fs/ioctl.c:890
   x64_sys_call+0x1883/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

  Bytes 40-65535 of 65536 are uninitialized
  Memory access of size 65536 starts at ffff888045a40000

This happens, because we're copying a 'struct btrfs_data_container' back
to user-space. This btrfs_data_container is allocated in
'init_data_container()' via kvmalloc(), which does not zero-fill the
memory.

Fix this by using kvzalloc() which zeroes out the memory on allocation.

CC: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # 4.14+
Reported-by:  <syzbot+510a1abbb8116eeb341d@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <Johannes.thumshirn@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 fs/btrfs/backref.c |   12 +++---------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/backref.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/backref.c
@@ -2236,20 +2236,14 @@ struct btrfs_data_container *init_data_c
 	size_t alloc_bytes;
 
 	alloc_bytes = max_t(size_t, total_bytes, sizeof(*data));
-	data = kvmalloc(alloc_bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
+	data = kvzalloc(alloc_bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!data)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-	if (total_bytes >= sizeof(*data)) {
+	if (total_bytes >= sizeof(*data))
 		data->bytes_left = total_bytes - sizeof(*data);
-		data->bytes_missing = 0;
-	} else {
+	else
 		data->bytes_missing = sizeof(*data) - total_bytes;
-		data->bytes_left = 0;
-	}
-
-	data->elem_cnt = 0;
-	data->elem_missed = 0;
 
 	return data;
 }