6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 24c890dd712f6345e382256cae8c97abb0406b70 upstream.
When a zero-length message is hashed by algif_hash, and an error
is triggered, it tries to free an SG list that was never allocated
in the first place. Fix this by not freeing the SG list on the
zero-length error path.
Reported-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@xxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: b6d972f68983 ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)")
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: syzbot+3266db0c26d1fbbe3abb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
crypto/algif_hash.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index 82c44d4899b9..e24c829d7a01 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
if (err)
- goto unlock_free;
+ goto unlock_free_result;
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL,
ctx->result, 0);
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
- goto unlock_free;
+ goto unlock_free_result;
}
goto done_more;
}
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
unlock_free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
+unlock_free_result:
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
ctx->more = false;
goto unlock;
--
2.43.2
