> From: Francesco Dolcini <francesco@xxxxxxxxxx> > Sent: Thursday, December 14, 2023 3:35 PM > To: David Lin <yu-hao.lin@xxxxxxx> > Cc: Brian Norris <briannorris@xxxxxxxxxxxx>; > linux-wireless@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; > kvalo@xxxxxxxxxx; francesco@xxxxxxxxxx; Pete Hsieh > <tsung-hsien.hsieh@xxxxxxx>; stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v2] wifi: mwifiex: fix STA cannot connect to AP > > Caution: This is an external email. Please take care when clicking links or > opening attachments. When in doubt, report the message using the 'Report > this email' button > > > Hello David, > > On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 02:22:57AM +0000, David Lin wrote: > > > From: Brian Norris <briannorris@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > ... > > > Nitpick: "fix STA cannot connect to AP" isn't the best commit > > > message; that could describe an enormous number of fixes. Maybe > > > something more like "Configure BSSID consistently when starting AP"? > > > > Thanks for your suggestion. I will change commit message as you > > suggested. Does it mean I should create another patch from v1? > > Just create `[PATCH v3] wifi: mwifiex: fix STA cannot connect to AP` > > Add the change suggested by Brian and the tags you received on this v2: > > - Reviewed-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@xxxxxxxxxxx> > - Tested-by: Rafael Beims <rafael.beims@xxxxxxxxxxx> # Verdin iMX8MP / > SD8997 SD > - Acked-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > O.K. Thanks. > > > Not directly related to this patch, but while you're expanding the > > > size of this command buffer: it always felt like a > > > security-hole-in-waiting that none of these command producers do any > kinds of bounds checking. > > > We're just "lucky" that these function only generate contents of > > > ~100 bytes at max, while MWIFIEX_SIZE_OF_CMD_BUFFER=2048. But, just > > > add a few more user-space controlled TLV params, and boom, we'll > > > have ourselves a nice little CVE. > > > > > > It probably wouldn't hurt to significantly write much of this > > > driver, but at a minimum, we could probably use a few checks like this: > > > > > > cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_mac_addr); > > > if (cmd_size > MWIFIEX_SIZE_OF_CMD_BUFFER) > > > return -1; > > > // Only touch tlv *after* the bounds check. > > > > > > That doesn't need to block this patch, of course. > > > > > > Brian > > > > > > > I will modify the code for next patch. > > I would suggest not modify this in this patch, we should fix all the code that > is subjected to this potential issue. > > I would personally do a follow-up patch just to add the check to avoid > overflowing the cmd buffer everywhere it is used. > > Francesco O.K. I will only change commit message. In fact, this TLV command is added as the first one command.
