6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 53f2cb491b500897a619ff6abd72f565933760f0 upstream.
syzkaller discovered that if tls_sw_splice_eof() is executed as part of
sendfile() when the plaintext/ciphertext sk_msg are empty, the send path
gets confused because the empty ciphertext buffer does not have enough
space for the encryption overhead. This causes tls_push_record() to go on
the `split = true` path (which is only supposed to be used when interacting
with an attached BPF program), and then get further confused and hit the
tls_merge_open_record() path, which then assumes that there must be at
least one populated buffer element, leading to a NULL deref.
It is possible to have empty plaintext/ciphertext buffers if we previously
bailed from tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() via the tls_trim_both_msgs() path.
tls_sw_push_pending_record() already handles this case correctly; let's do
the same check in tls_sw_splice_eof().
Fixes: df720d288dbb ("tls/sw: Use splice_eof() to flush")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+40d43509a099ea756317@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231122214447.675768-1-jannh@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index a78e8e722409..316f76187962 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1232,11 +1232,14 @@ void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)
lock_sock(sk);
retry:
+ /* same checks as in tls_sw_push_pending_record() */
rec = ctx->open_rec;
if (!rec)
goto unlock;
msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ if (msg_pl->sg.size == 0)
+ goto unlock;
/* Check the BPF advisor and perform transmission. */
ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, false, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
--
2.43.0
