5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jordan Rife <jrife@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 7563cf17dce0a875ba3d872acdc63a78ea344019 upstream. Direct calls to ops->connect() can overwrite the address parameter when used in conjunction with BPF SOCK_ADDR hooks. Recent changes to kernel_connect() ensure that callers are insulated from such side effects. This patch wraps the direct call to ops->connect() with kernel_connect() to prevent unexpected changes to the address passed to ceph_tcp_connect(). This change was originally part of a larger patch targeting the net tree addressing all instances of unprotected calls to ops->connect() throughout the kernel, but this change was split up into several patches targeting various trees. Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230821100007.559638-1-jrife@xxxxxxxxxx/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@xxxxxxxxxx/ Fixes: d74bad4e74ee ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect") Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ static int ceph_tcp_connect(struct ceph_ dout("connect %s\n", ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr)); con_sock_state_connecting(con); - ret = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), - O_NONBLOCK); + ret = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), + O_NONBLOCK); if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { dout("connect %s EINPROGRESS sk_state = %u\n", ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr),
