6.5-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 91857ae20303cc98ed36720d9868fcd604a2ee75 ]
Booting with mitigations=off incorrectly prevents the
X86_FEATURE_{IBPB_BRTYPE,SBPB} CPUID bits from getting set.
Also, future CPUs without X86_BUG_SRSO might still have IBPB with branch
type prediction flushing, in which case SBPB should be used instead of
IBPB. The current code doesn't allow for that.
Also, cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() has some surprising side effects
and the setting of these feature bits really doesn't belong in the
mitigation code anyway. Move it to earlier.
Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/869a1709abfe13b673bdd10c2f4332ca253a40bc.1693889988.git.jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 28 +++++++++-------------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +------------
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index fd750247ca891..9e26294e415c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -676,12 +676,10 @@ extern u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void);
extern u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void);
-extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void);
extern void amd_clear_divider(void);
#else
static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; }
static inline u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void) { return 0; }
-static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) { return false; }
static inline void amd_clear_divider(void) { }
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 7eca6a8abbb1c..b08af929135d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -766,6 +766,15 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
smp_num_siblings = ((cpuid_ebx(0x8000001e) >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) {
+ if (c->x86 == 0x17 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
+ else if (c->x86 >= 0x19 && !wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
+ }
+ }
}
static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -1301,25 +1310,6 @@ void amd_check_microcode(void)
on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
}
-bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)
-{
- switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
- /* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */
- case 0x17:
- return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
- case 0x19:
- /* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */
- if (!wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
- return true;
- } else {
- return false;
- }
- default:
- return false;
- }
-}
-
/*
* Issue a DIV 0/1 insn to clear any division data from previous DIV
* operations.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bdd3e296f72b0..b0ae985aa6a4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2404,26 +2404,15 @@ early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
{
- bool has_microcode;
+ bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
goto pred_cmd;
- /*
- * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
- * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation.
- */
- has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
if (!has_microcode) {
pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
} else {
- /*
- * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
- * flags for guests.
- */
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
-
/*
* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
* IBPB microcode has been applied.
--
2.40.1
