5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@xxxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit c30411266fd67ea3c02a05c157231654d5a3bdc9 ]
In anysee_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach anysee_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.
Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xxxxxxxxx>
[hverkuil: add spaces around +]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
index 89a1b204b90c3..3dacf3914d75b 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int anysee_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg,
while (i < num) {
if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
- if (msg[i].len > 2 || msg[i+1].len > 60) {
+ if (msg[i].len != 2 || msg[i + 1].len > 60) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
--
2.40.1
