From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47 upstream.
The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated. The result is that
you can end speculatively:
if (access_ok(from, size))
// Right here
even for bad from/size combinations. On first glance, it would be ideal
to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results
can never be mis-speculated.
But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via
"copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends). Those are
generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from
userspace other than the pointer. They are also very quick and common
system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.
"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and
is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches. Take
something like this:
if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size))
do_something_with(kernelvar);
If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel
addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other)
side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.
Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent
mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.
Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec().
This makes the macro usable in generic code.
Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the
BPF code can also go away.
Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@xxxxxxxxxx>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> # BPF bits
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/nospec.h | 4 ++++
kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 --
lib/usercopy.c | 7 +++++++
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
struct task_struct;
+#ifndef barrier_nospec
+# define barrier_nospec() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
/**
* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
* @index: array element index
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1908,9 +1908,7 @@ out:
* reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that
* happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
barrier_nospec();
-#endif
CONT;
#define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE) \
STX_MEM_##SIZEOP: \
--- a/lib/usercopy.c
+++ b/lib/usercopy.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
#include <linux/instrumented.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
/* out-of-line parts */
@@ -12,6 +13,12 @@ unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to,
unsigned long res = n;
might_fault();
if (!should_fail_usercopy() && likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
+ /*
+ * Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not
+ * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
+ * finished:
+ */
+ barrier_nospec();
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);
