Setting the IBRS bit implicitly enables STIBP to protect against
cross-thread branch target injection. With enhanced IBRS, the bit it set
once and is not cleared again. However, on CPUs with just legacy IBRS,
IBRS bit set on user -> kernel and cleared on kernel -> user (a.k.a
KERNEL_IBRS). Clearing this bit also disables the implicitly enabled
STIBP, thus requiring some form of cross-thread protection in userspace.
Enable STIBP, either opt-in via prctl or seccomp, or always on depending
on the choice of mitigation selected via spectre_v2_user.
Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@xxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@xxxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 85168740f76a..5be6075d8e36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1124,14 +1124,30 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
- return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+}
+
+static inline bool spectre_v2_user_needs_stibp(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ /*
+ * enhanced IBRS also protects against user-mode attacks as the IBRS bit
+ * remains always set which implicitly enables cross-thread protections.
+ * However, In legacy IBRS mode, the IBRS bit is set only in kernel
+ * and cleared on return to userspace. This disables the implicit
+ * cross-thread protections and STIBP is needed.
+ */
+ return !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode);
+}
+
static void __init
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -1193,13 +1209,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
"always-on" : "conditional");
}
- /*
- * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
- * STIBP is not required.
- */
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
- !smt_possible ||
- spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible ||
+ !spectre_v2_user_needs_stibp(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -2327,7 +2338,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (!spectre_v2_user_needs_stibp(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
--
2.39.2.637.g21b0678d19-goog
