Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS

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Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 19:51:54 +0100
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, pjt@xxxxxxxxxx, evn@xxxxxxxxxx, tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, mingo@xxxxxxxxxx, dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, x86@xxxxxxxxxx, hpa@xxxxxxxxx, peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kim.phillips@xxxxxxx, alexandre.chartre@xxxxxxxxxx, daniel.sneddon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@xxxxxxxxx>, Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>, stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <CACYkzJ4jvOGGhuQ1HDzfpGS5vffg9X6hEcLC93QJBFqX+LxLVw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 10:44:21AM -0800, KP Singh wrote:
> No it cannot with IBRS which is really just KERNEL_IBRS enabled, we

See my other reply. The intent is there to be able to do it. What needs
to be figured out now is *why* we said no STIBP with IBRS? Was it an
omission or was there some intent behind it.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

Follow-Ups:
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: KP Singh

References:
- [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: KP Singh
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: Josh Poimboeuf
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: KP Singh
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: KP Singh
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: Josh Poimboeuf
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: Borislav Petkov
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: Josh Poimboeuf
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: KP Singh
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: Borislav Petkov
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
  - From: KP Singh

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