On Tue, Jan 24, 2023 at 08:41:30AM -0500, Sasha Levin wrote:
> From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> [ Upstream commit 739790605705ddcf18f21782b9c99ad7d53a8c11 ]
>
> do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that
> will subsequently be dereferenced. In order to help prevent this
> codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be
> added after checking the range.
>
> Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Tested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> kernel/sys.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index 5fd54bf0e886..88b31f096fb2 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -1442,6 +1442,8 @@ static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
>
> if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
> return -EINVAL;
> + resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
> +
> if (new_rlim) {
> if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
> return -EINVAL;
> --
> 2.39.0
>
This is already in the 6.1.8 release so no need to add it again :)
thanks,
greg k-h
