On Sat, 24 Dec 2022 at 13:19, Marc Zyngier <maz@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 22 Dec 2022 13:01:55 +0000,
> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 20 Dec 2022 at 21:09, Marc Zyngier <maz@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > A recent development on the EFI front has resulted in guests having
> > > their page tables baked in the firmware binary, and mapped into
> > > the IPA space as part as a read-only memslot.
> > >
> > > Not only this is legitimate, but it also results in added security,
> > > so thumbs up. However, this clashes mildly with our handling of a S1PTW
> > > as a write to correctly handle AF/DB updates to the S1 PTs, and results
> > > in the guest taking an abort it won't recover from (the PTs mapping the
> > > vectors will suffer freom the same problem...).
> > >
> > > So clearly our handling is... wrong.
> > >
> > > Instead, switch to a two-pronged approach:
> > >
> > > - On S1PTW translation fault, handle the fault as a read
> > >
> > > - On S1PTW permission fault, handle the fault as a write
> > >
> > > This is of no consequence to SW that *writes* to its PTs (the write
> > > will trigger a non-S1PTW fault), and SW that uses RO PTs will not
> > > use AF/DB anyway, as that'd be wrong.
> > >
> > > Only in the case described in c4ad98e4b72c ("KVM: arm64: Assume write
> > > fault on S1PTW permission fault on instruction fetch") do we end-up
> > > with two back-to-back faults (page being evicted and faulted back).
> > > I don't think this is a case worth optimising for.
> > >
> > > Fixes: c4ad98e4b72c ("KVM: arm64: Assume write fault on S1PTW permission fault on instruction fetch")
> > > Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > I have tested this patch on my TX2 with one of the EFI builds in
> > question, and everything works as before (I never observed the issue
> > itself)
>
> If you get the chance, could you try with non-4kB page sizes? Here, I
> could only reproduce it with 16kB pages. It was firing like clockwork
> on Cortex-A55 with that.
>
I'll try on 64k but I don't have access to a 16k capable machine that
runs KVM atm (I'm still enjoying working wifi and GPU etc on my M1
Macbook Air)
> >
> > Regression-tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > For the record, the EFI build in question targets QEMU/mach-virt and
> > switches to a set of read-only page tables in emulated NOR flash
> > straight out of reset, so it can create and populate the real page
> > tables with MMU and caches enabled. EFI does not use virtual memory or
> > paging so managing access flags or dirty bits in hardware is unlikely
> > to add any value, and it is not being used at the moment. And given
> > that this is emulated NOR flash, any ordinary write to it tears down
> > the r/o memslot altogether, and kicks the NOR flash emulation in QEMU
> > into programming mode, which is fully based on MMIO emulation and does
> > not use a memslot at all. IOW, even if we could figure out what store
> > the PTW was attempting to do, it is always going to be rejected since
> > the r/o page tables can only be modified by 'programming' the NOR
> > flash sector.
>
> Indeed, and this would be a pretty dodgy setup anyway.
>
> Thanks for having had a look,
>
> M.
>
> --
> Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
