This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
to the 3.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
mnt-change-the-default-remount-atime-from-relatime-to-the-existing-value.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From ffbc6f0ead47fa5a1dc9642b0331cb75c20a640e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 17:36:04 -0700
Subject: mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit ffbc6f0ead47fa5a1dc9642b0331cb75c20a640e upstream.
Since March 2009 the kernel has treated the state that if no
MS_..ATIME flags are passed then the kernel defaults to relatime.
Defaulting to relatime instead of the existing atime state during a
remount is silly, and causes problems in practice for people who don't
specify any MS_...ATIME flags and to get the default filesystem atime
setting. Those users may encounter a permission error because the
default atime setting does not work.
A default that does not work and causes permission problems is
ridiculous, so preserve the existing value to have a default
atime setting that is always guaranteed to work.
Using the default atime setting in this way is particularly
interesting for applications built to run in restricted userspace
environments without /proc mounted, as the existing atime mount
options of a filesystem can not be read from /proc/mounts.
In practice this fixes user space that uses the default atime
setting on remount that are broken by the permission checks
keeping less privileged users from changing more privileged users
atime settings.
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/namespace.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2464,6 +2464,14 @@ long do_mount(const char *dev_name, cons
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
+ /* The default atime for remount is preservation */
+ if ((flags & MS_REMOUNT) &&
+ ((flags & (MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME |
+ MS_STRICTATIME)) == 0)) {
+ mnt_flags &= ~MNT_ATIME_MASK;
+ mnt_flags |= path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK;
+ }
+
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
MS_STRICTATIME);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx are
queue-3.14/mnt-correct-permission-checks-in-do_remount.patch
queue-3.14/mnt-only-change-user-settable-mount-flags-in-remount.patch
queue-3.14/mnt-add-tests-for-unprivileged-remount-cases-that-have-found-to-be-faulty.patch
queue-3.14/mnt-change-the-default-remount-atime-from-relatime-to-the-existing-value.patch
queue-3.14/mnt-move-the-test-for-mnt_lock_readonly-from-change_mount_flags-into-do_remount.patch
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