On Thu, Jul 28, 2022 at 09:26:02AM -0300, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo wrote:
> Some cloud hypervisors do not provide IBPB on very recent CPU processors,
> including AMD processors affected by Retbleed.
That's a bug in the hypervisor.
> Fixes: 28a99e95f55c ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
Fixes^WCreates-a-speculation-hole-in:
> Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 6454bc767f0f..6761668100b9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -1520,6 +1520,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
> */
> if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
> (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
> boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) {
At the very least we need a pr_warn() and something nasty in
retbleed_show_state() to warn the user their firmware calls are
vulnerable.
