diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 97c0ff0787ea..92a9a3282c5b 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3577,6 +3577,18 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
ramdisk_size= [RAM] Sizes of RAM disks in kilobytes
See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt.
+ random.trust_cpu={on,off}
+ [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of the
+ CPU's random number generator (if available) to
+ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+ by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
+
+ random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+ [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+ seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+ by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
rcu_nocbs= [KNL]
The argument is a cpu list, as described above.
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 30ba179392d8..79608693ef0b 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -777,9 +777,40 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
this sysctl interface anymore.
-==============================================================
+pty
+===
+
+See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
+
+
+random
+======
+
+This is a directory, with the following entries:
+
+* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
+ unvarying after that;
+
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+ thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
+* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
+
+* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
+
+* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
+ number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
+ writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
+ on any RNG behavior;
+
+* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
+ (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
+ are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
+ writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
+
-randomize_va_space:
+randomize_va_space
+==================
This option can be used to select the type of process address
space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index fcaab221553e..afafd0fa18a9 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -10068,6 +10068,7 @@ F: drivers/block/brd.c
RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
M: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@xxxxxxx>
+M: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/char/random.c
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index bf4a7b0fe8e7..04cefc7d5b47 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 319
+SUBLEVEL = 320
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Roaring Lionus
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
index afa0c45e3e98..c3ed97c79086 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -27,5 +27,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
return ret;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
index f6fcc67ef06e..c06d38f0df8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
#define get_cycles() ({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
index 86c7db861180..0117fa73ad49 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
return ret;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);
diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
index efc1f4892357..bbaf67f3a952 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
if (mach_random_get_entropy)
return mach_random_get_entropy();
- return 0;
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
index 8026baf46e72..2e107886f97a 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
else
return 0; /* no usable counter */
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
/*
* Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
* use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
- *
- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
*/
static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
- unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
- unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
+ unsigned int c0_random;
- if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
+ if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
return read_c0_count();
- else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
- return read_c0_random();
+
+ if (cpu_has_3kex)
+ c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
else
- return 0; /* no usable register */
+ c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
+ return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
index 2f2abb28ec2f..9c9b50599ea3 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -20,5 +20,8 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
index 2bd51f6d832b..87aeeee5b700 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return mfctl(16);
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 9ff848e3c4a6..d8da8c0fb928 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -5,27 +5,28 @@
#include <asm/machdep.h>
-static inline int arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
-static inline int arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
if (ppc_md.get_random_seed)
return ppc_md.get_random_seed(v);
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+
+static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
unsigned long val;
- int rc;
+ bool rc;
rc = arch_get_random_seed_long(&val);
if (rc)
@@ -33,16 +34,6 @@ static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
return rc;
}
-
-static inline int arch_has_random(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
-{
- return !!ppc_md.get_random_seed;
-}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
index 2cf846edb3fc..28b8a63bc366 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
return ret;
#endif
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
index f1330245b584..f9c222cfc65c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
int get_phys_clock(unsigned long long *clock);
void init_cpu_timer(void);
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
index 7678f7956409..1847bc3ff163 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ void ptep_zap_key(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
PGSTE_GR_BIT | PGSTE_GC_BIT);
ptev = pte_val(*ptep);
if (!(ptev & _PAGE_INVALID) && (ptev & _PAGE_WRITE))
- page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 1);
+ page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 0);
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
preempt_enable();
}
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
index b6ccdb0d6f7d..b805c511755d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE 1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-#define get_cycles() (0)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
#endif
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
index 0f4ada08f748..62a0fbf79420 100644
--- a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@
#ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
#define __UM_TIMEX_H
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 3ac991d81e74..4d3cac3c9b25 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -86,10 +86,6 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
return ok;
}
-/* Conditional execution based on CPU type */
-#define arch_has_random() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)
-#define arch_has_random_seed() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)
-
/*
* These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the
* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked,
@@ -99,22 +95,22 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
}
extern void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
index 1375cfc93960..627802b6204c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tsc.h>
+static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+ return rdtsc();
+}
+#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
/* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE PIT_TICK_RATE
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
index 33b6365c22fe..23235c5ef1a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
@@ -21,13 +21,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
return 0;
-#endif
-
return rdtsc();
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(cycle_t art);
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
index f9b389d4e973..d866bc847d8d 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -30,10 +30,6 @@
extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
-
-#define get_cycles() (0)
-
void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
/*
@@ -69,4 +65,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
WSR_CCOMPARE(LINUX_TIMER, ccompare);
}
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
#endif /* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
index 1cab83146e33..56603afbf6bd 100644
--- a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ static inline u32 le32_to_cpuvp(const void *p)
static void chacha20_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int bytes)
{
- u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ /* aligned to potentially speed up crypto_xor() */
+ u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(sizeof(long));
if (dst != src)
memcpy(dst, src, bytes);
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 4bb5f93c94cd..1b94a4306dfc 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -219,6 +219,57 @@ static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
}
}
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source
+ * The test is performed on the noise source input data. Thus, the function
+ * implicitly knows the size of the buffer to be equal to the security
+ * strength.
+ *
+ * Note, this function disregards the nonce trailing the entropy data during
+ * initial seeding.
+ *
+ * drbg->drbg_mutex must have been taken.
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG handle
+ * @entropy buffer of seed data to be checked
+ *
+ * return:
+ * 0 on success
+ * -EAGAIN on when the CTRNG is not yet primed
+ * < 0 on error
+ */
+static int drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *entropy)
+{
+ unsigned short entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* skip test if we test the overall system */
+ if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
+ return 0;
+ /* only perform test in FIPS mode */
+ if (!fips_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!drbg->fips_primed) {
+ /* Priming of FIPS test */
+ memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+ drbg->fips_primed = true;
+ /* priming: another round is needed */
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (!ret)
+ panic("DRBG continuous self test failed\n");
+ memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+
+ /* the test shall pass when the two values are not equal */
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer.
* The byte representation is big-endian
@@ -986,55 +1037,79 @@ static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = {
******************************************************************/
static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
- int reseed)
+ int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state)
{
int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed);
if (ret)
return ret;
- drbg->seeded = true;
+ drbg->seeded = new_seed_state;
/* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
+ switch (drbg->seeded) {
+ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED:
+ /* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */
+ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL:
+ /*
+ * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is
+ * fully initialized.
+ */
+ drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
+ break;
+
+ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL:
+ /*
+ * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent
+ * reseeds no longer required.
+ */
+ drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+ break;
+ }
+
return ret;
}
-static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work)
+static inline int drbg_get_random_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *entropy,
+ unsigned int entropylen)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ do {
+ get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+ ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy);
+ if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN)
+ return ret;
+ } while (ret);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
struct drbg_string data;
LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
- struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state,
- seed_work);
unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
unsigned char entropy[32];
+ int ret;
BUG_ON(!entropylen);
BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy));
- get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
- mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
-
- /* If nonblocking pool is initialized, deactivate Jitter RNG */
- crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
- drbg->jent = NULL;
-
- /* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the
- * next generate call will trigger a reseed.
- */
- drbg->seeded = false;
-
- __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
-
- if (drbg->seeded)
- drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+ ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
- mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
+out:
memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -1056,6 +1131,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
struct drbg_string data1;
LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+ enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
/* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
@@ -1083,7 +1159,12 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
/* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
- get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+ if (!rng_is_initialized())
+ new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL;
+
+ ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
if (!drbg->jent) {
drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen);
@@ -1096,7 +1177,23 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
entropylen);
if (ret) {
pr_devel("DRBG: jent failed with %d\n", ret);
- return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not treat the transient failure of the
+ * Jitter RNG as an error that needs to be
+ * reported. The combined number of the
+ * maximum reseed threshold times the maximum
+ * number of Jitter RNG transient errors is
+ * less than the reseed threshold required by
+ * SP800-90A allowing us to treat the
+ * transient errors as such.
+ *
+ * However, we mandate that at least the first
+ * seeding operation must succeed with the
+ * Jitter RNG.
+ */
+ if (!reseed || ret != -EAGAIN)
+ goto out;
}
drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2);
@@ -1121,8 +1218,9 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
}
- ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
+ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state);
+out:
memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
return ret;
@@ -1144,6 +1242,11 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
drbg->d_ops = NULL;
drbg->core = NULL;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
+ kzfree(drbg->prev);
+ drbg->prev = NULL;
+ drbg->fips_primed = false;
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1213,6 +1316,14 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
drbg->scratchpad = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->scratchpadbuf, ret + 1);
}
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
+ drbg->prev = kzalloc(drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg->prev)
+ goto fini;
+ drbg->fips_primed = false;
+ }
+
return 0;
fini:
@@ -1285,19 +1396,25 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
* here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler.
*/
if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr)
- drbg->seeded = false;
+ drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
- if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) {
+ if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) {
pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
"resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
- drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
+ (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ?
+ "seeded" : "unseeded"));
/* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true);
if (len)
goto err;
/* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
addtl = NULL;
+ } else if (rng_is_initialized() &&
+ drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL) {
+ len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg);
+ if (len)
+ goto err;
}
if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
@@ -1390,51 +1507,15 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
return 0;
}
-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
- struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
- random_ready);
-
- schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
-}
-
static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
- int err;
-
/* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */
if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
return 0;
- INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
-
- drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
- drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
-
- err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
-
- switch (err) {
- case 0:
- break;
-
- case -EALREADY:
- err = 0;
- /* fall through */
-
- default:
- drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
- return err;
- }
-
drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0);
- /*
- * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully
- * initialized.
- */
- drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
-
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -1477,7 +1558,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
if (!drbg->core) {
drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
drbg->pr = pr;
- drbg->seeded = false;
+ drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
@@ -1528,12 +1609,9 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
*/
static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
- if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
- del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
- cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
- drbg->jent = NULL;
- }
+ drbg->jent = NULL;
if (drbg->d_ops)
drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
diff --git a/crypto/md4.c b/crypto/md4.c
index 3515af425cc9..810fefb0a007 100644
--- a/crypto/md4.c
+++ b/crypto/md4.c
@@ -64,23 +64,6 @@ static inline u32 H(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
#define ROUND2(a,b,c,d,k,s) (a = lshift(a + G(b,c,d) + k + (u32)0x5A827999,s))
#define ROUND3(a,b,c,d,k,s) (a = lshift(a + H(b,c,d) + k + (u32)0x6ED9EBA1,s))
-/* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
-static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
- while (words--) {
- __le32_to_cpus(buf);
- buf++;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void cpu_to_le32_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
- while (words--) {
- __cpu_to_le32s(buf);
- buf++;
- }
-}
-
static void md4_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
{
u32 a, b, c, d;
diff --git a/crypto/md5.c b/crypto/md5.c
index 2355a7c25c45..419f2379b406 100644
--- a/crypto/md5.c
+++ b/crypto/md5.c
@@ -30,23 +30,6 @@ const u8 md5_zero_message_hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(md5_zero_message_hash);
-/* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
-static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
- while (words--) {
- __le32_to_cpus(buf);
- buf++;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void cpu_to_le32_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
-{
- while (words--) {
- __cpu_to_le32s(buf);
- buf++;
- }
-}
-
static inline void md5_transform_helper(struct md5_state *ctx)
{
le32_to_cpu_array(ctx->block, sizeof(ctx->block) / sizeof(u32));
diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
index 35db918a1de5..42f0a592b5ab 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
@@ -6051,7 +6051,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
const struct ata_port_info * const * ppi,
int n_ports)
{
- const struct ata_port_info *pi;
+ const struct ata_port_info *pi = &ata_dummy_port_info;
struct ata_host *host;
int i, j;
@@ -6059,7 +6059,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
if (!host)
return NULL;
- for (i = 0, j = 0, pi = NULL; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
struct ata_port *ap = host->ports[i];
if (ppi[j])
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index f4ae000eb285..1d3813d4f5c8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -593,5 +593,41 @@ config TILE_SROM
source "drivers/char/xillybus/Kconfig"
-endmenu
+config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
+ bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions"
+ default y
+ depends on ARCH_RANDOM
+ help
+ Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's
+ RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
+ random numbers are never used directly, but are rather hashed into
+ the main input pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not
+ this option is enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the
+ they are credited and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally,
+ other sources of randomness are always used, regardless of this
+ setting. Enabling this implies trusting that the CPU can supply high
+ quality and non-backdoored random numbers.
+
+ Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your CPU or believe
+ its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured at
+ boot time with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
+
+config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
+ bool "Initialize RNG using bootloader-supplied seed"
+ default y
+ help
+ Initialize the RNG using a seed supplied by the bootloader or boot
+ environment (e.g. EFI or a bootloader-generated device tree). This
+ seed is not used directly, but is rather hashed into the main input
+ pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not this option is
+ enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the seed is credited
+ and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, other sources of
+ randomness are always used, regardless of this setting. Enabling
+ this implies trusting that the bootloader can supply high quality and
+ non-backdoored seeds.
+
+ Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your bootloader or
+ believe its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured
+ at boot time with "random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
+endmenu
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 5e79b4bfe27a..f1121a162ef0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -1,38 +1,18 @@
/*
- Added support for the AMD Geode LX RNG
- (c) Copyright 2004-2005 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
-
- derived from
-
- Hardware driver for the Intel/AMD/VIA Random Number Generators (RNG)
- (c) Copyright 2003 Red Hat Inc <jgarzik@xxxxxxxxxx>
-
- derived from
-
- Hardware driver for the AMD 768 Random Number Generator (RNG)
- (c) Copyright 2001 Red Hat Inc <alan@xxxxxxxxxx>
-
- derived from
-
- Hardware driver for Intel i810 Random Number Generator (RNG)
- Copyright 2000,2001 Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@xxxxxxxxx>
- Copyright 2000,2001 Philipp Rumpf <prumpf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
-
- Added generic RNG API
- Copyright 2006 Michael Buesch <m@xxxxxxx>
- Copyright 2005 (c) MontaVista Software, Inc.
-
- Please read Documentation/hw_random.txt for details on use.
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------
- This software may be used and distributed according to the terms
- of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference.
-
+ * hw_random/core.c: HWRNG core API
+ *
+ * Copyright 2006 Michael Buesch <m@xxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright 2005 (c) MontaVista Software, Inc.
+ *
+ * Please read Documentation/hw_random.txt for details on use.
+ *
+ * This software may be used and distributed according to the terms
+ * of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference.
*/
-
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -45,14 +25,13 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
-
#define RNG_MODULE_NAME "hw_random"
-#define PFX RNG_MODULE_NAME ": "
-#define RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR 183 /* official */
-
static struct hwrng *current_rng;
+/* the current rng has been explicitly chosen by user via sysfs */
+static int cur_rng_set_by_user;
static struct task_struct *hwrng_fill;
+/* list of registered rngs, sorted decending by quality */
static LIST_HEAD(rng_list);
/* Protects rng_list and current_rng */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rng_mutex);
@@ -296,7 +275,6 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
-
static const struct file_operations rng_chrdev_ops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.open = rng_dev_open,
@@ -307,14 +285,13 @@ static const struct file_operations rng_chrdev_ops = {
static const struct attribute_group *rng_dev_groups[];
static struct miscdevice rng_miscdev = {
- .minor = RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR,
+ .minor = HWRNG_MINOR,
.name = RNG_MODULE_NAME,
.nodename = "hwrng",
.fops = &rng_chrdev_ops,
.groups = rng_dev_groups,
};
-
static ssize_t hwrng_attr_current_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t len)
@@ -329,6 +306,7 @@ static ssize_t hwrng_attr_current_store(struct device *dev,
list_for_each_entry(rng, &rng_list, list) {
if (sysfs_streq(rng->name, buf)) {
err = 0;
+ cur_rng_set_by_user = 1;
if (rng != current_rng)
err = set_current_rng(rng);
break;
@@ -377,16 +355,27 @@ static ssize_t hwrng_attr_available_show(struct device *dev,
return strlen(buf);
}
+static ssize_t hwrng_attr_selected_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cur_rng_set_by_user);
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(rng_current, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
hwrng_attr_current_show,
hwrng_attr_current_store);
static DEVICE_ATTR(rng_available, S_IRUGO,
hwrng_attr_available_show,
NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(rng_selected, S_IRUGO,
+ hwrng_attr_selected_show,
+ NULL);
static struct attribute *rng_dev_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_rng_current.attr,
&dev_attr_rng_available.attr,
+ &dev_attr_rng_selected.attr,
NULL
};
@@ -443,9 +432,9 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
{
int err = -EINVAL;
struct hwrng *old_rng, *tmp;
+ struct list_head *rng_list_ptr;
- if (rng->name == NULL ||
- (rng->data_read == NULL && rng->read == NULL))
+ if (!rng->name || (!rng->data_read && !rng->read))
goto out;
mutex_lock(&rng_mutex);
@@ -459,14 +448,27 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
init_completion(&rng->cleanup_done);
complete(&rng->cleanup_done);
+ /* rng_list is sorted by decreasing quality */
+ list_for_each(rng_list_ptr, &rng_list) {
+ tmp = list_entry(rng_list_ptr, struct hwrng, list);
+ if (tmp->quality < rng->quality)
+ break;
+ }
+ list_add_tail(&rng->list, rng_list_ptr);
+
old_rng = current_rng;
err = 0;
- if (!old_rng) {
+ if (!old_rng ||
+ (!cur_rng_set_by_user && rng->quality > old_rng->quality)) {
+ /*
+ * Set new rng as current as the new rng source
+ * provides better entropy quality and was not
+ * chosen by userspace.
+ */
err = set_current_rng(rng);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
- list_add_tail(&rng->list, &rng_list);
if (old_rng && !rng->init) {
/*
@@ -493,12 +495,13 @@ void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)
list_del(&rng->list);
if (current_rng == rng) {
drop_current_rng();
+ cur_rng_set_by_user = 0;
+ /* rng_list is sorted by quality, use the best (=first) one */
if (!list_empty(&rng_list)) {
- struct hwrng *tail;
-
- tail = list_entry(rng_list.prev, struct hwrng, list);
+ struct hwrng *new_rng;
- set_current_rng(tail);
+ new_rng = list_entry(rng_list.next, struct hwrng, list);
+ set_current_rng(new_rng);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 70ee86e034fc..8e701ea78b0d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1,239 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
/*
- * random.c -- A strong random number generator
- *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@xxxxxxxxxxx>, 2003, 2004, 2005
- *
- * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
- * rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
- * including the disclaimer of warranties.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- * products derived from this software without specific prior
- * written permission.
- *
- * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
- * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
- * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
- * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
- * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
- * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
- * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
- * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
- * DAMAGE.
+ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided
+ * into roughly six sections, each with a section header:
+ *
+ * - Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ * - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
+ * - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
+ * - Entropy collection routines.
+ * - Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ * - Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
+ * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that
+ * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy.
+ * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and
+ * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for
+ * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various
+ * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool.
*/
-/*
- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
- *
- * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
- * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
- * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
- * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
- * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
- * predict by an attacker.
- *
- * Theory of operation
- * ===================
- *
- * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
- * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
- * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
- * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
- * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
- * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to
- * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
- * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
- * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
- * from inside the kernel.
- *
- * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
- * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
- * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
- * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are
- * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
- * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
- * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
- * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
- * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
- * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
- * the random number generator's internal state.
- *
- * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
- * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
- * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
- * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
- * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to
- * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
- * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
- * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this
- * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
- * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
- * outputs random numbers.
- *
- * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
- * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
- * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
- * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
- * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
- * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
- * of purposes.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- output
- * ===============================
- *
- * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
- * be used from within the kernel:
- *
- * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
- *
- * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
- * and place it in the requested buffer.
- *
- * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
- * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
- * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
- * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
- * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
- * contained in the entropy pool.
- *
- * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
- * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
- * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
- * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
- * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- input
- * ==============================
- *
- * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
- * from the devices are:
- *
- * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
- * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- * unsigned int value);
- * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
- * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
- *
- * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
- * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
- * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
- * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
- * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
- * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
- * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
- *
- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
- * the event type information from the hardware.
- *
- * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
- * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
- * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second.
- *
- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
- * times are usually fairly consistent.
- *
- * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
- * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
- * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
- *
- * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
- * ============================================
- *
- * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
- * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
- * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
- * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
- * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to
- * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
- * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
- * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
- * sequence:
- *
- * echo "Initializing random number generator..."
- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
- * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
- * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
- * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
- * else
- * touch $random_seed
- * fi
- * chmod 600 $random_seed
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
- * the system is shutdown:
- *
- * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
- * # Save the whole entropy pool
- * echo "Saving random seed..."
- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- * touch $random_seed
- * chmod 600 $random_seed
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
- * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
- * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
- * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
- *
- * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
- * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
- * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
- * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
- * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with
- * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
- * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
- * the system.
- *
- * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
- * ==============================================
- *
- * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
- * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have
- * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
- * by using the commands:
- *
- * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
- * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
- *
- * Acknowledgements:
- * =================
- *
- * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
- * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
- * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random
- * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
- * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
- * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
- *
- * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
- * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
- *
- * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
- * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
- * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
- */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -253,8 +43,6 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/kmemcheck.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
@@ -263,1480 +51,1067 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <crypto/chacha20.h>
-
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
-#include <trace/events/random.h>
-
-/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ *
+ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
+ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
+ * is ready for safe consumption.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
/*
- * Configuration information
+ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
+ * its value (from empty->early->ready).
*/
-#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12
-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
-#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
-
-#define DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT 0
+static enum {
+ CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */
+ CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
+ CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
+} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
+#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
+/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
+static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);
-#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
+/* Control how we warn userspace. */
+static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
+ RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM);
+module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
/*
- * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
+ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
*
- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in
- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
+ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * false if the input pool has not been seeded.
*/
-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
-#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+{
+ return crng_ready();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
-/*
- * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
- * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
- */
-static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64;
+/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
/*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
+ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
*/
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+ while (!crng_ready()) {
+ int ret;
-/*
- * The minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding. We
- * do this to limit the amount of entropy that can be drained from the
- * input pool even if there are heavy demands on /dev/urandom.
- */
-static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
+ try_to_generate_entropy();
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
/*
- * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
- * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They
- * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
- * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
- *
- * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
- * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift
- * Register. (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR
- * generators. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
- * 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted
- * GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer
- * Simulation 4:254-266)
- *
- * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
- *
- * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash,
- * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that
- * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions
- * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as
- * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
- * input entropy and done a good job. The fact that an intelligent
- * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled
- * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't
- * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness. The only
- * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't
- * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state. Since all
- * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input,
- * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any
- * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that
- * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
- * decrease the uncertainty).
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
+ * pool is initialised.
*
- * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and
- * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator
- * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf). In their
- * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR,
- * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that
- * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using).
- * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor
- * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over
- * GF(2**32). They suggest a slight change to the generator
- * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
- * irreducible, which we have made here.
+ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
*/
-static struct poolinfo {
- int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits;
-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
-} poolinfo_table[] = {
- /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
- /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
- /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
- /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
- { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 },
-#if 0
- /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
- { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
-
- /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
- { S(1024), 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 },
-
- /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
- { S(1024), 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 },
-
- /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
- { S(512), 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 },
-
- /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
- { S(512), 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 },
- /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
- { S(512), 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 },
-
- /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
- { S(256), 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 },
-
- /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
- { S(128), 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 },
-
- /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
- { S(64), 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 },
-#endif
-};
+int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret = -EALREADY;
+
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return ret;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ if (!crng_ready())
+ ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
/*
- * Static global variables
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
*/
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait);
-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
+int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret;
-struct crng_state {
- __u32 state[16];
- unsigned long init_time;
- spinlock_t lock;
-};
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
-struct crng_state primary_crng = {
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
-};
+static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
-/*
- * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized
- * 1 --> Initialized
- * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool
- *
- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
- * its value (from 0->1->2).
- */
-static int crng_init = 0;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
-
-static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
-static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+}
-static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
+ pr_notice("%s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ __func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
-module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
-/**********************************************************************
+/*********************************************************************
*
- * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
+ * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
*
- **********************************************************************/
+ * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
+ * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
+ * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
+ *
+ * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
+ *
+ * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ * u32 get_random_u32()
+ * u64 get_random_u64()
+ * unsigned int get_random_int()
+ * unsigned long get_random_long()
+ *
+ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
+ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
+ * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of
+ * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers,
+ * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding
+ * until the buffer is emptied.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
-struct entropy_store;
-struct entropy_store {
- /* read-only data: */
- const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
- __u32 *pool;
- const char *name;
- struct entropy_store *pull;
- struct work_struct push_work;
-
- /* read-write data: */
- unsigned long last_pulled;
- spinlock_t lock;
- unsigned short add_ptr;
- unsigned short input_rotate;
- int entropy_count;
- int entropy_total;
- unsigned int initialized:1;
- unsigned int limit:1;
- unsigned int last_data_init:1;
- __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+enum {
+ CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ,
+ CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ
};
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int fips);
-
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work);
-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-
-static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
- .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
- .name = "input",
- .limit = 1,
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
- .pool = input_pool_data
+static struct {
+ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
+ unsigned long birth;
+ unsigned long generation;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+} base_crng = {
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
};
-static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
- .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
- .name = "blocking",
- .limit = 1,
- .pull = &input_pool,
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock),
- .pool = blocking_pool_data,
- .push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work,
- push_to_pool),
+struct crng {
+ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
+ unsigned long generation;
};
-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
- 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
- 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
-
-/*
- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
- * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
- *
- * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
- * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
- * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
- * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
- */
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
-{
- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
- int input_rotate;
- int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
- const char *bytes = in;
- __u32 w;
-
- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
-
- input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
- i = r->add_ptr;
-
- /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
- while (nbytes--) {
- w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
- i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
-
- /* XOR in the various taps */
- w ^= r->pool[i];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
-
- /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
- r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
-
- /*
- * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
- * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
- * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
- * input bits across the pool evenly.
- */
- input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
- }
-
- r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
- r->add_ptr = i;
-}
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
+ .generation = ULONG_MAX
+};
-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
-{
- trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
-}
+/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
+/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
+static void crng_reseed(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long next_gen;
+ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
- trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-}
+ extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
-struct fast_pool {
- __u32 pool[4];
- unsigned long last;
- unsigned short reg_idx;
- unsigned char count;
-};
+ /*
+ * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
+ * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
+ * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
+ * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
+ if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
+ ++next_gen;
+ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
+ if (!crng_ready())
+ crng_init = CRNG_READY;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
+}
/*
- * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
- * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
- * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
+ * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
+ * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
+ * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
+ * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
+ * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
+ *
+ * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
+ * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
+ * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
+ * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
+ * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
+ * that this function overwrites it before returning.
*/
-static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
+static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE],
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
+ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
- __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1];
- __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3];
+ u8 first_block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
+ memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+ memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
-
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
-
- f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b;
- f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d;
- f->count++;
+ memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+ memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
+ memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
}
-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+/*
+ * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old
+ * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding
+ * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval
+ * proportional to the uptime.
+ */
+static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
- struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
-
- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
- rdy->func(rdy);
- module_put(owner);
+ static bool early_boot = true;
+ unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) {
+ time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds();
+ if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
+ WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
+ else
+ interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL,
+ (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
}
/*
- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
+ * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
+ * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
+ * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
*/
-static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
+ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
- int entropy_count, orig;
- const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
- int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct crng *crng;
- if (!nbits)
- return;
+ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
-retry:
- entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
- if (nfrac < 0) {
- /* Debit */
- entropy_count += nfrac;
- } else {
- /*
- * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of
- * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the
- * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions
- * approach the full value asymptotically:
- *
- * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
- *
- * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >=
- * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
- * so we can approximate the exponential with
- * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
- * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
- *
- * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to
- * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop
- * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2
- * turns no matter how large nbits is.
- */
- int pnfrac = nfrac;
- const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
- /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
-
- do {
- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
- unsigned int add =
- ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
-
- entropy_count += add;
- pnfrac -= anfrac;
- } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
- }
-
- if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
- pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
- r->name, entropy_count);
- WARN_ON(1);
- entropy_count = 0;
- } else if (entropy_count > pool_size)
- entropy_count = pool_size;
- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
- goto retry;
-
- r->entropy_total += nbits;
- if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) {
- r->initialized = 1;
- r->entropy_total = 0;
+ /*
+ * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
+ * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
+ * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
+ * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY.
+ */
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ bool ready;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ ready = crng_ready();
+ if (!ready) {
+ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+ random_data, random_data_len);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (!ready)
+ return;
}
- trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
- entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
- r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
-
- if (r == &input_pool) {
- int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+ /*
+ * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the
+ * generation counter that we check below.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
+ crng_reseed();
- if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) {
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
- entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
- }
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
- /* should we wake readers? */
- if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits) {
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
- }
- /* If the input pool is getting full, send some
- * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full.
- */
- if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits &&
- r->initialized &&
- r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) {
- struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool;
-
- if (other->entropy_count <=
- 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) {
- schedule_work(&other->push_work);
- r->entropy_total = 0;
- }
- }
+ /*
+ * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
+ * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
+ * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
+ * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
+ spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+ crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
+ crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
+ spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
+ * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
+ * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
+ * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
+ * should wind up here immediately.
+ */
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
}
-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+ u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t first_block_len;
- if (nbits < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
- nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max);
+ if (!len)
+ return;
- credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
- return 0;
-}
+ first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
+ crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
+ len -= first_block_len;
+ buf += first_block_len;
-/*********************************************************************
- *
- * CRNG using CHACHA20
- *
- *********************************************************************/
+ while (len) {
+ if (len < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ break;
+ }
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
+ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+ ++chacha_state[13];
+ len -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+}
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
/*
- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost
- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
- * their brain damage.
+ * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
+ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+ * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
+ * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
*/
-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
-static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- int i;
- unsigned long rv;
-
- memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
- if (crng == &primary_crng)
- _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4],
- sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
- else
- get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
- }
- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
+ warn_unseeded_randomness();
+ _get_random_bytes(buf, len);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
-static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- char *p;
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+ u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t ret = 0, copied;
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
return 0;
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 0;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
- while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
- cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
- }
- if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- crng_init = 1;
- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
- pr_notice("random: fast init done\n");
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 1;
-}
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
- if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
- for_each_node(i)
- kfree(pool[i]);
- kfree(pool);
+ /*
+ * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
+ * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
+ * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
+ */
+ crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
+ * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
+ * the user directly.
+ */
+ if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
+ ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, iter);
+ goto out_zero_chacha;
}
-}
-
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
-
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
- schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- struct crng_state **pool;
- int nid = numa_node_id();
-
- /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
- pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
- if (pool && pool[nid])
- return pool[nid];
+ for (;;) {
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
+ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+ ++chacha_state[13];
- return &primary_crng;
-}
-#else
-static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- return &primary_crng;
-}
-#endif
+ copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+ ret += copied;
+ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+ break;
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- int i, num;
- union {
- __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
- __u32 key[8];
- } buf;
-
- if (r) {
- num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
- if (num == 0)
- return;
- } else {
- _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
- _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
- CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- unsigned long rv;
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
- }
- memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
- WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
- if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
- numa_crng_init();
- crng_init = 2;
- process_random_ready_list();
- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
- pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
- if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed "
- "due to ratelimiting\n",
- unseeded_warning.missed);
- unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
- }
- if (urandom_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("random: %d urandom warning(s) missed "
- "due to ratelimiting\n",
- urandom_warning.missed);
- urandom_warning.missed = 0;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ break;
+ cond_resched();
}
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void)
-{
- if (crng_init > 2 &&
- time_after(jiffies, primary_crng.init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
+ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+out_zero_chacha:
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
}
-static inline void crng_wait_ready(void)
-{
- wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
-}
-
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
-
- if (crng_ready()) {
- init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
- if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
- time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
- crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ?
- &input_pool : NULL);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
- crng->state[14] ^= v;
- chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
- if (crng->state[12] == 0)
- crng->state[13]++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- _extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
-}
+/*
+ * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
+ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
+ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
+ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
+ */
+#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type) \
+struct batch_ ##type { \
+ /* \
+ * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the \
+ * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full \
+ * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase \
+ * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the \
+ * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE. \
+ */ \
+ type entropy[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))]; \
+ unsigned long generation; \
+ unsigned int position; \
+}; \
+ \
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = { \
+ .position = UINT_MAX \
+}; \
+ \
+type get_random_ ##type(void) \
+{ \
+ type ret; \
+ unsigned long flags; \
+ struct batch_ ##type *batch; \
+ unsigned long next_gen; \
+ \
+ warn_unseeded_randomness(); \
+ \
+ if (!crng_ready()) { \
+ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); \
+ return ret; \
+ } \
+ \
+ local_irq_save(flags); \
+ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type); \
+ \
+ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); \
+ if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) || \
+ next_gen != batch->generation) { \
+ _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy)); \
+ batch->position = 0; \
+ batch->generation = next_gen; \
+ } \
+ \
+ ret = batch->entropy[batch->position]; \
+ batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0; \
+ ++batch->position; \
+ local_irq_restore(flags); \
+ return ret; \
+} \
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type);
+
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64)
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
- * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
- * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
+ * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
+ * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
*/
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- __u32 *s, *d;
- int i;
-
- used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
- if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- extract_crng(tmp);
- used = 0;
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
- d = &crng->state[4];
- for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
- *d++ ^= *s++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
+ /*
+ * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
+ * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh
+ * randomness.
+ */
+ per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
+ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+ return 0;
}
+#endif
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+/*
+ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
+ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
+ * bytes filled in.
+ */
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
-}
+ size_t left = len;
+ u8 *p = buf;
-static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
- int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
-
- while (nbytes) {
- if (large_request && need_resched()) {
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
- break;
- }
- schedule();
- }
+ while (left) {
+ unsigned long v;
+ size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
- extract_crng(tmp);
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
break;
- }
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
+ memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
+ p += block_len;
+ left -= block_len;
}
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i);
-
- /* Wipe data just written to memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- return ret;
+ return len - left;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
-/*********************************************************************
+/**********************************************************************
*
- * Entropy input management
+ * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
*
- *********************************************************************/
+ * Callers may add entropy via:
+ *
+ * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
+ *
+ * static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
+ *
+ * Finally, extract entropy via:
+ *
+ * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
-struct timer_rand_state {
- cycles_t last_time;
- long last_delta, last_delta2;
- unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
+enum {
+ POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
+ POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */
+ POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */
+};
+
+static struct {
+ struct blake2s_state hash;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ unsigned int init_bits;
+} input_pool = {
+ .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
+ .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
};
-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
+}
/*
- * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
- * initialize it.
- *
- * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
- * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
- * identical devices.
+ * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not
+ * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
+ * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
*/
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
- trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
-
-static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
/*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- *
- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
- * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
- *
+ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
+ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
*/
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- struct entropy_store *r;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
struct {
- long jiffies;
- unsigned cycles;
- unsigned num;
- } sample;
- long delta, delta2, delta3;
-
- preempt_disable();
-
- sample.jiffies = jiffies;
- sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
- sample.num = num;
- r = &input_pool;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
-
- /*
- * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
- * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
- * in order to make our estimate.
- */
-
- if (!state->dont_count_entropy) {
- delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time;
- state->last_time = sample.jiffies;
-
- delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
- state->last_delta = delta;
-
- delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
- state->last_delta2 = delta2;
-
- if (delta < 0)
- delta = -delta;
- if (delta2 < 0)
- delta2 = -delta2;
- if (delta3 < 0)
- delta3 = -delta3;
- if (delta > delta2)
- delta = delta2;
- if (delta > delta3)
- delta = delta3;
-
- /*
- * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
- * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
- * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
- */
- credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
+ unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
+ size_t counter;
+ } block;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
+ block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
}
- preempt_enable();
-}
-
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- unsigned int value)
-{
- static unsigned char last_value;
- /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
- if (value == last_value)
- return;
-
- last_value = value;
- add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
- (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
- trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
+ /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
+ blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
-static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
+ /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
+ block.counter = 0;
+ blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+ blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
-#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+
+ while (len) {
+ i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
+ ++block.counter;
+ blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+ len -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ }
-static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
-{
- long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
-
- /* Use a weighted moving average */
- delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_cycles += delta;
- /* And average deviation */
- delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_deviation += delta;
+ memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
}
-#else
-#define add_interrupt_bench(x)
-#endif
-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
- unsigned int idx;
-
- if (regs == NULL)
- return 0;
- idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
- if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
- idx = 0;
- ptr += idx++;
- WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
- return *ptr;
-}
+#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
-void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
+static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- struct entropy_store *r;
- struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
- unsigned long now = jiffies;
- cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
- __u32 c_high, j_high;
- __u64 ip;
- unsigned long seed;
- int credit = 0;
-
- if (cycles == 0)
- cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
- c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0;
- j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0;
- fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq;
- fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
- ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
- fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
- fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
- get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
-
- fast_mix(fast_pool);
- add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
-
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
- crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
- sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
- fast_pool->count = 0;
- fast_pool->last = now;
- }
- return;
- }
+ unsigned int new, orig, add;
+ unsigned long flags;
- if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
- !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
+ if (!bits)
return;
- r = &input_pool;
- if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock))
- return;
+ add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
- fast_pool->last = now;
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+ do {
+ orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
+ new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
- /*
- * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
- * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the
- * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the
- * interrupt noise.
- */
- if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed));
- credit = 1;
+ if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
+ crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
+ process_random_ready_list();
+ wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+ if (urandom_warning.missed)
+ pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+ urandom_warning.missed);
+ } else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ /* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
+ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
}
- spin_unlock(&r->lock);
-
- fast_pool->count = 0;
-
- /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */
- credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
- if (!disk || !disk->random)
- return;
- /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
- add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
- trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-#endif
-/*********************************************************************
+/**********************************************************************
*
- * Entropy extraction routines
+ * Entropy collection routines.
*
- *********************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy
- * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
- * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
- */
-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes);
-static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
-{
- if (!r->pull ||
- r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) ||
- r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
- return;
-
- if (r->limit == 0 && random_min_urandom_seed) {
- unsigned long now = jiffies;
-
- if (time_before(now,
- r->last_pulled + random_min_urandom_seed * HZ))
- return;
- r->last_pulled = now;
- }
-
- _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
-}
-
-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
-{
- __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
-
- /* For /dev/random's pool, always leave two wakeups' worth */
- int rsvd_bytes = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_bits / 4;
- int bytes = nbytes;
-
- /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
- bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8);
- /* but never more than the buffer size */
- bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
-
- trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
- ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
- bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
- random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, rsvd_bytes);
- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
- credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
-}
+ * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
+ * the above entropy accumulation routines:
+ *
+ * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
+ * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ *
+ * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
+ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
+ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
+ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to
+ * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
+ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
+ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+ *
+ * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
+ * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
+ * block until more entropy is needed.
+ *
+ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
+ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
+ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ *
+ * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
+ * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
+ * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
+ * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
+ *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
+ * as the event type information from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+ * times are usually fairly consistent.
+ *
+ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
+ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
+ * order deltas of the event timings.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
-/*
- * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting
- * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools. That
- * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead
- * of letting it go to waste.
- */
-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work)
+static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
+static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
{
- struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store,
- push_work);
- BUG_ON(!r);
- _xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8);
- trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
- r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT);
+ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
}
-
-/*
- * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
- * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
- */
-static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
- int reserved)
+static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
{
- int entropy_count, orig;
- size_t ibytes, nfrac;
-
- BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
-
- /* Can we pull enough? */
-retry:
- entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
- ibytes = nbytes;
- /* If limited, never pull more than available */
- if (r->limit) {
- int have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-
- if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
- have_bytes = 0;
- ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
- }
- if (ibytes < min)
- ibytes = 0;
-
- if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
- pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
- r->name, entropy_count);
- WARN_ON(1);
- entropy_count = 0;
- }
- nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
- if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
- entropy_count -= nfrac;
- else
- entropy_count = 0;
-
- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
- goto retry;
-
- trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
- if (ibytes &&
- (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
- }
-
- return ibytes;
+ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
}
+early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
/*
- * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and
- * extract_entropy_user.
- *
- * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
+ * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
+ * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
+ * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
+ * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
+ * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
+ * time we get here.
*/
-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
{
- int i;
- union {
- __u32 w[5];
- unsigned long l[LONGS(20)];
- } hash;
- __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
- unsigned long flags;
-
- /*
- * If we have an architectural hardware random number
- * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector
- */
- sha_init(hash.w);
- for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) {
- unsigned long v;
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
- break;
- hash.l[i] = v;
- }
-
- /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
- sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
-
- /*
- * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
- * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
- * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
- * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
- * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
- * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
- * hash.
- */
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-
- memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
-
- /*
- * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
- * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
- * twice as much data as we output.
- */
- hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3];
- hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
- hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
-
- memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash));
-}
-
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int fips)
-{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i;
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
- unsigned long flags;
+ ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+ unsigned int i, arch_bits;
+ unsigned long entropy;
- while (nbytes) {
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
+#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+ static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
+ _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
+#endif
- if (fips) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
- panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+ for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+ i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+ entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8;
}
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
}
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+ add_latent_entropy();
- /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ if (crng_ready())
+ crng_reseed();
+ else if (trust_cpu)
+ _credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
/*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a buffer.
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+ * initialize it.
*
- * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
- * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
- * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
+ * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
+ * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
+ * identical devices.
*/
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
unsigned long flags;
- /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
- if (fips_enabled) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- if (!r->last_data_init) {
- r->last_data_init = 1;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
- ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- }
-
- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
- nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
-
- return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
/*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a userspace buffer.
+ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
+ * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
+ * when our pool is full.
*/
-static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
- size_t nbytes)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i;
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
- int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
-
- trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
- nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
-
- while (nbytes) {
- if (large_request && need_resched()) {
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
- break;
- }
- schedule();
- }
-
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- break;
- }
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ credit_init_bits(entropy);
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
- }
-
- /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-
- return ret;
+ /*
+ * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless
+ * we're not yet initialized.
+ */
+ if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready())
+ schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
/*
- * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
- * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
- * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
- * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch().
+ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*/
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ if (trust_bootloader)
+ credit_init_bits(len * 8);
+}
-#if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0
- if (!crng_ready())
- printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called "
- "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init);
-#endif
- trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+struct fast_pool {
+ struct work_struct mix;
+ unsigned long pool[4];
+ unsigned long last;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
- while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- extract_crng(buf);
- buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+ .pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+#else
+#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+ .pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+#endif
+};
- if (nbytes > 0) {
- extract_crng(tmp);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
- } else
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+/*
+ * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
+ * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
+ * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
+ * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input.
+ */
+static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2)
+{
+ s[3] ^= v1;
+ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+ s[0] ^= v1;
+ s[3] ^= v2;
+ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+ s[0] ^= v2;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
- * pool is initialised.
- *
- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
- * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
- * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
+ * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
+ * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
*/
-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
- struct module *owner;
- unsigned long flags;
- int err = -EALREADY;
+ /*
+ * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
+ * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and
+ * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can
+ * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that
+ * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out
+ * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined
+ * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the
+ * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs
+ * are fresh.
+ */
+ per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
- if (crng_ready())
- return err;
+static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
+ /*
+ * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we
+ * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining
+ * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is
+ * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average
+ * we don't wind up "losing" some.
+ */
+ unsigned long pool[2];
+ unsigned int count;
- owner = rdy->owner;
- if (!try_module_get(owner))
- return -ENOENT;
+ /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
+ local_irq_disable();
+ if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) {
+ local_irq_enable();
+ return;
+ }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (crng_ready())
- goto out;
+ /*
+ * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a
+ * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
+ */
+ memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
+ count = fast_pool->count;
+ fast_pool->count = 0;
+ fast_pool->last = jiffies;
+ local_irq_enable();
+
+ mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
+ credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64));
- owner = NULL;
+ memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
+}
+
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
+{
+ enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+ unsigned int new_count;
- list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
- err = 0;
+ fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy,
+ (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq));
+ new_count = ++fast_pool->count;
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
+ return;
- module_put(owner);
+ if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
+ return;
- return err;
+ if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
+ INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness);
+ fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT;
+ queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
+
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+struct timer_rand_state {
+ unsigned long last_time;
+ long last_delta, last_delta2;
+};
/*
- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The
+ * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event that just happened.
*/
-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct module *owner = NULL;
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
+ long delta, delta2, delta3;
+ unsigned int bits;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
- owner = rdy->owner;
+ /*
+ * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called
+ * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool.
+ */
+ if (in_irq()) {
+ fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
+ } else {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-
- module_put(owner);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
-/*
- * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
- * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
- * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
- * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
- * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
- * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but
- * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
- * have put in a back door.
- */
-void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
-{
- char *p = buf;
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return;
- trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- while (nbytes) {
- unsigned long v;
- int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
+ /*
+ * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+ * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+ * in order to make our estimate.
+ */
+ delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
+
+ delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+
+ delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+
+ if (delta < 0)
+ delta = -delta;
+ if (delta2 < 0)
+ delta2 = -delta2;
+ if (delta3 < 0)
+ delta3 = -delta3;
+ if (delta > delta2)
+ delta = delta2;
+ if (delta > delta3)
+ delta = delta3;
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
- break;
-
- memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
- p += chunk;
- nbytes -= chunk;
- }
+ /*
+ * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit
+ * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits.
+ */
+ bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11);
- if (nbytes)
- get_random_bytes(p, nbytes);
+ /*
+ * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness()
+ * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit
+ * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting
+ * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit,
+ * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added.
+ */
+ if (in_irq())
+ this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
+ else
+ _credit_init_bits(bits);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
-
-/*
- * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
- *
- * @r: pool to initialize
- *
- * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
- * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
- * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
- */
-static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
{
- int i;
- ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
- unsigned long rv;
-
- r->last_pulled = jiffies;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
- for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
- }
- mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+ static unsigned char last_value;
+ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+ /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
+ if (value == last_value)
+ return;
+
+ last_value = value;
+ add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+ (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
-/*
- * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
- * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
- * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
- * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
- * statically allocated structures that already have all
- * initializations complete at compile time. We should also
- * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
- * we were given.
- */
-static int rand_initialize(void)
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
{
- init_std_data(&input_pool);
- init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
- crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
- crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
- if (ratelimit_disable) {
- urandom_warning.interval = 0;
- unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
- }
- return 0;
+ if (!disk || !disk->random)
+ return;
+ /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
+ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
}
-early_initcall(rand_initialize);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
@@ -1752,134 +1127,189 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
}
#endif
-static ssize_t
-_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+/*
+ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
+ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
+ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
+ * generating entropy..
+ *
+ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
+ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
+ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
+ * entropy loop is running.
+ *
+ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
+ */
+static void __cold entropy_timer(unsigned long data)
+{
+ credit_init_bits(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
+ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
+ */
+static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
{
- ssize_t n;
+ struct {
+ unsigned long entropy;
+ struct timer_list timer;
+ } stack;
- if (nbytes == 0)
- return 0;
+ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE);
- while (1) {
- n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
- if (n < 0)
- return n;
- trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8,
- ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool),
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
- if (n > 0)
- return n;
-
- /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
- if (nonblock)
- return -EAGAIN;
+ /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
+ if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy())
+ return;
- wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
- random_read_wakeup_bits);
- if (signal_pending(current))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ __setup_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0, 0);
+ while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
+ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
+ schedule();
+ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
}
-}
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes);
+ del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
+ destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
}
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ *
+ * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
+ * be used in preference to anything else.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
+ * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
+ * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
+ * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
+ *
+ * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
+ * the input pool but does not credit it.
+ *
+ * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
+ * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
+ *
+ * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
+ * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
+ * reseeding the crng.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- static int maxwarn = 10;
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ struct iovec iov;
int ret;
- if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
- maxwarn--;
- if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
- printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized "
- "urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
- current->comm, nbytes);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- crng_init_cnt = 0;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
+ * no sense.
+ */
+ if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
}
- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
- ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
- trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
- return ret;
+
+ ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
}
-static unsigned int
-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+static unsigned int random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
- unsigned int mask;
-
- poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
- poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
- mask = 0;
- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits)
- mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
- mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
- return mask;
+ poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ return crng_ready() ? POLLIN | POLLRDNORM : POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
}
-static int
-write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- size_t bytes;
- __u32 t, buf[16];
- const char __user *p = buffer;
+ u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ size_t copied;
- while (count > 0) {
- int b, i = 0;
+ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+ return 0;
- bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
- if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
- return -EFAULT;
+ for (;;) {
+ copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+ ret += copied;
+ mix_pool_bytes(block, copied);
+ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+ break;
- for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+ if (signal_pending(current))
break;
- buf[i] ^= t;
+ cond_resched();
}
+ }
- count -= bytes;
- p += bytes;
+ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+ return write_pool_user(iter);
+}
- mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
- cond_resched();
+static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+ static int maxwarn = 10;
+
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ ++urandom_warning.missed;
+ else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+ --maxwarn;
+ pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
+ current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
+ }
}
- return 0;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
}
-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- size_t ret;
+ int ret;
- ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count);
- if (ret)
+ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (ret != 0)
return ret;
-
- return (ssize_t)count;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
}
static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- int size, ent_count;
int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
- int retval;
+ int ent_count;
switch (cmd) {
case RNDGETENTCNT:
- /* inherently racy, no point locking */
- ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
- if (put_user(ent_count, p))
+ /* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
+ if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
@@ -1887,39 +1317,48 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p))
return -EFAULT;
- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
- case RNDADDENTROPY:
+ if (ent_count < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+ return 0;
+ case RNDADDENTROPY: {
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ struct iovec iov;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int len;
+
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
return -EFAULT;
if (ent_count < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (get_user(size, p++))
+ if (get_user(len, p++))
return -EFAULT;
- retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
- size);
- if (retval < 0)
- return retval;
- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+ ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+ ret = write_pool_user(&iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+ return ret;
+ /* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */
+ if (unlikely(ret != len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+ return 0;
+ }
case RNDZAPENTCNT:
case RNDCLEARPOOL:
- /*
- * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
- * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
- */
+ /* No longer has any effect. */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
- blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0;
return 0;
case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (crng_init < 2)
+ if (!crng_ready())
return -ENODATA;
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
- WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
+ crng_reseed();
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1932,47 +1371,54 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
}
const struct file_operations random_fops = {
- .read = random_read,
- .write = random_write,
- .poll = random_poll,
+ .read_iter = random_read_iter,
+ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
+ .poll = random_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
+ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
};
const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
- .read = urandom_read,
- .write = random_write,
+ .read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
+ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
+ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
};
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
- unsigned int, flags)
-{
- if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (count > INT_MAX)
- count = INT_MAX;
-
- if (flags & GRND_RANDOM)
- return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count);
-
- if (!crng_ready()) {
- if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
- return -EAGAIN;
- crng_wait_ready();
- if (signal_pending(current))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
- }
- return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
-}
/********************************************************************
*
- * Sysctl interface
+ * Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break
+ * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible
+ * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows:
+ *
+ * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot.
+ *
+ * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read.
+ *
+ * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can
+ * hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant.
+ *
+ * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the
+ * input pool. Always <= poolsize.
+ *
+ * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
+ * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
+ * more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable
+ * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
+ * change any behavior of the RNG.
+ *
+ * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
+ * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing
+ * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG.
*
********************************************************************/
@@ -1980,25 +1426,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
-static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
-static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
-static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
-static char sysctl_bootid[16];
+static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
+static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
+static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
/*
* This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
- * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
* then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
- *
- * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
- * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
- * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
*/
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct ctl_table fake_table;
- unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+ u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
+ char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
+ struct ctl_table fake_table = {
+ .data = uuid_string,
+ .maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN
+ };
+
+ if (write)
+ return -EPERM;
uuid = table->data;
if (!uuid) {
@@ -2013,32 +1462,17 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
}
- sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
-
- fake_table.data = buf;
- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
-
- return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
+ return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
}
-/*
- * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
- */
-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
+static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct ctl_table fake_table;
- int entropy_count;
-
- entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
- fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
-
- return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
}
-static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
{
@@ -2050,177 +1484,36 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
},
{
.procname = "entropy_avail",
+ .data = &input_pool.init_bits,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy,
- .data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
- },
- {
- .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold",
- .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits,
- .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = &min_read_thresh,
- .extra2 = &max_read_thresh,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
- .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits,
+ .data = &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = &min_write_thresh,
- .extra2 = &max_write_thresh,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
},
{
.procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
- .data = &random_min_urandom_seed,
+ .data = &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
},
{
.procname = "boot_id",
.data = &sysctl_bootid,
- .maxlen = 16,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
},
{
.procname = "uuid",
- .maxlen = 16,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
},
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
- {
- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles",
- .data = &avg_cycles,
- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles),
- .mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
- },
- {
- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation",
- .data = &avg_deviation,
- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation),
- .mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
- },
-#endif
{ }
};
-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-struct batched_entropy {
- union {
- unsigned long entropy_long[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
- unsigned int entropy_int[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned int)];
- };
- unsigned int position;
-};
-
-/*
- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
- * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with
- * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_long);
-unsigned long get_random_long(void)
-{
- unsigned long ret;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
-
- batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_long) == 0) {
- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_long);
- batch->position = 0;
- }
- ret = batch->entropy_long[batch->position++];
- put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long);
-
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
-unsigned int get_random_int(void)
-{
- return get_random_long();
-}
-#else
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_int);
-unsigned int get_random_int(void)
-{
- unsigned int ret;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
-
- batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_int) == 0) {
- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_int);
- batch->position = 0;
- }
- ret = batch->entropy_int[batch->position++];
- put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int);
-
-/**
- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
- * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
- * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
- * random address must fall.
- *
- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
- *
- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
- * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
- *
- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
- * @start is returned.
- */
-unsigned long
-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
-{
- if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
- range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
- }
-
- if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
- range = ULONG_MAX - start;
-
- range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
-
- if (range == 0)
- return start;
-
- return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
-}
-
-/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
- * when our pool is full.
- */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
- size_t entropy)
-{
- struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
-
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
- return;
- }
-
- /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
- * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
- * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
- */
- wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() ||
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
- mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
- credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
index 9a0d0d0ad6d0..3248aa7a35b3 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
tasklet_schedule(hv_context.msg_dpc[cpu]);
}
- add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, 0);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR);
}
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
index 54c296401525..61024882c685 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ realview_gic_of_init(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *parent)
/* The PB11MPCore GIC needs to be configured in the syscon */
map = syscon_node_to_regmap(np);
+ of_node_put(np);
if (!IS_ERR(map)) {
/* new irq mode with no DCC */
regmap_write(map, REALVIEW_SYS_LOCK_OFFSET,
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
index 2ab6060031a4..9ae24ffb9b09 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ static int get_cpu_number(struct device_node *dn)
{
const __be32 *cell;
u64 hwid;
- int i;
+ int cpu;
cell = of_get_property(dn, "reg", NULL);
if (!cell)
@@ -996,9 +996,9 @@ static int get_cpu_number(struct device_node *dn)
if (hwid & ~MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK)
return -1;
- for (i = 0; i < num_possible_cpus(); i++)
- if (cpu_logical_map(i) == hwid)
- return i;
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+ if (cpu_logical_map(cpu) == hwid)
+ return cpu;
return -1;
}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
index 8c9a444d61d3..65bc573d6ab4 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ static int ssc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
clk_disable_unprepare(ssc->clk);
ssc->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
- if (!ssc->irq) {
+ if (ssc->irq < 0) {
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "could not get irq\n");
- return -ENXIO;
+ return ssc->irq;
}
mutex_lock(&user_lock);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
index 84d667957221..61a9b60ab022 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
@@ -527,6 +527,17 @@ static inline void mtk_rx_get_desc(struct mtk_rx_dma *rxd,
rxd->rxd4 = READ_ONCE(dma_rxd->rxd4);
}
+static void *mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ unsigned int size = mtk_max_frag_size(MTK_MAX_LRO_RX_LENGTH);
+ unsigned long data;
+
+ data = __get_free_pages(gfp_mask | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN,
+ get_order(size));
+
+ return (void *)data;
+}
+
/* the qdma core needs scratch memory to be setup */
static int mtk_init_fq_dma(struct mtk_eth *eth)
{
@@ -928,7 +939,10 @@ static int mtk_poll_rx(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget,
goto release_desc;
/* alloc new buffer */
- new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
+ new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ else
+ new_data = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!new_data)) {
netdev->stats.rx_dropped++;
goto release_desc;
@@ -1231,7 +1245,10 @@ static int mtk_rx_alloc(struct mtk_eth *eth, int ring_no, int rx_flag)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < rx_dma_size; i++) {
- ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
+ ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ else
+ ring->data[i] = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ring->data[i])
return -ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
index 585a0f20835b..3263e2a2bdfd 100644
--- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
@@ -401,13 +401,25 @@ static void nfcmrvl_play_deferred(struct nfcmrvl_usb_drv_data *drv_data)
int err;
while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
+ usb_anchor_urb(urb, &drv_data->tx_anchor);
+
err = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(urb->setup_packet);
+ usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
+ usb_free_urb(urb);
break;
+ }
drv_data->tx_in_flight++;
+ usb_free_urb(urb);
+ }
+
+ /* Cleanup the rest deferred urbs. */
+ while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
+ kfree(urb->setup_packet);
+ usb_free_urb(urb);
}
- usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs(&drv_data->deferred);
}
static int nfcmrvl_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
diff --git a/drivers/of/fdt.c b/drivers/of/fdt.c
index 6a239c9bbf59..e797fa92c90d 100644
--- a/drivers/of/fdt.c
+++ b/drivers/of/fdt.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/serial_core.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/setup.h> /* for COMMAND_LINE_SIZE */
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -1068,6 +1069,7 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
{
int l;
const char *p;
+ const void *rng_seed;
pr_debug("search \"chosen\", depth: %d, uname: %s\n", depth, uname);
@@ -1102,6 +1104,14 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
pr_debug("Command line is: %s\n", (char*)data);
+ rng_seed = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "rng-seed", &l);
+ if (rng_seed && l > 0) {
+ add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, l);
+
+ /* try to clear seed so it won't be found. */
+ fdt_nop_property(initial_boot_params, node, "rng-seed");
+ }
+
/* break now */
return 1;
}
@@ -1203,8 +1213,6 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_verify(void *params)
/* Setup flat device-tree pointer */
initial_boot_params = params;
- of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
- fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
return true;
}
@@ -1230,6 +1238,8 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_scan(void *params)
return false;
early_init_dt_scan_nodes();
+ of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
+ fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
return true;
}
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
index 30b5f65b29d1..7f230d0b2fd6 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
@@ -633,7 +633,8 @@ lpfc_rcv_logo(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp,
else
lpfc_els_rsp_acc(vport, ELS_CMD_ACC, cmdiocb, ndlp, NULL);
if (ndlp->nlp_DID == Fabric_DID) {
- if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC)
+ if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC ||
+ vport->fc_flag & FC_PT2PT)
goto out;
lpfc_linkdown_port(vport);
spin_lock_irq(shost->host_lock);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
index d41292ef85f2..98ad17cb6643 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ struct PVSCSIRingReqDesc {
u8 tag;
u8 bus;
u8 target;
- u8 vcpuHint;
- u8 unused[59];
+ u16 vcpuHint;
+ u8 unused[58];
} __packed;
/*
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
index 36470ee06596..6010c047f4f8 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static int vmk80xx_alloc_usb_buffers(struct comedi_device *dev)
if (!devpriv->usb_rx_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
+ size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
devpriv->usb_tx_buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!devpriv->usb_tx_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
index 2d83f1dfb4d6..d3f17b23ac61 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
@@ -1473,6 +1473,8 @@ static inline void __stop_tx(struct uart_8250_port *p)
if (em485) {
unsigned char lsr = serial_in(p, UART_LSR);
+ p->lsr_saved_flags |= lsr & LSR_SAVE_FLAGS;
+
/*
* To provide required timeing and allow FIFO transfer,
* __stop_tx_rs485() must be called only when both FIFO and
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
index 710793161795..498a44ae2b92 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
@@ -3034,6 +3034,7 @@ static int lpc32xx_udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
}
udc->isp1301_i2c_client = isp1301_get_client(isp1301_node);
+ of_node_put(isp1301_node);
if (!udc->isp1301_i2c_client) {
retval = -EPROBE_DEFER;
goto phy_fail;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
index e98532feb0cc..8e49eb68896a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id edgeport_2port_id_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
{ }
};
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
{ }
};
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
index 6f6a856bc37c..a470262dcf48 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@
//
// Definitions for other product IDs
#define ION_DEVICE_ID_MT4X56USB 0x1403 // OEM device
+#define ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A 0x1A01 // OEM device (rebranded Edgeport/4)
#define GENERATION_ID_FROM_USB_PRODUCT_ID(ProductId) \
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 5b198d881a40..8add5a762f21 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb);
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_CLS8 0x00b0
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_MBIM 0x00b3
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET 0x00b7
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM 0x00b8
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET 0x00b9
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA 0x00f1
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB 0x00f2
@@ -1953,6 +1955,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
.driver_info = RSVD(3)},
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET, 0xff),
.driver_info = RSVD(0)},
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM, 0xff),
+ .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET, 0xff),
+ .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA, 0xff),
.driver_info = RSVD(3)},
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB, 0xff),
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
index 50840984fbfa..f62da3b7c27b 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
@@ -630,6 +630,7 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device,
if (!vm_cmdline_parent_registered) {
err = device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent);
if (err) {
+ put_device(&vm_cmdline_parent);
pr_err("Failed to register parent device!\n");
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
index 425bc1a2b8c1..77a97195ef35 100644
--- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
+++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
@@ -656,14 +656,10 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotl *stat, struct inode *inode,
if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_NLINK)
set_nlink(inode, stat->st_nlink);
if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_MODE) {
- inode->i_mode = stat->st_mode;
- if ((S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) ||
- (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)))
- init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
- inode->i_rdev);
+ mode = stat->st_mode & S_IALLUGO;
+ mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO;
+ inode->i_mode = mode;
}
- if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_RDEV)
- inode->i_rdev = new_decode_dev(stat->st_rdev);
if (!(flags & V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE) &&
stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_SIZE)
v9fs_i_size_write(inode, stat->st_size);
diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
index 2a7fb2cf19b8..f39b65601233 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -3142,6 +3142,15 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac,
size = size >> bsbits;
start = start_off >> bsbits;
+ /*
+ * For tiny groups (smaller than 8MB) the chosen allocation
+ * alignment may be larger than group size. Make sure the
+ * alignment does not move allocation to a different group which
+ * makes mballoc fail assertions later.
+ */
+ start = max(start, rounddown(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical,
+ (ext4_lblk_t)EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(ac->ac_sb)));
+
/* don't cover already allocated blocks in selected range */
if (ar->pleft && start <= ar->lleft) {
size -= ar->lleft + 1 - start;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index 159d259e5e5e..edf78728ed32 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -1726,7 +1726,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir,
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
{
unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
- unsigned count, continued;
+ unsigned continued;
+ int count;
struct buffer_head *bh2;
ext4_lblk_t newblock;
u32 hash2;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c
index 51fa706707a3..c367129dcdc1 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block *sb)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * If the reserved GDT blocks is non-zero, the resize_inode feature
+ * should always be set.
+ */
+ if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks &&
+ !ext4_has_feature_resize_inode(sb)) {
+ ext4_error(sb, "resize_inode disabled but reserved GDT blocks non-zero");
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
/*
* If we are not using the primary superblock/GDT copy don't resize,
* because the user tools have no way of handling this. Probably a
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
index 585c52dbb2e3..13cf7c260a83 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -992,7 +992,17 @@ static int fuse_copy_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page **pagep,
while (count) {
if (cs->write && cs->pipebufs && page) {
- return fuse_ref_page(cs, page, offset, count);
+ /*
+ * Can't control lifetime of pipe buffers, so always
+ * copy user pages.
+ */
+ if (cs->req->user_pages) {
+ err = fuse_copy_fill(cs);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ } else {
+ return fuse_ref_page(cs, page, offset, count);
+ }
} else if (!cs->len) {
if (cs->move_pages && page &&
offset == 0 && count == PAGE_SIZE) {
diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c
index 8aef8e56eb1b..aa4f0d632bed 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -1319,6 +1319,7 @@ static int fuse_get_user_pages(struct fuse_req *req, struct iov_iter *ii,
(PAGE_SIZE - ret) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
}
+ req->user_pages = true;
if (write)
req->in.argpages = 1;
else
diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
index 7e4b0e298bc7..6104534ddb7e 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
+++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
@@ -310,6 +310,8 @@ struct fuse_req {
/** refcount */
atomic_t count;
+ bool user_pages;
+
/** Unique ID for the interrupt request */
u64 intr_unique;
diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
index f19cded49b29..317d22f84492 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
@@ -1753,6 +1753,12 @@ pnfs_update_layout(struct inode *ino,
/* Fallthrough */
case -EAGAIN:
break;
+ case -ENODATA:
+ /* The server returned NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE */
+ pnfs_layout_set_fail_bit(
+ lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
+ lseg = NULL;
+ goto out_put_layout_hdr;
default:
if (!nfs_error_is_fatal(PTR_ERR(lseg))) {
pnfs_layout_clear_fail_bit(lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d439496fa6ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+enum blake2s_lengths {
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64,
+ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32,
+ BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE = 32,
+
+ BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE = 16,
+ BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE = 20,
+ BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE = 28,
+ BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE = 32,
+};
+
+struct blake2s_state {
+ u32 h[8];
+ u32 t[2];
+ u32 f[2];
+ u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned int buflen;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+};
+
+enum blake2s_iv {
+ BLAKE2S_IV0 = 0x6A09E667UL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV1 = 0xBB67AE85UL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV2 = 0x3C6EF372UL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV3 = 0xA54FF53AUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV4 = 0x510E527FUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5 = 0x9B05688CUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV6 = 0x1F83D9ABUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL,
+};
+
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
+
+static inline void blake2s_init_param(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const u32 param)
+{
+ *state = (struct blake2s_state){{
+ BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ param,
+ BLAKE2S_IV1,
+ BLAKE2S_IV2,
+ BLAKE2S_IV3,
+ BLAKE2S_IV4,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5,
+ BLAKE2S_IV6,
+ BLAKE2S_IV7,
+ }};
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const size_t outlen)
+{
+ blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | outlen);
+ state->outlen = outlen;
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const size_t outlen, const void *key,
+ const size_t keylen)
+{
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && (!outlen || outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
+ !key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE));
+
+ blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
+ memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
+ state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ state->outlen = outlen;
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
+ const size_t outlen, const size_t inlen,
+ const size_t keylen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state state;
+
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && ((!in && inlen > 0) || !out || !outlen ||
+ outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE ||
+ (!key && keylen)));
+
+ if (keylen)
+ blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
+ else
+ blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
+
+ blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+ blake2s_final(&state, out);
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h
index 20d20f681a72..0b8deb5e8291 100644
--- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h
@@ -16,11 +16,26 @@ struct chacha20_ctx {
u32 key[8];
};
-void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream);
+void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream);
void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv);
int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize);
int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes);
+enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
+};
+
+static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
+{
+ state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
+ state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
+ state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
+ state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 22f884c97387..19b44179bb7c 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@ struct drbg_test_data {
struct drbg_string *testentropy; /* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */
};
+enum drbg_seed_state {
+ DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED,
+ DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL, /* Seeded with !rng_is_initialized() */
+ DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL,
+};
+
struct drbg_state {
struct mutex drbg_mutex; /* lock around DRBG */
unsigned char *V; /* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */
@@ -129,14 +135,14 @@ struct drbg_state {
struct completion ctr_completion; /* CTR mode async handler */
int ctr_async_err; /* CTR mode async error */
- bool seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */
+ enum drbg_seed_state seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */
bool pr; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */
- struct work_struct seed_work; /* asynchronous seeding support */
+ bool fips_primed; /* Continuous test primed? */
+ unsigned char *prev; /* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */
struct crypto_rng *jent;
const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
const struct drbg_core *core;
struct drbg_string test_data;
- struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
};
static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
@@ -184,11 +190,7 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
/* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
-#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
- return SIZE_MAX;
-#else
- return (1UL<<48);
-#endif
+ return (1<<20);
}
/*
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3ba066845b69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
+{
+ state->f[0] = -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h b/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h
index 89f67c1c3160..9cf01d7bb7c0 100644
--- a/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h
+++ b/include/linux/byteorder/generic.h
@@ -155,6 +155,23 @@ static inline void le64_add_cpu(__le64 *var, u64 val)
*var = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(*var) + val);
}
+/* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
+static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
+{
+ while (words--) {
+ __le32_to_cpus(buf);
+ buf++;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void cpu_to_le32_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
+{
+ while (words--) {
+ __cpu_to_le32s(buf);
+ buf++;
+ }
+}
+
static inline void be16_add_cpu(__be16 *var, u16 val)
{
*var = cpu_to_be16(be16_to_cpu(*var) + val);
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
index 1ab0273560ae..8160ad1885dc 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_ACPI_CPUDRV_DEAD,
CPUHP_S390_PFAULT_DEAD,
CPUHP_BLK_MQ_DEAD,
+ CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_CCN_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_L2X0_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_NOTIFY_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h
index 34a0dc18f327..48e28f7844fe 100644
--- a/include/linux/hw_random.h
+++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h
@@ -60,7 +60,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
/** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
-/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
#endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/miscdevice.h b/include/linux/miscdevice.h
index 722698a43d79..659f58617b9e 100644
--- a/include/linux/miscdevice.h
+++ b/include/linux/miscdevice.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#define SGI_MMTIMER 153
#define STORE_QUEUE_MINOR 155 /* unused */
#define I2O_MINOR 166
+#define HWRNG_MINOR 183
#define MICROCODE_MINOR 184
#define VFIO_MINOR 196
#define TUN_MINOR 200
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 81ee5d0b2642..ebfe5b771153 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2059,6 +2059,8 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+
extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
diff --git a/include/linux/net.h b/include/linux/net.h
index 54270c4707cf..455aa9c1247c 100644
--- a/include/linux/net.h
+++ b/include/linux/net.h
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ do { \
#define net_get_random_once(buf, nbytes) \
get_random_once((buf), (nbytes))
+#define net_get_random_once_wait(buf, nbytes) \
+ get_random_once_wait((buf), (nbytes))
int kernel_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct kvec *vec,
size_t num, size_t len);
diff --git a/include/linux/once.h b/include/linux/once.h
index 285f12cb40e6..9c98aaa87cbc 100644
--- a/include/linux/once.h
+++ b/include/linux/once.h
@@ -53,5 +53,7 @@ void __do_once_done(bool *done, struct static_key *once_key,
#define get_random_once(buf, nbytes) \
DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes, (buf), (nbytes))
+#define get_random_once_wait(buf, nbytes) \
+ DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes_wait, (buf), (nbytes)) \
#endif /* _LINUX_ONCE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index e20339c78a84..709e8e69fb39 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
u32 prandom_u32(void);
void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
@@ -21,15 +22,10 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
* The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
* parallel given enough CPU resources.
*/
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
- v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
- v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
-)
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
/*
@@ -37,14 +33,9 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
* This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
* applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
*/
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
- v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
- v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
-)
-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
#else
#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 15cd75454468..291b493fd2e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -1,50 +1,78 @@
-/*
- * include/linux/random.h
- *
- * Include file for the random number generator.
- */
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/once.h>
#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
-struct random_ready_callback {
- struct list_head list;
- void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
- struct module *owner;
-};
+struct notifier_block;
-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
+#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
{
- add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
- sizeof(latent_entropy));
+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
}
#else
-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
#endif
-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
+u32 get_random_u32(void);
+u64 get_random_u64(void);
+static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+{
+ return get_random_u32();
+}
+static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
+{
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+ return get_random_u64();
+#else
+ return get_random_u32();
+#endif
+}
-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
+bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
-#ifndef MODULE
-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
-#endif
+/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
+ * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+ return ret;
+}
-unsigned int get_random_int(void);
-unsigned long get_random_long(void);
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
+ static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
+ int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
+ if (unlikely(ret)) \
+ return ret; \
+ *out = get_random_ ## name(); \
+ return 0; \
+ }
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
+#undef declare_get_random_var
/*
* This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
@@ -56,30 +84,39 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
#else
-static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
+ * secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible.
+ */
+#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_long_early
+static inline bool __init arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
{
- return 0;
+ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+ return arch_get_random_seed_long(v);
}
-static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef arch_get_random_long_early
+static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
{
- return 0;
+ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+ return arch_get_random_long(v);
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+#endif
+
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h
index 0cda61855d90..0bb5ecd507be 100644
--- a/include/linux/siphash.h
+++ b/include/linux/siphash.h
@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
}
+/*
+ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
+ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
+ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
+ */
+
+#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+ (a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
+ (c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
+ (a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
+ (c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
+
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
+
+#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+ (a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
+ (c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
+ (a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
+ (c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
+
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
+
#endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/swab.h b/include/linux/swab.h
index 9ad3c60f6cae..f66e6f8bf049 100644
--- a/include/linux/swab.h
+++ b/include/linux/swab.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
# define swab16 __swab16
# define swab32 __swab32
# define swab64 __swab64
+# define swab __swab
# define swahw32 __swahw32
# define swahb32 __swahb32
# define swab16p __swab16p
diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h
index 39c25dbebfe8..c7616cfb48d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/timex.h
+++ b/include/linux/timex.h
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/param.h>
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
+
#include <asm/timex.h>
#ifndef random_get_entropy
@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
*
* By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
* architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
+ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
+ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
*/
-#define random_get_entropy() get_cycles()
+#ifdef get_cycles
+#define random_get_entropy() ((unsigned long)get_cycles())
+#else
+#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy_fallback()
+#endif
#endif
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/uuid.h b/include/linux/uuid.h
index 2d095fc60204..c77fb14868b7 100644
--- a/include/linux/uuid.h
+++ b/include/linux/uuid.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
* not including trailing NUL.
*/
#define UUID_STRING_LEN 36
+#define UUID_SIZE 16
static inline int uuid_le_cmp(const uuid_le u1, const uuid_le u2)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/workqueue.h b/include/linux/workqueue.h
index 8e880f7f67b2..b95c511139b9 100644
--- a/include/linux/workqueue.h
+++ b/include/linux/workqueue.h
@@ -359,6 +359,8 @@ extern struct workqueue_struct *system_freezable_wq;
extern struct workqueue_struct *system_power_efficient_wq;
extern struct workqueue_struct *system_freezable_power_efficient_wq;
+extern bool wq_online;
+
extern struct workqueue_struct *
__alloc_workqueue_key(const char *fmt, unsigned int flags, int max_active,
struct lock_class_key *key, const char *lock_name, ...) __printf(1, 6);
@@ -598,7 +600,7 @@ static inline bool schedule_delayed_work(struct delayed_work *dwork,
*/
static inline bool keventd_up(void)
{
- return system_wq != NULL;
+ return wq_online;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
@@ -635,4 +637,7 @@ int workqueue_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
int workqueue_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
#endif
+int __init workqueue_init_early(void);
+int __init workqueue_init(void);
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
index fc445e7ccadf..c3cf2021bb3b 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static inline void sk_rcv_saddr_set(struct sock *sk, __be32 addr)
}
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
- struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
+ struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16,
struct inet_timewait_sock **));
diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h
index 3f36d45b714a..542a80c05107 100644
--- a/include/net/secure_seq.h
+++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
__be16 dport);
__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 4684de344c5d..000000000000
--- a/include/trace/events/random.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
-#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
-#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
-
-#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
-#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
-
-#include <linux/writeback.h>
-#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, bytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->bytes = bytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
- __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, bytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->bytes = bytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
- int entropy_total, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, entropy_total, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, bits )
- __field( int, entropy_count )
- __field( int, entropy_total )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->bits = bits;
- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
- __entry->entropy_total = entropy_total;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d entropy_total %d "
- "caller %pS", __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
- __entry->entropy_count, __entry->entropy_total,
- (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, pool_bits )
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->pool_bits = pool_bits;
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
- __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, debit_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->debit_bits = debit_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
- __entry->debit_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( dev_t, dev )
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->dev = dev;
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
- MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
- int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
- input_entropy),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, xfer_bits )
- __field( int, request_bits )
- __field( int, pool_entropy )
- __field( int, input_entropy )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->xfer_bits = xfer_bits;
- __entry->request_bits = request_bits;
- __entry->pool_entropy = pool_entropy;
- __entry->input_entropy = input_entropy;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
- "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
- __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
- __entry->input_entropy)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, nbytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, nbytes )
- __field( int, entropy_count )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
- (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
- TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, got_bits )
- __field( int, need_bits )
- __field( int, pool_left )
- __field( int, input_left )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
- __entry->need_bits = need_bits;
- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
- __entry->input_left = input_left;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
- "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
- __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
- __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
- TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, got_bits )
- __field( int, pool_left )
- __field( int, input_left )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
- __entry->input_left = input_left;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
- "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
- __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
-
-/* This part must be outside protection */
-#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
index b455b0d86f26..b01d118750ab 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
@@ -47,9 +47,11 @@ struct rand_pool_info {
* Flags for getrandom(2)
*
* GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead
- * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom
+ * GRND_RANDOM No effect
+ * GRND_INSECURE Return non-cryptographic random bytes
*/
#define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001
#define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002
+#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/swab.h b/include/uapi/linux/swab.h
index 8f3a8f606fd9..1f42d110987a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/swab.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/swab.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
#include <asm/swab.h>
/*
@@ -131,6 +132,15 @@ static inline __attribute_const__ __u32 __fswahb32(__u32 val)
__fswab64(x))
#endif
+static __always_inline unsigned long __swab(const unsigned long y)
+{
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+ return __swab64(y);
+#else /* BITS_PER_LONG == 32 */
+ return __swab32(y);
+#endif
+}
+
/**
* __swahw32 - return a word-swapped 32-bit value
* @x: value to wordswap
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 0c01d4e10d2f..30226a836c8b 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
/*
* Set up the the initial canary ASAP:
*/
+ add_latent_entropy();
boot_init_stack_canary();
cgroup_init_early();
@@ -553,6 +554,14 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
"Interrupts were enabled *very* early, fixing it\n"))
local_irq_disable();
idr_init_cache();
+
+ /*
+ * Allow workqueue creation and work item queueing/cancelling
+ * early. Work item execution depends on kthreads and starts after
+ * workqueue_init().
+ */
+ workqueue_init_early();
+
rcu_init();
/* trace_printk() and trace points may be used after this */
@@ -570,6 +579,17 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
softirq_init();
timekeeping_init();
time_init();
+
+ /*
+ * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
+ * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
+ * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
+ * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
+ * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
+ */
+ random_init(command_line);
+ boot_init_stack_canary();
+
sched_clock_postinit();
printk_nmi_init();
perf_event_init();
@@ -1011,6 +1031,8 @@ static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void)
smp_prepare_cpus(setup_max_cpus);
+ workqueue_init();
+
do_pre_smp_initcalls();
lockup_detector_init();
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index e005209f279e..5ddac8914515 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/smpboot.h>
#include <linux/relay.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <trace/events/power.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -1404,6 +1405,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_bp_states[] = {
.startup.single = perf_event_init_cpu,
.teardown.single = perf_event_exit_cpu,
},
+ [CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
+ .name = "random:prepare",
+ .startup.single = random_prepare_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = NULL,
+ },
[CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
.name = "workqueue:prepare",
.startup.single = workqueue_prepare_cpu,
@@ -1529,6 +1535,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_ap_states[] = {
.startup.single = workqueue_online_cpu,
.teardown.single = workqueue_offline_cpu,
},
+ [CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
+ .name = "random:online",
+ .startup.single = random_online_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = NULL,
+ },
[CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
.name = "RCU/tree:online",
.startup.single = rcutree_online_cpu,
diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
index d3f24905852c..374c45fbe3db 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
- add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
if (!noirqdebug)
note_interrupt(desc, retval);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
index bcba817f7af2..828728639e0d 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/clocksource.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
#include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
@@ -2269,6 +2270,21 @@ ktime_t ktime_get_update_offsets_now(unsigned int *cwsseq, ktime_t *offs_real,
return base;
}
+/**
+ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
+ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
+ */
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
+{
+ struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
+ struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
+
+ if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
+ return 0;
+ return clock->read(clock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
+
/**
* do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function
*/
diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c
index b3476a21a7b3..df96f797939e 100644
--- a/kernel/workqueue.c
+++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ module_param_named(disable_numa, wq_disable_numa, bool, 0444);
static bool wq_power_efficient = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WQ_POWER_EFFICIENT_DEFAULT);
module_param_named(power_efficient, wq_power_efficient, bool, 0444);
+bool wq_online; /* can kworkers be created yet? */
+
static bool wq_numa_enabled; /* unbound NUMA affinity enabled */
/* buf for wq_update_unbound_numa_attrs(), protected by CPU hotplug exclusion */
@@ -2588,6 +2590,9 @@ void flush_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq)
};
int next_color;
+ if (WARN_ON(!wq_online))
+ return;
+
lock_map_acquire(&wq->lockdep_map);
lock_map_release(&wq->lockdep_map);
@@ -2848,6 +2853,9 @@ bool flush_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct wq_barrier barr;
+ if (WARN_ON(!wq_online))
+ return false;
+
lock_map_acquire(&work->lockdep_map);
lock_map_release(&work->lockdep_map);
@@ -2918,7 +2926,13 @@ static bool __cancel_work_timer(struct work_struct *work, bool is_dwork)
mark_work_canceling(work);
local_irq_restore(flags);
- flush_work(work);
+ /*
+ * This allows canceling during early boot. We know that @work
+ * isn't executing.
+ */
+ if (wq_online)
+ flush_work(work);
+
clear_work_data(work);
/*
@@ -3368,7 +3382,7 @@ static struct worker_pool *get_unbound_pool(const struct workqueue_attrs *attrs)
goto fail;
/* create and start the initial worker */
- if (!create_worker(pool))
+ if (wq_online && !create_worker(pool))
goto fail;
/* install */
@@ -3439,6 +3453,7 @@ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq)
{
struct workqueue_struct *wq = pwq->wq;
bool freezable = wq->flags & WQ_FREEZABLE;
+ unsigned long flags;
/* for @wq->saved_max_active */
lockdep_assert_held(&wq->mutex);
@@ -3447,7 +3462,8 @@ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq)
if (!freezable && pwq->max_active == wq->saved_max_active)
return;
- spin_lock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock);
+ /* this function can be called during early boot w/ irq disabled */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&pwq->pool->lock, flags);
/*
* During [un]freezing, the caller is responsible for ensuring that
@@ -3477,7 +3493,7 @@ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq)
pwq->max_active = 0;
}
- spin_unlock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pwq->pool->lock, flags);
}
/* initialize newly alloced @pwq which is associated with @wq and @pool */
@@ -5550,7 +5566,17 @@ static void __init wq_numa_init(void)
wq_numa_enabled = true;
}
-static int __init init_workqueues(void)
+/**
+ * workqueue_init_early - early init for workqueue subsystem
+ *
+ * This is the first half of two-staged workqueue subsystem initialization
+ * and invoked as soon as the bare basics - memory allocation, cpumasks and
+ * idr are up. It sets up all the data structures and system workqueues
+ * and allows early boot code to create workqueues and queue/cancel work
+ * items. Actual work item execution starts only after kthreads can be
+ * created and scheduled right before early initcalls.
+ */
+int __init workqueue_init_early(void)
{
int std_nice[NR_STD_WORKER_POOLS] = { 0, HIGHPRI_NICE_LEVEL };
int i, cpu;
@@ -5583,16 +5609,6 @@ static int __init init_workqueues(void)
}
}
- /* create the initial worker */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- struct worker_pool *pool;
-
- for_each_cpu_worker_pool(pool, cpu) {
- pool->flags &= ~POOL_DISASSOCIATED;
- BUG_ON(!create_worker(pool));
- }
- }
-
/* create default unbound and ordered wq attrs */
for (i = 0; i < NR_STD_WORKER_POOLS; i++) {
struct workqueue_attrs *attrs;
@@ -5629,8 +5645,36 @@ static int __init init_workqueues(void)
!system_power_efficient_wq ||
!system_freezable_power_efficient_wq);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * workqueue_init - bring workqueue subsystem fully online
+ *
+ * This is the latter half of two-staged workqueue subsystem initialization
+ * and invoked as soon as kthreads can be created and scheduled.
+ * Workqueues have been created and work items queued on them, but there
+ * are no kworkers executing the work items yet. Populate the worker pools
+ * with the initial workers and enable future kworker creations.
+ */
+int __init workqueue_init(void)
+{
+ struct worker_pool *pool;
+ int cpu, bkt;
+
+ /* create the initial workers */
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ for_each_cpu_worker_pool(pool, cpu) {
+ pool->flags &= ~POOL_DISASSOCIATED;
+ BUG_ON(!create_worker(pool));
+ }
+ }
+
+ hash_for_each(unbound_pool_hash, bkt, pool, hash_node)
+ BUG_ON(!create_worker(pool));
+
+ wq_online = true;
wq_watchdog_init();
return 0;
}
-early_initcall(init_workqueues);
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index e7addfcd302f..95be8e1b12f6 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1177,6 +1177,33 @@ config STACKTRACE
It is also used by various kernel debugging features that require
stack trace generation.
+config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ bool "Warn for all uses of unseeded randomness"
+ default n
+ help
+ Some parts of the kernel contain bugs relating to their use of
+ cryptographically secure random numbers before it's actually possible
+ to generate those numbers securely. This setting ensures that these
+ flaws don't go unnoticed, by enabling a message, should this ever
+ occur. This will allow people with obscure setups to know when things
+ are going wrong, so that they might contact developers about fixing
+ it.
+
+ Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting
+ a fully seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can
+ result in dmesg getting spammed for a surprisingly long
+ time. This is really bad from a security perspective, and
+ so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
+ to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
+ However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
+ address this, by default this option is disabled.
+
+ Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
+ unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for
+ those developers interersted in improving the security of
+ Linux kernels running on their architecture (or
+ subarchitecture).
+
config DEBUG_KOBJECT
bool "kobject debugging"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 7a55c5205281..775d6ef6d2ef 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -234,3 +234,5 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
CFLAGS_ubsan.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o
+
+obj-y += crypto/
diff --git a/lib/chacha20.c b/lib/chacha20.c
index 250ceed9ec9a..5f6c222e939a 100644
--- a/lib/chacha20.c
+++ b/lib/chacha20.c
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ static inline u32 rotl32(u32 v, u8 n)
return (v << n) | (v >> (sizeof(v) * 8 - n));
}
-extern void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream)
+void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream)
{
- u32 x[16], *out = stream;
+ u32 x[16];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++)
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ extern void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream)
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++)
- out[i] = cpu_to_le32(x[i] + state[i]);
+ put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]);
state[12]++;
}
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d0bca68618f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-y += libblake2s.o
+libblake2s-y += blake2s.o blake2s-generic.o
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS),y)
+libblake2s-y += blake2s-selftest.o
+endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..04ff8df24513
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
+ *
+ * Information: https://blake2.net/
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+static const u8 blake2s_sigma[10][16] = {
+ { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 },
+ { 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 },
+ { 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 },
+ { 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 },
+ { 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 },
+ { 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 },
+ { 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 },
+ { 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 },
+ { 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 },
+ { 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0 },
+};
+
+static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const u32 inc)
+{
+ state->t[0] += inc;
+ state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
+}
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
+{
+ u32 m[16];
+ u32 v[16];
+ int i;
+
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) &&
+ (nblocks > 1 && inc != BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE));
+
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ blake2s_increment_counter(state, inc);
+ memcpy(m, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ le32_to_cpu_array(m, ARRAY_SIZE(m));
+ memcpy(v, state->h, 32);
+ v[ 8] = BLAKE2S_IV0;
+ v[ 9] = BLAKE2S_IV1;
+ v[10] = BLAKE2S_IV2;
+ v[11] = BLAKE2S_IV3;
+ v[12] = BLAKE2S_IV4 ^ state->t[0];
+ v[13] = BLAKE2S_IV5 ^ state->t[1];
+ v[14] = BLAKE2S_IV6 ^ state->f[0];
+ v[15] = BLAKE2S_IV7 ^ state->f[1];
+
+#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d) do { \
+ a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]]; \
+ d = ror32(d ^ a, 16); \
+ c += d; \
+ b = ror32(b ^ c, 12); \
+ a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]]; \
+ d = ror32(d ^ a, 8); \
+ c += d; \
+ b = ror32(b ^ c, 7); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ROUND(r) do { \
+ G(r, 0, v[0], v[ 4], v[ 8], v[12]); \
+ G(r, 1, v[1], v[ 5], v[ 9], v[13]); \
+ G(r, 2, v[2], v[ 6], v[10], v[14]); \
+ G(r, 3, v[3], v[ 7], v[11], v[15]); \
+ G(r, 4, v[0], v[ 5], v[10], v[15]); \
+ G(r, 5, v[1], v[ 6], v[11], v[12]); \
+ G(r, 6, v[2], v[ 7], v[ 8], v[13]); \
+ G(r, 7, v[3], v[ 4], v[ 9], v[14]); \
+} while (0)
+ ROUND(0);
+ ROUND(1);
+ ROUND(2);
+ ROUND(3);
+ ROUND(4);
+ ROUND(5);
+ ROUND(6);
+ ROUND(7);
+ ROUND(8);
+ ROUND(9);
+
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+ state->h[i] ^= v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
+
+ block += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ --nblocks;
+ }
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_generic);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7a9edc96dddd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+/*
+ * blake2s_testvecs[] generated with the program below (using libb2-dev and
+ * libssl-dev [OpenSSL])
+ *
+ * #include <blake2.h>
+ * #include <stdint.h>
+ * #include <stdio.h>
+ *
+ * #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ *
+ * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256
+ *
+ * static void print_vec(const uint8_t vec[], int len)
+ * {
+ * int i;
+ *
+ * printf(" { ");
+ * for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ * if (i && (i % 12) == 0)
+ * printf("\n ");
+ * printf("0x%02x, ", vec[i]);
+ * }
+ * printf("},\n");
+ * }
+ *
+ * int main(void)
+ * {
+ * uint8_t key[BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES];
+ * uint8_t buf[BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT];
+ * uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];
+ * int i, j;
+ *
+ * key[0] = key[1] = 1;
+ * for (i = 2; i < BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES; ++i)
+ * key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
+ *
+ * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i)
+ * buf[i] = (uint8_t)i;
+ *
+ * printf("static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
+ *
+ * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i) {
+ * int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES;
+ * int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES + 1);
+ *
+ * blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES - keylen, outlen, i,
+ * keylen);
+ * print_vec(hash, outlen);
+ * }
+ * printf("};\n\n");
+ *
+ * return 0;
+ *}
+ */
+static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
+ { 0xa1, },
+ { 0x7c, 0x89, },
+ { 0x74, 0x0e, 0xd4, },
+ { 0x47, 0x0c, 0x21, 0x15, },
+ { 0x18, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xa6, 0xc4, },
+ { 0x13, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf9, },
+ { 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x73, },
+ { 0x9a, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x68, 0x1b, 0x92, },
+ { 0xc8, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xf4, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0x2b, },
+ { 0x5b, 0xf9, 0x43, 0x52, 0x0c, 0x12, 0xba, 0xb5, 0x93, 0x9f, },
+ { 0xc6, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0x80, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x5b, 0x33, 0xb8, 0xb8, 0x0a, },
+ { 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xfd, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xca, 0xb7, 0x97, 0xde, 0xd8, },
+ { 0x66, 0xca, 0x3c, 0xc4, 0x19, 0xef, 0x92, 0x66, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x8f, 0xda,
+ 0xb7, },
+ { 0xba, 0xe5, 0xbb, 0x30, 0x25, 0x94, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x89, 0x09, 0xc4, 0x25,
+ 0x52, 0x3e, },
+ { 0xa2, 0xef, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x0b, 0x5f, 0xa2, 0x01, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xbc,
+ 0x57, 0xe2, 0x27, },
+ { 0x4f, 0xe0, 0xf9, 0x52, 0x12, 0xda, 0x84, 0xb7, 0xab, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xa6,
+ 0x47, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0xf5, },
+ { 0x56, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x1c, 0x4c, 0xca, 0xed, 0x90, 0x31, 0xec, 0x87, 0x43,
+ 0xe7, 0x72, 0x08, 0xec, 0xbe, },
+ { 0x7e, 0xdf, 0x80, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x33, 0xfd, 0x53, 0x44, 0xba, 0xfd, 0x96,
+ 0xe1, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x65, 0xa5, 0x00, },
+ { 0xec, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x62, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0xf4, 0x82, 0xf3, 0x1e,
+ 0x18, 0xff, 0x2b, 0xc4, 0x06, 0x20, 0x2a, },
+ { 0x74, 0x98, 0xd7, 0x68, 0x63, 0xed, 0x87, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x1d,
+ 0xfd, 0x2a, 0xbb, 0x86, 0xac, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x89, },
+ { 0x89, 0xc3, 0x88, 0xce, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x10, 0xd1, 0x37, 0x20, 0x86,
+ 0x28, 0x43, 0x70, 0xd9, 0xfb, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xb5, 0xd3, },
+ { 0xcb, 0x56, 0x74, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x01, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x38, 0xe1, 0x41,
+ 0xad, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x74, 0xce, 0x35, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x6e, },
+ { 0x79, 0xaf, 0x94, 0x59, 0x99, 0x26, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0x34, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0x22,
+ 0xf7, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x65, 0xd4, 0x48, 0x18, 0xac, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x93, },
+ { 0x85, 0x0d, 0xff, 0xb8, 0x3e, 0x87, 0x41, 0xb0, 0x95, 0xd3, 0x3d, 0x00,
+ 0x47, 0x55, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x69, 0xea, 0xbf, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x2d, 0x61, 0x45, },
+ { 0x03, 0xe0, 0x85, 0xec, 0x54, 0xb5, 0x16, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x71, 0xe9,
+ 0x6a, 0xe7, 0xcb, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x28, 0x13,
+ 0xd1, },
+ { 0xe3, 0x34, 0x4b, 0xe1, 0xd0, 0x4b, 0x55, 0x61, 0x8f, 0xc0, 0x24, 0x05,
+ 0xe6, 0xe0, 0x3d, 0x70, 0x24, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xb8, 0x91, 0x05, 0x29, 0x07,
+ 0x01, 0x3e, },
+ { 0x61, 0xff, 0x01, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xd1, 0xd1, 0x08, 0x74,
+ 0xe6, 0x91, 0x44, 0xeb, 0x61, 0xda, 0x40, 0xaf, 0xfc, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b,
+ 0xec, 0x13, 0xed, },
+ { 0xd4, 0x40, 0xd2, 0xa0, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x0c, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xc7,
+ 0x86, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xea, 0x19, 0x86, 0x1f, 0xab, 0x07, 0xce, 0x37,
+ 0x72, 0x67, 0x09, 0xfc, },
+ { 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x18, 0x67, 0x93, 0x10, 0x9b, 0x39, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x38,
+ 0x82, 0x7d, 0xb8, 0xb7, 0xa5, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0x9c,
+ 0x95, 0x29, 0x19, 0xf2, 0x4b, },
+ { 0xc8, 0x62, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x98, 0xc9, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x3a, 0xd3, 0x22,
+ 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x15, 0x07, 0xee, 0x15, 0x61, 0xbb, 0x05, 0x30,
+ 0x99, 0x7f, 0x11, 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x1d, },
+ { 0x68, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x90, 0xa1, 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xbb, 0xce, 0xd2, 0x0e,
+ 0x33, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xa8, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x66, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xcd,
+ 0x58, 0x55, 0x3a, 0x0b, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0xb5, },
+ { 0xdd, 0x35, 0xd2, 0xb4, 0xf6, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xab, 0x64, 0x24, 0x4e, 0xfe,
+ 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x95, 0x8b, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0xbc, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0x88, 0x61,
+ 0x09, 0xb7, 0x78, 0xa3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x2f, },
+ { 0x0a, },
+ { 0x6e, 0xd4, },
+ { 0x64, 0xe9, 0xd1, },
+ { 0x30, 0xdd, 0x71, 0xef, },
+ { 0x11, 0xb5, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xc9, },
+ { 0x06, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x04, 0x82, 0xd0, },
+ { 0x5c, 0x42, 0x0b, 0xee, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xb2, },
+ { 0xe8, 0x29, 0xd6, 0xb4, 0x5d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0x93, },
+ { 0x18, 0xca, 0x27, 0x72, 0x43, 0x39, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x6a, },
+ { 0x39, 0x8f, 0xfd, 0x64, 0xf5, 0x57, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x45, 0xf8, },
+ { 0xbb, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x02, 0x1d, 0x0b, 0x16, 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x9a, },
+ { 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0xd4, 0x1d, 0x0d, 0x85, 0x49, 0x91, 0x35, 0xfa, },
+ { 0x6d, 0x48, 0x2a, 0x0c, 0x42, 0x08, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x78, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xaf,
+ 0xe2, },
+ { 0x10, 0x45, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x88, 0xec, 0x4e, 0x1e, 0xf6, 0x14, 0x92, 0x64,
+ 0x7e, 0xb0, },
+ { 0x8b, 0x0b, 0x95, 0xee, 0x92, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x91, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xeb, 0x51,
+ 0x98, 0x0a, 0x8d, },
+ { 0xa3, 0x50, 0x4d, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x68, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x78, 0xd6, 0x04,
+ 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0xd8, },
+ { 0xb8, 0x66, 0x6e, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x15, 0xae, 0x3d, 0x83, 0x7e, 0xcf, 0xe7,
+ 0x2c, 0xe8, 0x8f, 0xc7, 0x34, },
+ { 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1f, 0x29, 0xea, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xe2, 0xc2, 0x93, 0xeb, 0x41,
+ 0x0d, 0xf0, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x0e, 0xa2, },
+ { 0x71, 0xb8, 0x33, 0xa9, 0x1b, 0xac, 0xf1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x5e, 0x81,
+ 0x34, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0x18, 0x5c, 0x47, },
+ { 0xda, 0x45, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xfa, 0xb4,
+ 0x1c, 0x5e, 0xa0, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x96, 0x5a, 0x58, },
+ { 0xe3, 0x09, 0x05, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x13, 0xad, 0x71, 0x88, 0x81, 0x9a,
+ 0x3e, 0x2c, 0xe1, 0x23, 0x99, 0x13, 0x35, 0x9f, 0xb5, },
+ { 0xb7, 0x86, 0x2d, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x04, 0x00, 0x47, 0x47, 0x61, 0x31, 0xfb,
+ 0x14, 0xac, 0xd8, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0x49, 0xbd, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0x3f, },
+ { 0x7f, 0xd9, 0x95, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xcc, 0xba, 0xef, 0xb1, 0x0a, 0xa9,
+ 0x21, 0x62, 0x08, 0x0f, 0x1b, 0xff, 0x7b, 0x9d, 0xae, 0xb2, 0x95, },
+ { 0x85, 0x99, 0xea, 0x33, 0xe0, 0x56, 0xff, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x61, 0x8c, 0xf9,
+ 0x57, 0x05, 0x03, 0x11, 0xf9, 0xfb, 0x3a, 0xf7, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x52, 0x30, },
+ { 0xb2, 0x72, 0x9c, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0x01, 0x6c, 0xff, 0x4e,
+ 0x4f, 0x02, 0xd2, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x51, 0x28, 0x99, 0x50, 0xab, 0xc4, 0x42,
+ 0xe3, },
+ { 0x8b, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xf5, 0x7b, 0xdd, 0xba, 0x47, 0x37, 0xc9,
+ 0x2a, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x08, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x17, 0xa7, 0x9e, 0x6b, 0x6e,
+ 0xe3, 0x90, },
+ { 0x90, 0xdd, 0xf7, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xa3, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x7d, 0x75, 0xc3,
+ 0x39, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x53, 0xb1, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x10,
+ 0x58, 0x06, 0x9a, },
+ { 0x99, 0x52, 0xf0, 0x49, 0xa8, 0x8c, 0xec, 0xa6, 0x97, 0x32, 0x13, 0xb5,
+ 0xf7, 0xa3, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x4b, 0x59, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x59, 0x98, 0x5d,
+ 0x53, 0x03, 0x1a, 0x39, },
+ { 0x9f, 0xe0, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x5d, 0x93, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x9b, 0xe0,
+ 0x26, 0x35, 0x84, 0x20, 0x1d, 0xc5, 0x53, 0x10, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xb5,
+ 0xd4, 0x36, 0xb1, 0xac, 0x73, },
+ { 0x30, 0x32, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x28, 0xec, 0x1f, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x59,
+ 0xeb, 0x7b, 0xee, 0x45, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x49, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x69, 0xbd, 0x90,
+ 0x2c, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xd5, },
+ { 0x2a, 0x37, 0x73, 0x7f, 0xf9, 0x96, 0x19, 0xaa, 0x25, 0xd8, 0x13, 0x28,
+ 0x01, 0x29, 0x89, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x43, 0x44, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x75,
+ 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x87, 0x66, 0x0b, 0x5f, },
+ { 0x23, 0xdf, 0x96, 0x68, 0x91, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x93, 0x55, 0x33, 0x24, 0xf6,
+ 0xba, 0x08, 0x75, 0x5b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x69, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x2c, 0x77,
+ 0x02, 0xf6, 0x47, 0xee, 0x81, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x06, },
+ { 0x9d, },
+ { 0x9d, 0x7d, },
+ { 0xfd, 0xc3, 0xda, },
+ { 0xe8, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x21, },
+ { 0xc3, 0x1d, 0x42, 0x4c, 0x74, },
+ { 0xe9, 0xda, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0xe5, 0x7c, },
+ { 0x52, 0xb8, 0x6f, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x4c, },
+ { 0x5b, 0x39, 0x26, 0xfc, 0x92, 0x5e, 0xe0, 0x49, },
+ { 0x59, 0xe4, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1c, 0xf9, 0x28, 0x93, 0xde, },
+ { 0xde, 0xdf, 0xb2, 0x43, 0x61, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x2e, },
+ { 0x14, 0x8f, 0x75, 0x51, 0xaf, 0xb9, 0xee, 0x51, 0x5a, 0xae, 0x23, },
+ { 0x43, 0x5f, 0x50, 0xd5, 0x70, 0xb0, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x6d, },
+ { 0x66, 0x0a, 0x64, 0x93, 0x79, 0x71, 0x94, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x2d, 0xd3,
+ 0x63, },
+ { 0x15, 0x00, 0xc4, 0x0c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x73, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x6f,
+ 0xe6, 0xa9, },
+ { 0x34, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x56, 0xcf, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xf2, 0x62, 0x0a,
+ 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x20, },
+ { 0xb1, 0xde, 0xc9, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0xf3, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xd6, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x39,
+ 0x18, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0xc3, },
+ { 0xc5, 0x89, 0xb2, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0xa3, 0xb9, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x6d, 0x7c,
+ 0x92, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0x34, 0x41, },
+ { 0xc4, 0xd8, 0xef, 0xba, 0xef, 0xd2, 0xaa, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0xbb,
+ 0x12, 0xfc, 0x0f, 0x72, 0xbf, 0x0f, },
+ { 0xdd, 0x91, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x7d, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0xb9, 0x14, 0x63, 0x96,
+ 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x35, 0x1c, 0xec, },
+ { 0xa9, 0xf8, 0x52, 0xc9, 0x67, 0x76, 0x2b, 0xad, 0xfb, 0xd8, 0x3a, 0xa6,
+ 0x74, 0x02, 0xae, 0xb8, 0x25, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x49, },
+ { 0x77, 0x1f, 0x66, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x50, 0x29, 0xaa, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0xee, 0xba,
+ 0x75, 0x98, 0xdc, 0x93, 0x12, 0x3f, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0x38, },
+ { 0xe2, 0xe1, 0x89, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x38, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0x40, 0xac, 0x3f, 0xb0,
+ 0xca, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0xea, 0xf9, 0x0f, 0x5d, 0x8e, 0x39, },
+ { 0x0f, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x38, 0x01, 0xb1, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0x0a, 0x6d,
+ 0xd2, 0x63, 0x69, 0x9e, 0xcc, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x98, 0xdd, },
+ { 0x13, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x30, 0xfe, 0xc6, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x96, 0x59,
+ 0xc2, 0xa9, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x40, 0xf3, 0xde, 0x02, },
+ { 0xa3, 0x9e, 0xce, 0xda, 0x42, 0xee, 0x8c, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x7d, 0xdc, 0x89,
+ 0x02, 0x77, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x95, 0xbb, 0xff, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xb5, 0x38, 0x1e,
+ 0xaf, },
+ { 0x9a, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x24, 0xdc,
+ 0x97, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa1, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xf5, 0xda, 0x2e, 0xe7,
+ 0xb1, 0x1d, },
+ { 0x84, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x3d, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xf2, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xb9,
+ 0xfb, 0xc5, 0x45, 0x99, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x93, 0x43, 0x02, 0xee, 0x58, 0xaf,
+ 0xee, 0x6a, 0xbe, },
+ { 0x07, 0x2f, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xab, 0x7c, 0x26, 0xbb, 0xa8, 0xd8,
+ 0xe3, 0x1c, 0x75, 0x15, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x6a, 0xf0, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xcd,
+ 0x5c, 0xef, 0xa3, 0x25, },
+ { 0x2f, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0xb5, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x86, 0xe0, 0xdc, 0x31, 0x48, 0xb6,
+ 0xa1, 0x8c, 0xfd, 0x75, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0x3d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x10, 0x9a, 0xd8,
+ 0x4b, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x94, 0x9f, },
+ { 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xaf, 0xe5, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0xdc,
+ 0x6f, 0xa4, 0x53, 0x88, 0xd8, 0xcf, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x42, 0x62, 0xdb, 0xdf,
+ 0xf8, 0x45, 0xc2, 0x13, 0xec, 0x35, },
+ { 0x06, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x2c, 0x15, 0xc6, 0x43, 0x03, 0x81, 0xfb, 0x08, 0x76,
+ 0x33, 0xcb, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xba, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x46,
+ 0x28, 0x3f, 0x3e, 0x9d, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x54, },
+ { 0xea, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xf8, 0xd1, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x11, 0x40, 0x78, 0x42, 0x02,
+ 0x19, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x92, 0xd3, 0xc3, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe7, 0xc3,
+ 0x40, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xfa, 0x5e, 0x28, },
+ { 0x02, },
+ { 0x52, 0xa8, },
+ { 0x38, 0x25, 0x0d, },
+ { 0xe3, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x92, },
+ { 0x97, 0xdb, 0xf7, 0x81, 0xca, },
+ { 0x8a, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x62, 0x56, 0xcc, },
+ { 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x72, 0x8f, 0x63, 0x03, },
+ { 0xf7, 0xf3, 0x39, 0x09, 0x0a, 0xa1, 0xbb, 0x23, },
+ { 0x6b, 0x03, 0xc0, 0xe9, 0xd9, 0x83, 0x05, 0x22, 0x01, },
+ { 0x1b, 0x4b, 0xf5, 0xd6, 0x4f, 0x05, 0x75, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x7f, },
+ { 0x4c, 0x8c, 0x25, 0x20, 0x21, 0xcb, 0xc2, 0x4b, 0x3a, 0x5b, 0x8d, },
+ { 0x56, 0xe2, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0x9f, 0x81, 0xec, 0x83, 0x75, 0xc4, 0xf9, },
+ { 0x71, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xad, 0x4d, 0x35, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x88, 0x69, 0xf9, 0xaa,
+ 0xd3, },
+ { 0x50, 0x6e, 0x86, 0x6e, 0x43, 0xc0, 0xc2, 0x44, 0xc2, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0x1c,
+ 0xb7, 0x9a, },
+ { 0xe4, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xc6, 0x12, 0x8e, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x08, 0x31,
+ 0x3d, 0x47, 0x3d, },
+ { 0x08, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x80, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0x50, 0x77, 0xdf, 0x1f, 0xd0,
+ 0x24, 0xf0, 0x17, 0xc0, },
+ { 0x01, 0xb6, 0x29, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0x91, 0xdd, 0x76, 0x76,
+ 0xd2, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x40, },
+ { 0xa1, 0xd8, 0x09, 0x97, 0x7a, 0xa6, 0xc8, 0x94, 0xf6, 0x91, 0x7b, 0xae,
+ 0x2b, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0x83, 0x48, 0xf7, },
+ { 0x12, 0xd5, 0x53, 0x7d, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xed, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0xee,
+ 0x61, 0x5b, 0x42, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0x73, 0xc0, },
+ { 0xd5, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x5c, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x2b, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xd6, 0x7d,
+ 0x1d, 0xbe, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0x02, 0x21, 0xcd, 0x29, },
+ { 0xa4, 0x98, 0x80, 0xca, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x5e, 0x40, 0x0d, 0x61,
+ 0x08, 0x21, 0xef, 0xc0, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xb4, 0xb0, 0x53, },
+ { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x8f, 0x3b, 0x7a, 0x97, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x07, 0x37, 0xfd,
+ 0x15, 0xdf, 0xce, 0x26, 0x2a, 0xb1, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xac, },
+ { 0x16, 0x22, 0xe1, 0xbc, 0x99, 0x4e, 0x01, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xff, 0x8f, 0xa5,
+ 0x0c, 0x61, 0xb0, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xb1, 0xe1, 0x21, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x2e, },
+ { 0x11, 0x5b, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xe6, 0x14, 0xc1, 0xd5, 0x4d, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x17,
+ 0xea, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x6c, 0xbd, 0x1d, 0xbe, 0x12, 0x1b, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x1a, },
+ { 0x40, 0x88, 0x22, 0xf3, 0x20, 0x6c, 0xed, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x34, 0x62, 0x2c,
+ 0x98, 0x83, 0x52, 0xe2, 0x25, 0xee, 0xe9, 0xf5, 0xe1, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x5c,
+ 0xae, },
+ { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x37, 0xde, 0x95, 0x8c, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x0c, 0x23, 0xe7, 0xb5,
+ 0x38, 0x70, 0x61, 0xcc, 0xff, 0xd3, 0x95, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x9d,
+ 0x59, 0x00, },
+ { 0x0c, 0x19, 0x52, 0x05, 0x22, 0x53, 0xcb, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x10, 0x0e, 0x7e,
+ 0x14, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0x92, 0x43, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x4b, 0x8f, 0x51, 0x2c,
+ 0x5a, 0x2c, 0x3b, },
+ { 0xe1, 0x9d, 0x70, 0x70, 0x28, 0xec, 0x86, 0x40, 0x55, 0x33, 0x56, 0xda,
+ 0x88, 0xca, 0xee, 0xc8, 0x6a, 0x20, 0xb1, 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x57, 0xf8, 0x3c,
+ 0x10, 0x07, 0x2a, 0xc4, },
+ { 0x0b, 0xae, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x79, 0xee, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x27, 0x35, 0x8d, 0x14,
+ 0xd6, 0xae, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x50, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0x0c, 0xf7, 0xdf,
+ 0xee, 0xa1, 0x74, 0xd6, 0x71, },
+ { 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xf4, 0x99, 0x98, 0xb9, 0x80, 0xea, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x4f, 0x33,
+ 0xcf, 0x74, 0x25, 0x6f, 0x17, 0x6c, 0xbf, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x38, 0xd0, 0xff,
+ 0x96, 0xcb, 0x13, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xfd, },
+ { 0xbe, 0x92, 0xeb, 0xba, 0x44, 0x2c, 0x24, 0x74, 0xd4, 0x03, 0x27, 0x3c,
+ 0x5d, 0x5b, 0x03, 0x30, 0x87, 0x63, 0x69, 0xe0, 0xb8, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x44,
+ 0x7e, 0xad, 0xcd, 0x20, 0x12, 0x16, 0x79, },
+ { 0x30, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x90, 0x2a, 0x97, 0x63, 0x94, 0x46, 0xff,
+ 0xce, 0xd8, 0x67, 0xa7, 0xac, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x95, 0xb7, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x23,
+ 0x98, 0x9d, 0x76, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0x8a, },
+ { 0xbe, },
+ { 0x17, 0x6c, },
+ { 0x1a, 0x42, 0x4f, },
+ { 0xba, 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x65, },
+ { 0xc2, 0x63, 0x43, 0x6a, 0xea, },
+ { 0xe4, 0x4d, 0xad, 0xf2, 0x0b, 0x02, },
+ { 0x04, 0xc7, 0xc4, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x2b, 0xce, },
+ { 0x66, 0xf6, 0x67, 0xcb, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc8, 0xf1, },
+ { 0x56, 0xa3, 0x60, 0x78, 0xc9, 0x5f, 0x70, 0x1b, 0x5e, },
+ { 0x99, 0xff, 0x81, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x79, 0x4b, 0x65, },
+ { 0x51, 0x10, 0x50, 0x93, 0x01, 0x93, 0xb7, 0x01, 0xc9, 0x18, 0xb7, },
+ { 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x5e, 0x7d, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x70, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x98, },
+ { 0x5f, 0xd9, 0x9b, 0xc8, 0xd7, 0xb2, 0x72, 0x62, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0xba, 0x92,
+ 0xe9, },
+ { 0x70, 0x2b, 0xba, 0xfe, 0xad, 0x5d, 0x96, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x6d,
+ 0xc4, 0xb3, },
+ { 0xae, 0xe0, 0xd5, 0xd4, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x15, 0x5e, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x60,
+ 0xd7, 0xd3, 0x5e, },
+ { 0x79, 0x8e, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x20, 0xb9, 0x19, 0x4b, 0x63, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x16,
+ 0xaf, 0x39, 0xbd, 0x92, },
+ { 0xc2, 0x0e, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xec, 0xde, 0x38, 0xd3, 0x10,
+ 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x66, 0x27, 0xcf, },
+ { 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x80, 0x67, 0x14, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x90, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x02,
+ 0x81, 0xf6, 0xa6, 0x87, 0xce, 0x58, },
+ { 0x79, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x52, 0x4d, 0xf7, 0x59, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x27, 0xdd,
+ 0xb3, 0xed, 0x57, 0x5b, 0x82, 0xea, 0x6f, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x97, 0xf5, 0x80, 0x02, 0x3d, 0xde, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0xf6, 0xab, 0xe3,
+ 0x57, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x10, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xf2, },
+ { 0x12, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0xb7, 0x67, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x1a, 0xfe, 0x88, 0x4f,
+ 0xc6, 0xac, 0x52, 0x96, 0x64, 0x28, 0x97, 0x84, 0x06, },
+ { 0xc5, 0x04, 0x44, 0x6b, 0xb2, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0x66, 0xe1, 0x76, 0xa2, 0x51,
+ 0xf9, 0x59, 0x69, 0x97, 0x56, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0x50, 0xb3, 0x34, },
+ { 0x21, 0x32, 0x6b, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xed, 0x71, 0x8d, 0xf7, 0x5a, 0x35, 0xe3,
+ 0x90, 0xe2, 0xee, 0xaa, 0x89, 0xf6, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0x73, 0xf4, },
+ { 0x4c, 0xa6, 0x09, 0xf4, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x46, 0xbc, 0x49, 0xfc, 0xe5, 0xda,
+ 0xd1, 0x87, 0x13, 0x17, 0x4c, 0x59, 0x71, 0x26, 0x5b, 0x2c, 0x42, 0xb7, },
+ { 0x13, 0x63, 0xf3, 0x40, 0x02, 0xe5, 0xa3, 0x3a, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0xb6,
+ 0x8a, 0x49, 0x60, 0x76, 0x34, 0x72, 0x94, 0x73, 0xf6, 0xd9, 0x21, 0x6a,
+ 0x26, },
+ { 0xdf, 0x75, 0x16, 0x10, 0x1b, 0x5e, 0x81, 0xc3, 0xc8, 0xde, 0x34, 0x24,
+ 0xb0, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x1b, 0x8f, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0x05, 0xee, 0xa5, 0xe9, 0x35,
+ 0xf4, 0x1d, },
+ { 0xcd, 0x21, 0x93, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xa0, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x0e, 0xa0, 0xb9,
+ 0x1c, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xb8, 0xf8, 0x1e, 0xff, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x39, 0x46,
+ 0x4e, 0x29, 0x26, },
+ { 0x73, 0x7f, 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x0b, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0x60, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xa1, 0x09,
+ 0xb1, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x13, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x98,
+ 0x1a, 0x5b, 0xff, 0xc9, },
+ { 0xd3, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x71, 0x44, 0x7e, 0x31, 0x74, 0x98, 0x9d, 0x9a, 0xd2,
+ 0x27, 0xf3, 0x46, 0x43, 0x42, 0x51, 0xd0, 0x5f, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0x69,
+ 0xbf, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x3c, 0x40, },
+ { 0x31, 0x99, 0x31, 0x9f, 0xaa, 0x43, 0x2e, 0x77, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x26, 0x31,
+ 0x5e, 0x61, 0xf1, 0x87, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x9b, 0xcd, 0xd0, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x20,
+ 0x7e, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x7e, 0xfa, },
+ { 0xa4, 0x27, 0x80, 0x67, 0x81, 0x2a, 0xa7, 0x62, 0xf7, 0x6e, 0xda, 0xd4,
+ 0x5c, 0x39, 0x74, 0xad, 0x7e, 0xbe, 0xad, 0xa5, 0x84, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x30,
+ 0x5d, 0xdb, 0xe2, 0x05, 0x43, 0xf7, 0x1b, },
+ { 0x0b, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x83, 0xd6, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x35, 0xc2, 0xb0,
+ 0x37, 0xef, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x93, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x45, 0x0a, 0xef, 0xb5,
+ 0x76, 0x70, 0x12, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0x7a, },
+ { 0x1f, },
+ { 0x82, 0x60, },
+ { 0xcc, 0xe3, 0x08, },
+ { 0x56, 0x17, 0xe4, 0x59, },
+ { 0xe2, 0xd7, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x4c, },
+ { 0xb2, 0xad, 0xd3, 0x78, 0x58, 0x5a, },
+ { 0xce, 0x43, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x96, 0xab, 0x3c, },
+ { 0xe6, 0x05, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x22, 0x32, 0xbb, 0x77, },
+ { 0x23, 0xe7, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x2c, 0xef, 0x8c, 0x22, 0xec, },
+ { 0xe9, 0x8e, 0x55, 0x38, 0xd1, 0xd7, 0x35, 0x23, 0x98, 0xc7, },
+ { 0xb5, 0x81, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0xca, 0x41, 0xe7, },
+ { 0x41, 0x16, 0x16, 0x95, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x0c, 0xea, 0x8c, 0x71, 0x9a, 0xc1, },
+ { 0x7c, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x62, 0xea, 0x60, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x20, 0xbc,
+ 0x5b, },
+ { 0xdb, 0xb1, 0xdc, 0xfd, 0x08, 0xc0, 0xde, 0x82, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x38, 0xc0,
+ 0x90, 0x48, },
+ { 0x37, 0x18, 0x2e, 0x0d, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x61, 0xd7, 0x86, 0x20, 0x16, 0x60,
+ 0x04, 0xd9, 0xd5, },
+ { 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x2c, 0x4c, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x4f, 0x2a, 0x23, 0x25, 0x58, 0x47,
+ 0xe5, 0x31, 0x06, 0x70, },
+ { 0x91, 0xa0, 0xa3, 0x86, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x72, 0x38, 0x06, 0x67, 0x59, 0x5c,
+ 0x70, 0x25, 0xdb, 0x33, 0x27, },
+ { 0x44, 0x58, 0x66, 0xb8, 0x58, 0xc7, 0x13, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xc0, 0xf4, 0x9a,
+ 0x1e, 0x67, 0x75, 0x33, 0xb6, 0xb8, },
+ { 0x7f, 0x98, 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x50, 0xa2, 0x5c, 0xcd, 0x59, 0xde, 0x72, 0xb3,
+ 0x9d, 0xc3, 0x09, 0x8a, 0xab, 0x56, 0xf1, },
+ { 0x80, 0x96, 0x49, 0x1a, 0x59, 0xa2, 0xc5, 0xd5, 0xa7, 0x20, 0x8a, 0xb7,
+ 0x27, 0x62, 0x84, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0x1b, 0x5d, },
+ { 0x6b, 0xb7, 0x2b, 0x26, 0x62, 0x14, 0x70, 0x19, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xac, 0xac,
+ 0x63, 0x58, 0x5e, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xa2, },
+ { 0x20, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xfd, 0x63, 0x3d, 0x6e, 0x98, 0xcf, 0x0c, 0x49, 0x98,
+ 0xe4, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x8c, 0xaa, 0x70, 0x82, 0x1c, 0x7b, 0x74, },
+ { 0xc8, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0xdf, 0x69, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc2, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x2f, 0x11,
+ 0xcc, 0x3e, 0x17, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x40, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0x79, 0x7f, 0xcf, },
+ { 0xdb, 0x61, 0xc0, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x49, 0x07, 0x31, 0x1d, 0x91, 0x42, 0x8a,
+ 0xfc, 0x5e, 0xd3, 0xf8, 0x56, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xfd, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x8e, },
+ { 0x0c, 0x89, 0x55, 0x0c, 0x1f, 0x59, 0x2c, 0x9d, 0x1b, 0x29, 0x1d, 0x41,
+ 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x2b, 0xea, 0x8f, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x21, 0x70,
+ 0x88, },
+ { 0x12, 0x18, 0x95, 0xa6, 0x59, 0xb1, 0x31, 0x24, 0x45, 0x67, 0x55, 0xa4,
+ 0x1a, 0x2d, 0x48, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x43, 0x88, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0xa0, 0x70, 0xb3,
+ 0xc6, 0xbb, },
+ { 0xe7, 0xb1, 0x1d, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x68, 0x68, 0x68, 0x23, 0x02, 0x55,
+ 0x3a, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x43, 0xf9, 0x34, 0x77, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0xf5,
+ 0x55, 0xfd, 0x4f, },
+ { 0x8c, 0x87, 0x5a, 0x08, 0x3a, 0x73, 0xad, 0x61, 0xe1, 0xe7, 0x99, 0x7e,
+ 0xf0, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x43, 0x80, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x34, 0xe2,
+ 0x42, 0x64, 0x3b, 0x1a, },
+ { 0x39, 0xc1, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x22, 0xbf, 0x16, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x80, 0x7f, 0x95,
+ 0x0a, 0x05, 0x67, 0x27, 0xe7, 0x15, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x1c, 0xb5,
+ 0x1d, 0x60, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x1d, },
+ { 0x9b, 0x6e, 0x08, 0x09, 0x06, 0x73, 0xab, 0x68, 0x02, 0x62, 0x1a, 0xe4,
+ 0xd4, 0xdf, 0xc7, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x6a, 0x5f, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xac, 0xae, 0x6d,
+ 0x43, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x50, 0x60, 0x3c, },
+ { 0x1d, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x4b, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0xe2, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x1b,
+ 0xa0, 0x92, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xff, 0x8f, 0x8b, 0x5d, 0xdf, 0xa8, 0x04, 0xb3,
+ 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xfa, 0x35, 0x46, },
+ { 0x49, 0x45, 0x97, 0x11, 0x0f, 0x1c, 0x60, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x47, 0x30, 0xcf,
+ 0x60, 0xa8, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x1b, 0xe9, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x1f,
+ 0x24, 0xab, 0x37, 0xff, 0x83, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0x3a, },
+ { 0x60, },
+ { 0x24, 0x26, },
+ { 0x47, 0xeb, 0xc9, },
+ { 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf0, },
+ { 0x8e, 0x2b, 0xc9, 0x85, 0x3c, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x07, 0x15, 0xb8, 0x12, 0x74, },
+ { 0x0f, 0xdb, 0x5b, 0x33, 0x69, 0xfe, 0x4b, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x86, 0x54, 0xf4, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xe6, },
+ { 0xbb, 0x84, 0x78, 0x49, 0x27, 0x8e, 0x61, 0xda, 0x60, },
+ { 0x04, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x03, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0xb6, },
+ { 0xf8, 0x27, 0x1d, 0x61, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x42, 0xdd, 0xad, 0x92, 0x40, },
+ { 0x12, 0x87, 0xdf, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x45, 0x5a, 0x36, 0x48, 0x5b, 0x51, 0x2b, },
+ { 0xbb, 0x37, 0x5d, 0x1f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xd2, 0xa4, 0x91,
+ 0x8d, },
+ { 0x5b, 0x27, 0xd1, 0x04, 0x54, 0x52, 0x9f, 0xa3, 0x47, 0x86, 0x33, 0x33,
+ 0xbf, 0xa0, },
+ { 0xcf, 0x04, 0xea, 0xf8, 0x03, 0x2a, 0x43, 0xff, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x21, 0x4c,
+ 0xd5, 0x4b, 0xed, },
+ { 0xaf, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0x63, 0x0f, 0x18, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0x7a, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x44,
+ 0xc8, 0x24, 0x0a, 0xb7, },
+ { 0x3e, 0xdc, 0x36, 0xe4, 0x89, 0xb1, 0xfa, 0xc6, 0x40, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x75,
+ 0xb2, 0x15, 0xd1, 0xb1, 0x10, },
+ { 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x79, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xbc, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0x35,
+ 0xbe, 0x1b, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xbc, 0x3a, },
+ { 0x78, 0x65, 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x35, 0x67, 0xdc, 0x78, 0xd4, 0x41, 0xf6, 0xc9,
+ 0xde, 0xde, 0x1f, 0x18, 0x13, 0x31, 0x11, },
+ { 0x8a, 0x7f, 0xb1, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0x3c, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x47,
+ 0x29, 0x1b, 0x29, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xef, 0x7a, },
+ { 0x65, 0x91, 0xf1, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x96, 0xd3, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x4a, 0x59, 0x35,
+ 0x72, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x87, 0xca, 0x34, 0x7b, 0x63, },
+ { 0x5f, 0x08, 0x87, 0x80, 0x56, 0x25, 0x89, 0x77, 0x61, 0x8c, 0x64, 0xa1,
+ 0x59, 0x6d, 0x59, 0x62, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x99, 0xd1, },
+ { 0x23, 0x87, 0x1d, 0xed, 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x91, 0x90, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x43, 0x21,
+ 0xaf, 0x97, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x15, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x08, 0x77, 0x91, },
+ { 0x90, 0x47, 0x9a, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0xdf, 0xf3, 0xc9, 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa7, 0xd4,
+ 0x6a, 0x32, 0x90, 0xfe, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0x96, 0x61, 0xfb, 0xa4, },
+ { 0xb1, 0x67, 0x60, 0x45, 0xb0, 0x96, 0xc5, 0x15, 0x9f, 0x4d, 0x26, 0xd7,
+ 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x21, 0x00, 0x94, 0x31, 0x64, 0x94, 0xd3, 0xa7,
+ 0xd3, },
+ { 0x02, 0x3e, 0xaf, 0xf3, 0x79, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xcc, 0x7a, 0x7f, 0xfb,
+ 0x79, 0x2b, 0x85, 0x8c, 0x88, 0x72, 0x06, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xc1, 0x16,
+ 0xa6, 0xd6, },
+ { 0x2a, 0xb0, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xaa, 0x6e, 0xb3, 0xae, 0x53, 0x85, 0x33, 0x80,
+ 0x75, 0xae, 0x30, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0x72, 0x42, 0xf6, 0x25, 0x4f, 0x38, 0x88,
+ 0x55, 0xd1, 0xa9, },
+ { 0x90, 0xd8, 0x0c, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x4b, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x65, 0x6c, 0xa1, 0x54,
+ 0xa6, 0xf6, 0x6e, 0xca, 0xd2, 0xbb, 0x7e, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0xd3, 0xce, 0x46,
+ 0xef, 0xb0, 0x00, 0x8d, },
+ { 0xed, 0x9c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x38, 0x0e, 0xe9, 0x98, 0x6c, 0xc8,
+ 0x90, 0x9e, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xd3, 0xeb, 0x88, 0x32, 0xc7, 0x28, 0xe3, 0x94,
+ 0x1c, 0x9f, 0x8b, 0xf3, 0xcb, },
+ { 0xac, 0xe7, 0x92, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x14, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0x04, 0x79, 0xa2, 0xf4,
+ 0x31, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x26, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0x69, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x94, 0x67,
+ 0xda, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0x32, 0x1f, 0xef, },
+ { 0x68, 0x63, 0x85, 0x57, 0x95, 0x9e, 0x42, 0x27, 0x41, 0x43, 0x42, 0x02,
+ 0xa5, 0x78, 0xa7, 0xc6, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x6a, 0xba, 0x70, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x04,
+ 0xb6, 0x78, 0x76, 0x29, 0xf3, 0xe8, 0xa0, },
+ { 0xe6, 0xac, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0x28,
+ 0x0f, 0x59, 0xb2, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x34, 0x42, 0x96, 0x30, 0x2b, 0xca,
+ 0x49, 0xb6, 0xc5, 0x9a, 0x84, 0x59, 0xa7, 0x81, },
+ { 0x7e, },
+ { 0x1e, 0x21, },
+ { 0x26, 0xd3, 0xdd, },
+ { 0x2c, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x3d, },
+ { 0x86, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x3c, 0xf0, },
+ { 0x12, 0xc3, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x18, },
+ { 0x96, 0xc2, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x55, 0xf4, 0x24, },
+ { 0x20, 0x51, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x58, 0x8f, 0x07, 0x2a, },
+ { 0x93, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x97, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x6c, },
+ { 0x39, 0x93, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0xca, 0xdc, 0x7a, 0x92, 0xce, },
+ { 0x60, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x26, 0x82, 0x26, 0x73, 0x02, 0xbc, },
+ { 0x98, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xf5, 0xfb, 0x00, 0xac, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x38, 0x9f, },
+ { 0xda, 0x3a, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xd0, 0xcd, 0x12, 0xcd, 0x15, 0xbb, 0xab, 0x77,
+ 0x66, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x92, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x75, 0xeb, 0xaf, 0x00, 0x31,
+ 0x55, 0x66, },
+ { 0x06, 0xea, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x86, 0x38, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x12,
+ 0x43, 0xbf, 0xa1, },
+ { 0xe4, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x94, 0xdb, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0xff, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xad, 0x8e,
+ 0x95, 0x8a, 0xc5, 0xed, },
+ { 0x25, 0x5a, 0x77, 0x71, 0x41, 0x0e, 0x7a, 0xe9, 0xed, 0x0c, 0x10, 0xef,
+ 0xf6, 0x2b, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x60, },
+ { 0xee, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x67, 0x64, 0x1d, 0xc6, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xe1, 0x68, 0xd2,
+ 0x6e, 0xd2, 0x91, 0x75, 0x53, 0x07, },
+ { 0xe0, 0xf6, 0x4d, 0x8f, 0x68, 0xfc, 0x06, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x79, 0x7f, 0x2b,
+ 0x6d, 0xef, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xab, 0xb2, 0xad, },
+ { 0x3d, 0x35, 0x88, 0x9f, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0x96, 0x45, 0x07, 0x60, 0x71, 0x94,
+ 0x00, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xf4, 0xef, 0x46, 0x2e, 0x3c, },
+ { 0x43, 0xcf, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x2d, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x2d, 0x9b,
+ 0x24, 0xfb, 0x4d, 0xea, 0x4a, 0xec, 0x01, 0x25, 0x29, },
+ { 0x8e, 0x73, 0x9a, 0x78, 0x11, 0xfe, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x26, 0xdf,
+ 0x25, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x1c, 0x70, 0x07, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0xa0, 0xa6, },
+ { 0xe8, 0x47, 0x71, 0xc7, 0x3e, 0xdf, 0xb5, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x85, 0x13, 0xa8,
+ 0x54, 0x47, 0x6e, 0x59, 0x96, 0x09, 0x13, 0x5f, 0x82, 0x16, 0x0b, },
+ { 0xfb, 0xc0, 0x8c, 0x03, 0x21, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x32, 0x6c, 0xea,
+ 0x7f, 0xa8, 0x43, 0x91, 0xe8, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x58, 0x6a, 0xa3, },
+ { 0x55, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x76, 0x09, 0xef, 0x69, 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x8a, 0xf2,
+ 0x65, 0xc3, 0xcb, 0x9b, 0x43, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xb0,
+ 0xd7, },
+ { 0xaa, 0x13, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x40, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x95, 0x64, 0x7b,
+ 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb6, 0x56, 0xb4, 0x5b, 0xcf, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x97, 0xdd,
+ 0xb6, 0xef, },
+ { 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x36, 0xb0, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x9c, 0x9a, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xf6,
+ 0x1f, 0x12, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x59, 0x30, 0x54, 0xab, 0x27, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x57,
+ 0xef, 0xf8, 0x53, },
+ { 0x97, 0x34, 0x45, 0x3e, 0xce, 0x7c, 0x35, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x46,
+ 0x6c, 0x11, 0x67, 0xff, 0x2f, 0x76, 0x58, 0x15, 0x71, 0xfa, 0x44, 0x89,
+ 0x89, 0xfd, 0xf7, 0x99, },
+ { 0x1f, 0xb1, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x83, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x89, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0x03,
+ 0x61, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xa5, 0x74, 0x0e, 0x9b, 0x7e, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x70, 0x0a,
+ 0xa9, 0x8f, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xfb, },
+ { 0xf8, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x10, 0x69, 0x10, 0xd5, 0x4c, 0xeb,
+ 0x1a, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x98, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x2f, 0x0d,
+ 0xbd, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x69, 0xa1, 0x82, },
+ { 0x12, 0x8c, 0x6d, 0x52, 0x08, 0xef, 0x74, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0xaa, 0xd3, 0xb0,
+ 0x26, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x94, 0xb6, 0x11, 0x45, 0x0e, 0x36, 0x71, 0x14, 0x2d,
+ 0x41, 0x8c, 0x21, 0x53, 0x31, 0xe9, 0x68, },
+ { 0xee, 0xea, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xd1, 0xd8, 0xce, 0x58, 0x4c,
+ 0x94, 0x1f, 0x0d, 0x51, 0x08, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xe7, 0x82, 0x46, 0x92,
+ 0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
+};
+
+bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
+{
+ u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 buf[ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs)];
+ u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct blake2s_state state;
+ bool success = true;
+ int i, l;
+
+ key[0] = key[1] = 1;
+ for (i = 2; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
+ key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); ++i)
+ buf[i] = (u8)i;
+
+ for (i = l = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs); l = (l + 37) % ++i) {
+ int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE;
+ int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE + 1);
+
+ blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen, outlen, i,
+ keylen);
+ if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
+ pr_err("blake2s self-test %d: FAIL\n", i + 1);
+ success = false;
+ }
+
+ if (!keylen)
+ blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
+ else
+ blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen,
+ key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen,
+ keylen);
+
+ blake2s_update(&state, buf, l);
+ blake2s_update(&state, buf + l, i - l);
+ blake2s_final(&state, hash);
+ if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
+ pr_err("blake2s init/update/final self-test %d: FAIL\n",
+ i + 1);
+ success = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..536fce87555b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
+ *
+ * Information: https://blake2.net/
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+bool blake2s_selftest(void);
+
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+
+ if (unlikely(!inlen))
+ return;
+ if (inlen > fill) {
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ state->buflen = 0;
+ in += fill;
+ inlen -= fill;
+ }
+ if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ }
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+ state->buflen += inlen;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
+
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
+{
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
+ blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+ memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+ cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+ memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+ memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
+
+static int __init mod_init(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
+ WARN_ON(!blake2s_selftest()))
+ return -ENODEV;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit mod_exit(void)
+{
+}
+
+module_init(mod_init);
+module_exit(mod_exit);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>");
diff --git a/lib/find_bit.c b/lib/find_bit.c
index 18072ea9c20e..479d0a9cf69f 100644
--- a/lib/find_bit.c
+++ b/lib/find_bit.c
@@ -133,18 +133,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_last_bit);
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
-/* include/linux/byteorder does not support "unsigned long" type */
-static inline unsigned long ext2_swab(const unsigned long y)
-{
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
- return (unsigned long) __swab64((u64) y);
-#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
- return (unsigned long) __swab32((u32) y);
-#else
-#error BITS_PER_LONG not defined
-#endif
-}
-
#if !defined(find_next_bit_le) || !defined(find_next_zero_bit_le)
static unsigned long _find_next_bit_le(const unsigned long *addr,
unsigned long nbits, unsigned long start, unsigned long invert)
@@ -157,7 +145,7 @@ static unsigned long _find_next_bit_le(const unsigned long *addr,
tmp = addr[start / BITS_PER_LONG] ^ invert;
/* Handle 1st word. */
- tmp &= ext2_swab(BITMAP_FIRST_WORD_MASK(start));
+ tmp &= swab(BITMAP_FIRST_WORD_MASK(start));
start = round_down(start, BITS_PER_LONG);
while (!tmp) {
@@ -168,7 +156,7 @@ static unsigned long _find_next_bit_le(const unsigned long *addr,
tmp = addr[start / BITS_PER_LONG] ^ invert;
}
- return min(start + __ffs(ext2_swab(tmp)), nbits);
+ return min(start + __ffs(swab(tmp)), nbits);
}
#endif
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 3c5b67b69cba..7e630025cbc3 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
/**
@@ -543,9 +546,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(unsigned long dontcare)
* To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
* long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
*/
-static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long action, void *data)
{
mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -554,13 +559,13 @@ static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
*/
static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
{
- static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
- .func = prandom_timer_start
+ static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
+ .notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
};
- int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+ int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
if (ret == -EALREADY) {
- prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/sha1.c
index 5a56dfd7b99d..8aa4ee352ad5 100644
--- a/lib/sha1.c
+++ b/lib/sha1.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
/*
@@ -54,7 +55,8 @@
#define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
- B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
+ B = ror32(B, 2); \
+ TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
#define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
#define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
@@ -81,6 +83,7 @@
void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
{
__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
A = digest[0];
B = digest[1];
@@ -89,94 +92,24 @@ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
E = digest[4];
/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
- T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
+ for (; i < 16; ++i)
+ T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
- T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 20; ++i)
+ T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 2 */
- T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 40; ++i)
+ T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 3 */
- T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 60; ++i)
+ T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 4 */
- T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 80; ++i)
+ T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
digest[0] += A;
digest[1] += B;
diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
index e632ee40aac1..5b34b5c83988 100644
--- a/lib/siphash.c
+++ b/lib/siphash.c
@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
#endif
-#define SIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
- } while (0)
+#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PREAMBLE(len) \
- u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
- u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
- u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
- u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
+ u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
#else
-#define HSIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
- } while (0)
+#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define HPREAMBLE(len) \
- u32 v0 = 0; \
- u32 v1 = 0; \
- u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
- u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
+ u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
index 74b5b8862198..277a2f6fde6b 100644
--- a/lib/swiotlb.c
+++ b/lib/swiotlb.c
@@ -532,9 +532,14 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
*/
for (i = 0; i < nslots; i++)
io_tlb_orig_addr[index+i] = orig_addr + (i << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
- if (dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL)
- swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-
+ /*
+ * When dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE we could omit the copy from the orig
+ * to the tlb buffer, if we knew for sure the device will
+ * overwirte the entire current content. But we don't. Thus
+ * unconditional bounce may prevent leaking swiotlb content (i.e.
+ * kernel memory) to user-space.
+ */
+ swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
return tlb_addr;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(swiotlb_tbl_map_single);
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 07f467206186..0559a1feec02 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -261,6 +262,38 @@ int vma_is_stack_for_current(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
return (vma->vm_start <= KSTK_ESP(t) && vma->vm_end >= KSTK_ESP(t));
}
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ * random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+ range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+ start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+ }
+
+ if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+ range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+ range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (range == 0)
+ return start;
+
+ return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
#if defined(CONFIG_MMU) && !defined(HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT)
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
index fd3ce461fbe6..ed05b8277aa4 100644
--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
__be16 dport)
{
u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
return seq_scale(hash[0]);
}
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
{
u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 887633870763..db47e1c407d9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int __inet_check_established(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
-static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -537,8 +537,21 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
+/* RFC 6056 3.3.4. Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm
+ * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
+ * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
+ * property might be used by clever attacker.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
+ */
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
+static u32 *table_perturb;
+
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
- struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
+ struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **))
{
@@ -550,7 +563,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct inet_bind_bucket *tb;
u32 remaining, offset;
int ret, i, low, high;
- static u32 hint;
+ u32 index;
if (port) {
head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port,
@@ -575,7 +588,13 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
if (likely(remaining > 1))
remaining &= ~1U;
- offset = (hint + port_offset) % remaining;
+ net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
+ INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
+ index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1);
+
+ offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
+ offset %= remaining;
+
/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
* inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice.
*/
@@ -628,7 +647,13 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
ok:
- hint += i + 2;
+ /* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source
+ * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that
+ * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention
+ * it may be inexistent.
+ */
+ i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);
@@ -651,7 +676,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
- u32 port_offset = 0;
+ u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk);
@@ -669,6 +694,15 @@ void inet_hashinfo_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h)
INIT_HLIST_NULLS_HEAD(&h->listening_hash[i].nulls_head,
i + LISTENING_NULLS_BASE);
}
+
+ if (h != &tcp_hashinfo)
+ return;
+
+ /* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */
+ table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE,
+ sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!table_perturb)
+ panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb");
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_hashinfo_init);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
index d47cab6d7c6d..8223ac61a9fd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int __inet6_check_established(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
-static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+static u64 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
- u32 port_offset = 0;
+ u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
port_offset = inet6_sk_port_offset(sk);
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index 76ef758db112..e412020029df 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -518,14 +518,15 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
- int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
+ int ulen;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
- if (len > INT_MAX)
+ if (len > INT_MAX - transhdrlen)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ ulen = len + transhdrlen;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
index 979fa868a4f1..4673f6f48942 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -435,20 +435,28 @@ static int pppol2tp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
* Session (and tunnel control) socket create/destroy.
*****************************************************************************/
+static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+
+ ps = container_of(head, typeof(*ps), rcu);
+ sock_put(ps->__sk);
+}
+
/* Called by l2tp_core when a session socket is being closed.
*/
static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
- struct sock *sk;
-
- BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
+ struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
- sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
- if (sk) {
- if (sk->sk_socket)
- inet_shutdown(sk->sk_socket, SEND_SHUTDOWN);
- sock_put(sk);
- }
+ ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+ mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
+ ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
+ if (ps->__sk)
+ call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
+ mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
}
/* Really kill the session socket. (Called from sock_put() if
@@ -468,14 +476,6 @@ static void pppol2tp_session_destruct(struct sock *sk)
}
}
-static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
-
- ps = container_of(head, typeof(*ps), rcu);
- sock_put(ps->__sk);
-}
-
/* Called when the PPPoX socket (session) is closed.
*/
static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock)
@@ -499,26 +499,17 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock)
sock_orphan(sk);
sock->sk = NULL;
+ /* If the socket is associated with a session,
+ * l2tp_session_delete will call pppol2tp_session_close which
+ * will drop the session's ref on the socket.
+ */
session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk);
-
- if (session != NULL) {
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
-
+ if (session) {
l2tp_session_delete(session);
-
- ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
- ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
- lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
- RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
- mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
- call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
-
- /* Rely on the sock_put() call at the end of the function for
- * dropping the reference held by pppol2tp_sock_to_session().
- * The last reference will be dropped by pppol2tp_put_sk().
- */
+ /* drop the ref obtained by pppol2tp_sock_to_session */
+ sock_put(sk);
}
+
release_sock(sk);
/* This will delete the session context via
@@ -827,6 +818,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
out_no_ppp:
/* This is how we get the session context from the socket. */
+ sock_hold(sk);
sk->sk_user_data = session;
rcu_assign_pointer(ps->sk, sk);
mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
index 0287734f126f..aec0113a88b0 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_call_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
/* Maximum Read list size */
maxsegs += 2; /* segment for head and tail buffers */
- size = maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_read_chunk);
+ size += maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_read_chunk);
/* Minimal Read chunk size */
size += sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_reply_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
/* Maximum Write list size */
maxsegs += 2; /* segment for head and tail buffers */
- size = sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
+ size += sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
size += maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_segment);
size += sizeof(__be32); /* list discriminator */
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
index 0d9c4a57301b..47f2439fd7b0 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
@@ -141,7 +141,9 @@ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mic_tlv, 1600, 100, 0);
static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pga_tlv, -600, 50, 0);
-static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -50, 50, 0);
+static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pass_tlv, -6000, 50, 0);
+
+static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -5150, 50, 0);
static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(beep_tlv, -56, 200, 0);
@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
CS42L52_SPKB_VOL, 0, 0x40, 0xC0, hl_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Bypass Volume", CS42L52_PASSTHRUA_VOL,
- CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pga_tlv),
+ CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pass_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE("Bypass Mute", CS42L52_MISC_CTL, 4, 5, 1, 0),
@@ -368,7 +370,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
CS42L52_ADCB_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x78, ipd_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("ADC Mixer Volume",
CS42L52_ADCA_MIXER_VOL, CS42L52_ADCB_MIXER_VOL,
- 0, 0x19, 0x7F, ipd_tlv),
+ 0, 0x19, 0x7F, mix_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Switch", CS42L52_ADC_MISC_CTL, 0, 1, 1, 0),
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
index a2535a7eb4bb..f9f8a9112ff8 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
@@ -405,9 +405,9 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l56_snd_controls[] = {
SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Boost Switch", CS42L56_GAIN_BIAS_CTL, 3, 2, 1, 1),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Headphone Volume", CS42L56_HPA_VOLUME,
- CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+ CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("LineOut Volume", CS42L56_LOA_VOLUME,
- CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+ CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Bass Shelving Volume", CS42L56_TONE_CTL,
0, 0x00, 1, tone_tlv),
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
index cb47fb595ff4..5a16020423fe 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
@@ -351,22 +351,22 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs53l30_snd_controls[] = {
SOC_ENUM("ADC2 NG Delay", adc2_ng_delay_enum),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
};
static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget cs53l30_dapm_widgets[] = {
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
index 0e8008d38161..d46881f96c16 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
@@ -3861,6 +3861,7 @@ static int wm8962_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev)
#endif
static const struct dev_pm_ops wm8962_pm = {
+ SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend, pm_runtime_force_resume)
SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(wm8962_runtime_suspend, wm8962_runtime_resume, NULL)
};
