[PATCH 5.15 522/667] f2fs: dont use casefolded comparison for "." and ".."

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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit b5639bb4313b9d455fc9fc4768d23a5e4ca8cb9d upstream.

Tryng to rename a directory that has all following properties fails with
EINVAL and triggers the 'WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir))'
in f2fs_match_ci_name():

    - The directory is casefolded
    - The directory is encrypted
    - The directory's encryption key is not yet set up
    - The parent directory is *not* encrypted

The problem is incorrect handling of the lookup of ".." to get the
parent reference to update.  fscrypt_setup_filename() treats ".." (and
".") specially, as it's never encrypted.  It's passed through as-is, and
setting up the directory's key is not attempted.  As the name isn't a
no-key name, f2fs treats it as a "normal" name and attempts a casefolded
comparison.  That breaks the assumption of the WARN_ON_ONCE() in
f2fs_match_ci_name() which assumes that for encrypted directories,
casefolded comparisons only happen when the directory's key is set up.

We could just remove this WARN_ON_ONCE().  However, since casefolding is
always a no-op on "." and ".." anyway, let's instead just not casefold
these names.  This results in the standard bytewise comparison.

Fixes: 7ad08a58bf67 ("f2fs: Handle casefolding with Encryption")
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # v5.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 fs/f2fs/dir.c  |    3 ++-
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h |   10 +++++-----
 fs/f2fs/hash.c |   11 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ int f2fs_init_casefolded_name(const stru
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE
 	struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
 
-	if (IS_CASEFOLDED(dir)) {
+	if (IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) &&
+	    !is_dot_dotdot(fname->usr_fname->name, fname->usr_fname->len)) {
 		fname->cf_name.name = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(f2fs_cf_name_slab,
 					GFP_NOFS, false, F2FS_SB(sb));
 		if (!fname->cf_name.name)
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -488,11 +488,11 @@ struct f2fs_filename {
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE
 	/*
 	 * For casefolded directories: the casefolded name, but it's left NULL
-	 * if the original name is not valid Unicode, if the directory is both
-	 * casefolded and encrypted and its encryption key is unavailable, or if
-	 * the filesystem is doing an internal operation where usr_fname is also
-	 * NULL.  In all these cases we fall back to treating the name as an
-	 * opaque byte sequence.
+	 * if the original name is not valid Unicode, if the original name is
+	 * "." or "..", if the directory is both casefolded and encrypted and
+	 * its encryption key is unavailable, or if the filesystem is doing an
+	 * internal operation where usr_fname is also NULL.  In all these cases
+	 * we fall back to treating the name as an opaque byte sequence.
 	 */
 	struct fscrypt_str cf_name;
 #endif
--- a/fs/f2fs/hash.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/hash.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static u32 TEA_hash_name(const u8 *p, si
 /*
  * Compute @fname->hash.  For all directories, @fname->disk_name must be set.
  * For casefolded directories, @fname->usr_fname must be set, and also
- * @fname->cf_name if the filename is valid Unicode.
+ * @fname->cf_name if the filename is valid Unicode and is not "." or "..".
  */
 void f2fs_hash_filename(const struct inode *dir, struct f2fs_filename *fname)
 {
@@ -110,10 +110,11 @@ void f2fs_hash_filename(const struct ino
 		/*
 		 * If the casefolded name is provided, hash it instead of the
 		 * on-disk name.  If the casefolded name is *not* provided, that
-		 * should only be because the name wasn't valid Unicode, so fall
-		 * back to treating the name as an opaque byte sequence.  Note
-		 * that to handle encrypted directories, the fallback must use
-		 * usr_fname (plaintext) rather than disk_name (ciphertext).
+		 * should only be because the name wasn't valid Unicode or was
+		 * "." or "..", so fall back to treating the name as an opaque
+		 * byte sequence.  Note that to handle encrypted directories,
+		 * the fallback must use usr_fname (plaintext) rather than
+		 * disk_name (ciphertext).
 		 */
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(!fname->usr_fname->name);
 		if (fname->cf_name.name) {





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