On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 01:49:18PM +0100, Daniel Thompson wrote: > commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 upstream. > > KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus > should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a > serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud > vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is > important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is > triggered. > > Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions > mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism > (although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply > and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking > any action. > > For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then > this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before > the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen. > > CVE: CVE-2022-21499 > Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@xxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > > Notes: > Original patch did not backport cleanly. This backport is fixed up, > compile tested (on arm64) and side-by-side compared against the > original. Now queued up, thanks. greg k-h
