On 07/23/2014 12:36 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
> This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744
> plus fixing it a different way...
You sent something like this a couple days ago. What changed?
--Andy
>
> We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
> had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
> capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
> undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.
>
> Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
> capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set
> eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
> less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
> undefined future capabilities.
>
> The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a
> time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
> we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task
> which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
> things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
> higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.
>
> So the 'parent' will look something like:
> CapInh: 0000000000000000
> CapPrm: 0000000000000000
> CapEff: 0000000000000000
> CapBnd: ffffffc000000000
>
> All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that
> aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
>
> So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
> and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
> it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what
> the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
> They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
> you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve()
> the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset
> however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child
> task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are
> 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
> have.
>
> The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
> subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
> subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that
> the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It
> also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.
>
> The solution here:
> 1) stop hiding capability bits in status
> This makes debugging easier!
>
> 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you
> don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
> and you won't get them in any other task either.
> This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
> made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
> things)
>
> 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
> ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
> This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.
>
> 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
> again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
> compatibility.
> This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> ---
> fs/proc/array.c | 11 +----------
> include/linux/capability.h | 5 ++++-
> kernel/audit.c | 2 +-
> kernel/capability.c | 4 ++++
> security/commoncap.c | 3 +++
> 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
> index 64db2bc..3e1290b 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/array.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/array.c
> @@ -297,15 +297,11 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,
> seq_puts(m, header);
> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
> seq_printf(m, "%08x",
> - a->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - __capi]);
> + a->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - __capi]);
> }
> seq_putc(m, '\n');
> }
>
> -/* Remove non-existent capabilities */
> -#define NORM_CAPS(v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \
> - CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1)
> -
> static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
> {
> const struct cred *cred;
> @@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
> cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;
> rcu_read_unlock();
>
> - NORM_CAPS(cap_inheritable);
> - NORM_CAPS(cap_permitted);
> - NORM_CAPS(cap_effective);
> - NORM_CAPS(cap_bset);
> -
> render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable);
> render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &cap_permitted);
> render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective);
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 84b13ad..aa93e5e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -78,8 +78,11 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
> # error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
> #else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
>
> +#define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
> +#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
> +
> # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
> -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
> +# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
> # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
> | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
> CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 3ef2e0e..ba2ff5a 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
> audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
> audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
> - cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
> + cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index a5cf13c..989f5bf 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -258,6 +258,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
> i++;
> }
>
> + effective.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> + permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> + inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> +
> new = prepare_creds();
> if (!new)
> return -ENOMEM;
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index b9d613e..963dc59 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
> }
>
> + cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> + cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
>
--
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