[PATCH 4.19 041/338] qed: validate and restrict untrusted VFs vlan promisc mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

From: Manish Chopra <manishc@xxxxxxxxxxx>

commit cbcc44db2cf7b836896733acc0e5ea966136ed22 upstream.

Today when VFs are put in promiscuous mode, they can request PF
to configure device for them to receive all VLANs traffic regardless
of what vlan is configured by the PF (via ip link) and PF allows this
config request regardless of whether VF is trusted or not.

>From security POV, when VLAN is configured for VF through PF (via ip link),
honour such config requests from VF only when they are configured to be
trusted, otherwise restrict such VFs vlan promisc mode config.

Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: f990c82c385b ("qed*: Add support for ndo_set_vf_trust")
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c
@@ -3002,12 +3002,16 @@ static int qed_iov_pre_update_vport(stru
 	u8 mask = QED_ACCEPT_UCAST_UNMATCHED | QED_ACCEPT_MCAST_UNMATCHED;
 	struct qed_filter_accept_flags *flags = &params->accept_flags;
 	struct qed_public_vf_info *vf_info;
+	u16 tlv_mask;
+
+	tlv_mask = BIT(QED_IOV_VP_UPDATE_ACCEPT_PARAM) |
+		   BIT(QED_IOV_VP_UPDATE_ACCEPT_ANY_VLAN);
 
 	/* Untrusted VFs can't even be trusted to know that fact.
 	 * Simply indicate everything is configured fine, and trace
 	 * configuration 'behind their back'.
 	 */
-	if (!(*tlvs & BIT(QED_IOV_VP_UPDATE_ACCEPT_PARAM)))
+	if (!(*tlvs & tlv_mask))
 		return 0;
 
 	vf_info = qed_iov_get_public_vf_info(hwfn, vfid, true);
@@ -3024,6 +3028,13 @@ static int qed_iov_pre_update_vport(stru
 			flags->tx_accept_filter &= ~mask;
 	}
 
+	if (params->update_accept_any_vlan_flg) {
+		vf_info->accept_any_vlan = params->accept_any_vlan;
+
+		if (vf_info->forced_vlan && !vf_info->is_trusted_configured)
+			params->accept_any_vlan = false;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -5140,6 +5151,12 @@ static void qed_iov_handle_trust_change(
 
 		params.update_ctl_frame_check = 1;
 		params.mac_chk_en = !vf_info->is_trusted_configured;
+		params.update_accept_any_vlan_flg = 0;
+
+		if (vf_info->accept_any_vlan && vf_info->forced_vlan) {
+			params.update_accept_any_vlan_flg = 1;
+			params.accept_any_vlan = vf_info->accept_any_vlan;
+		}
 
 		if (vf_info->rx_accept_mode & mask) {
 			flags->update_rx_mode_config = 1;
@@ -5155,13 +5172,20 @@ static void qed_iov_handle_trust_change(
 		if (!vf_info->is_trusted_configured) {
 			flags->rx_accept_filter &= ~mask;
 			flags->tx_accept_filter &= ~mask;
+			params.accept_any_vlan = false;
 		}
 
 		if (flags->update_rx_mode_config ||
 		    flags->update_tx_mode_config ||
-		    params.update_ctl_frame_check)
+		    params.update_ctl_frame_check ||
+		    params.update_accept_any_vlan_flg) {
+			DP_VERBOSE(hwfn, QED_MSG_IOV,
+				   "vport update config for %s VF[abs 0x%x rel 0x%x]\n",
+				   vf_info->is_trusted_configured ? "trusted" : "untrusted",
+				   vf->abs_vf_id, vf->relative_vf_id);
 			qed_sp_vport_update(hwfn, &params,
 					    QED_SPQ_MODE_EBLOCK, NULL);
+		}
 	}
 }
 
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.h
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct qed_public_vf_info {
 	bool is_trusted_request;
 	u8 rx_accept_mode;
 	u8 tx_accept_mode;
+	bool accept_any_vlan;
 };
 
 struct qed_iov_vf_init_params {