Re: Linux 4.14.271

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diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 985181dba0ba..6bd97cd50d62 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
 execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
 
 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
 ---------------------------------------
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
 speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
 victim's data.
 
+Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch
+to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't
+associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
+the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
+Enhanced IBRS.
+
+Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
+unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
+unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
+retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
 
@@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are:
 
   - Kernel status:
 
-  ====================================  =================================
-  'Not affected'                        The processor is not vulnerable
-  'Vulnerable'                          Vulnerable, no mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline'  Software-focused mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline'      AMD-specific software mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'           Hardware-focused mitigation
-  ====================================  =================================
+  ========================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                            The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: None'                        Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Retpolines'                  Use Retpoline thunks
+  'Mitigation: LFENCE'                      Use LFENCE instructions
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'               Hardware-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines'  Hardware-focused + Retpolines
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE'      Hardware-focused + LFENCE
+  ========================================  =================================
 
   - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
     used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
@@ -584,12 +599,13 @@ kernel command line.
 
 		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
-		retpoline
-					replace indirect branches
-		retpoline,generic
-					google's original retpoline
-		retpoline,amd
-					AMD-specific minimal thunk
+                retpoline               auto pick between generic,lfence
+                retpoline,generic       Retpolines
+                retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
+                retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
+                eibrs                   enhanced IBRS
+                eibrs,retpoline         enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+                eibrs,lfence            enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
 
 		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 		spectre_v2=auto.
@@ -730,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers:
 
 .. _spec_ref6:
 
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
 
 ARM white papers:
 
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index d840466c8b21..55ad746d3574 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4150,8 +4150,12 @@
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
-			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
-			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+			retpoline,generic - Retpolines
+			retpoline,lfence  - LFENCE; indirect branch
+			retpoline,amd     - alias for retpoline,lfence
+			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
+			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 6b4a4650a507..78850e721b3d 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 270
+SUBLEVEL = 271
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Petit Gorille
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
index 1935b580f0e8..c7fa0c0ff447 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -110,6 +110,16 @@
 	.endm
 #endif
 
+#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 7
+	.macro	dsb, args
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c10, 4
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	isb, args
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 4
+	.endm
+#endif
+
 	.macro asm_trace_hardirqs_off, save=1
 #if defined(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS)
 	.if \save
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1fa5607d3aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+
+enum {
+	SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED,
+	SPECTRE_MITIGATED,
+	SPECTRE_VULNERABLE,
+};
+
+enum {
+	__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL,
+	__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU,
+	__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC,
+	__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC,
+	__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8,
+};
+
+enum {
+	SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL),
+	SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU),
+	SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC),
+	SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC),
+	SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8 = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8),
+};
+
+void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods);
+
+int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
index 3939ad178405..07a421255e4e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
@@ -101,4 +101,6 @@ endif
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC)	+= smccc-call.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += spectre.o
+
 extra-y := $(head-y) vmlinux.lds
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
index 2d8323648256..8d75da86ea8b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
@@ -1033,12 +1033,11 @@ vector_\name:
 	sub	lr, lr, #\correction
 	.endif
 
-	@
-	@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC) and spsr_<exception>
-	@ (parent CPSR)
-	@
+	@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
 	stmia	sp, {r0, lr}		@ save r0, lr
-	mrs	lr, spsr
+
+	@ Save spsr_<exception> (parent CPSR)
+2:	mrs	lr, spsr
 	str	lr, [sp, #8]		@ save spsr
 
 	@
@@ -1059,6 +1058,44 @@ vector_\name:
 	movs	pc, lr			@ branch to handler in SVC mode
 ENDPROC(vector_\name)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	.subsection 1
+	.align 5
+vector_bhb_loop8_\name:
+	.if \correction
+	sub	lr, lr, #\correction
+	.endif
+
+	@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
+	stmia	sp, {r0, lr}
+
+	@ bhb workaround
+	mov	r0, #8
+1:	b	. + 4
+	subs	r0, r0, #1
+	bne	1b
+	dsb
+	isb
+	b	2b
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_\name)
+
+vector_bhb_bpiall_\name:
+	.if \correction
+	sub	lr, lr, #\correction
+	.endif
+
+	@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
+	stmia	sp, {r0, lr}
+
+	@ bhb workaround
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6	@ BPIALL
+	@ isb not needed due to "movs pc, lr" in the vector stub
+	@ which gives a "context synchronisation".
+	b	2b
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_\name)
+	.previous
+#endif
+
 	.align	2
 	@ handler addresses follow this label
 1:
@@ -1067,6 +1104,10 @@ ENDPROC(vector_\name)
 	.section .stubs, "ax", %progbits
 	@ This must be the first word
 	.word	vector_swi
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	.word	vector_bhb_loop8_swi
+	.word	vector_bhb_bpiall_swi
+#endif
 
 vector_rst:
  ARM(	swi	SYS_ERROR0	)
@@ -1181,8 +1222,10 @@ vector_addrexcptn:
  * FIQ "NMI" handler
  *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Handle a FIQ using the SVC stack allowing FIQ act like NMI on x86
- * systems.
+ * systems. This must be the last vector stub, so lets place it in its own
+ * subsection.
  */
+	.subsection 2
 	vector_stub	fiq, FIQ_MODE, 4
 
 	.long	__fiq_usr			@  0  (USR_26 / USR_32)
@@ -1215,6 +1258,30 @@ vector_addrexcptn:
 	W(b)	vector_irq
 	W(b)	vector_fiq
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	.section .vectors.bhb.loop8, "ax", %progbits
+.L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start:
+	W(b)	vector_rst
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_loop8_und
+	W(ldr)	pc, .L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start + 0x1004
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_loop8_pabt
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_loop8_dabt
+	W(b)	vector_addrexcptn
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_loop8_irq
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_loop8_fiq
+
+	.section .vectors.bhb.bpiall, "ax", %progbits
+.L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start:
+	W(b)	vector_rst
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_bpiall_und
+	W(ldr)	pc, .L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start + 0x1008
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_bpiall_pabt
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_bpiall_dabt
+	W(b)	vector_addrexcptn
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_bpiall_irq
+	W(b)	vector_bhb_bpiall_fiq
+#endif
+
 	.data
 	.align	2
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index 08a7132f5600..558f88fbb33c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -151,6 +151,29 @@ ENDPROC(ret_from_fork)
  *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  */
 
+	.align	5
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+ENTRY(vector_bhb_loop8_swi)
+	sub	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
+	stmia	sp, {r0 - r12}
+	mov	r8, #8
+1:	b	2f
+2:	subs	r8, r8, #1
+	bne	1b
+	dsb
+	isb
+	b	3f
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_swi)
+
+	.align	5
+ENTRY(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi)
+	sub	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
+	stmia	sp, {r0 - r12}
+	mcr	p15, 0, r8, c7, c5, 6	@ BPIALL
+	isb
+	b	3f
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi)
+#endif
 	.align	5
 ENTRY(vector_swi)
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_V7M
@@ -158,6 +181,7 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
 #else
 	sub	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
 	stmia	sp, {r0 - r12}			@ Calling r0 - r12
+3:
  ARM(	add	r8, sp, #S_PC		)
  ARM(	stmdb	r8, {sp, lr}^		)	@ Calling sp, lr
  THUMB(	mov	r8, sp			)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0dcefc36fb7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
+
+static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			    char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+}
+
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_state;
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_methods;
+
+void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int method)
+{
+	if (state > spectre_v2_state)
+		spectre_v2_state = state;
+	spectre_v2_methods |= method;
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			    char *buf)
+{
+	const char *method;
+
+	if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Not affected");
+
+	if (spectre_v2_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Vulnerable");
+
+	if (_unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n");
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_methods) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+		method = "Branch predictor hardening";
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU:
+		method = "I-cache invalidation";
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC:
+		method = "Firmware call";
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
+		method = "History overwrite";
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		method = "Multiple mitigations";
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s\n", method);
+}
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
index f702f2b37052..7d81d4a1f5a9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/exception.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -820,10 +821,59 @@ static inline void __init kuser_init(void *vectors)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M
+static void copy_from_lma(void *vma, void *lma_start, void *lma_end)
+{
+	memcpy(vma, lma_start, lma_end - lma_start);
+}
+
+static void flush_vectors(void *vma, size_t offset, size_t size)
+{
+	unsigned long start = (unsigned long)vma + offset;
+	unsigned long end = start + size;
+
+	flush_icache_range(start, end);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method)
+{
+	extern char __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start[], __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end[];
+	extern char __vectors_bhb_loop8_start[], __vectors_bhb_loop8_end[];
+	void *vec_start, *vec_end;
+
+	if (system_state > SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) {
+		pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB workaround too late - system vulnerable\n",
+		       smp_processor_id());
+		return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+	}
+
+	switch (method) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
+		vec_start = __vectors_bhb_loop8_start;
+		vec_end = __vectors_bhb_loop8_end;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+		vec_start = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start;
+		vec_end = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		pr_err("CPU%u: unknown Spectre BHB state %d\n",
+		       smp_processor_id(), method);
+		return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+	}
+
+	copy_from_lma(vectors_page, vec_start, vec_end);
+	flush_vectors(vectors_page, 0, vec_end - vec_start);
+
+	return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+}
+#endif
+
 void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base)
 {
-#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M
-	unsigned long vectors = (unsigned long)vectors_base;
 	extern char __stubs_start[], __stubs_end[];
 	extern char __vectors_start[], __vectors_end[];
 	unsigned i;
@@ -844,17 +894,20 @@ void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base)
 	 * into the vector page, mapped at 0xffff0000, and ensure these
 	 * are visible to the instruction stream.
 	 */
-	memcpy((void *)vectors, __vectors_start, __vectors_end - __vectors_start);
-	memcpy((void *)vectors + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end - __stubs_start);
+	copy_from_lma(vectors_base, __vectors_start, __vectors_end);
+	copy_from_lma(vectors_base + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end);
 
 	kuser_init(vectors_base);
 
-	flush_icache_range(vectors, vectors + PAGE_SIZE * 2);
+	flush_vectors(vectors_base, 0, PAGE_SIZE * 2);
+}
 #else /* ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M */
+void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base)
+{
 	/*
 	 * on V7-M there is no need to copy the vector table to a dedicated
 	 * memory area. The address is configurable and so a table in the kernel
 	 * image can be used.
 	 */
-#endif
 }
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S
index 0951df916b85..a7d553f11e0e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S
@@ -13,6 +13,19 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 
+/*
+ * ld.lld does not support NOCROSSREFS:
+ * https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LD_IS_LLD
+#define NOCROSSREFS
+#endif
+
+/* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */
+#define ARM_LMA(sym, section)						\
+	sym##_start = LOADADDR(section);				\
+	sym##_end = LOADADDR(section) + SIZEOF(section)
+
 #define PROC_INFO							\
 	. = ALIGN(4);							\
 	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__proc_info_begin) = .;				\
@@ -149,19 +162,31 @@ SECTIONS
 	 * The vectors and stubs are relocatable code, and the
 	 * only thing that matters is their relative offsets
 	 */
-	__vectors_start = .;
-	.vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) {
-		*(.vectors)
+	__vectors_lma = .;
+	OVERLAY 0xffff0000 : NOCROSSREFS AT(__vectors_lma) {
+		.vectors {
+			*(.vectors)
+		}
+		.vectors.bhb.loop8 {
+			*(.vectors.bhb.loop8)
+		}
+		.vectors.bhb.bpiall {
+			*(.vectors.bhb.bpiall)
+		}
 	}
-	. = __vectors_start + SIZEOF(.vectors);
-	__vectors_end = .;
-
-	__stubs_start = .;
-	.stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_start) {
+	ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors);
+	ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_loop8, .vectors.bhb.loop8);
+	ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_bpiall, .vectors.bhb.bpiall);
+	. = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors) +
+		SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.loop8) +
+		SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.bpiall);
+
+	__stubs_lma = .;
+	.stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) {
 		*(.stubs)
 	}
-	. = __stubs_start + SIZEOF(.stubs);
-	__stubs_end = .;
+	ARM_LMA(__stubs, .stubs);
+	. = __stubs_lma + SIZEOF(.stubs);
 
 	PROVIDE(vector_fiq_offset = vector_fiq - ADDR(.vectors));
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 1845a5affb44..b7a27a563a3a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
+/*
+ * ld.lld does not support NOCROSSREFS:
+ * https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LD_IS_LLD
+#define NOCROSSREFS
+#endif
+
+/* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */
+#define ARM_LMA(sym, section)						\
+	sym##_start = LOADADDR(section);				\
+	sym##_end = LOADADDR(section) + SIZEOF(section)
+
 #define PROC_INFO							\
 	. = ALIGN(4);							\
 	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__proc_info_begin) = .;				\
@@ -170,19 +183,31 @@ SECTIONS
 	 * The vectors and stubs are relocatable code, and the
 	 * only thing that matters is their relative offsets
 	 */
-	__vectors_start = .;
-	.vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) {
-		*(.vectors)
+	__vectors_lma = .;
+	OVERLAY 0xffff0000 : NOCROSSREFS AT(__vectors_lma) {
+		.vectors {
+			*(.vectors)
+		}
+		.vectors.bhb.loop8 {
+			*(.vectors.bhb.loop8)
+		}
+		.vectors.bhb.bpiall {
+			*(.vectors.bhb.bpiall)
+		}
 	}
-	. = __vectors_start + SIZEOF(.vectors);
-	__vectors_end = .;
-
-	__stubs_start = .;
-	.stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_start) {
+	ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors);
+	ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_loop8, .vectors.bhb.loop8);
+	ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_bpiall, .vectors.bhb.bpiall);
+	. = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors) +
+		SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.loop8) +
+		SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.bpiall);
+
+	__stubs_lma = .;
+	.stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) {
 		*(.stubs)
 	}
-	. = __stubs_start + SIZEOF(.stubs);
-	__stubs_end = .;
+	ARM_LMA(__stubs, .stubs);
+	. = __stubs_lma + SIZEOF(.stubs);
 
 	PROVIDE(vector_fiq_offset = vector_fiq - ADDR(.vectors));
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index 77fd4446b5fc..09c6ba22a02e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -829,6 +829,7 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 
 config CPU_SPECTRE
 	bool
+	select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
 
 config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
@@ -849,6 +850,16 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 
 	   If unsure, say Y.
 
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	bool "Harden Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT
+	depends on CPU_SPECTRE
+	default y
+	help
+	  Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
+	  make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When
+	  taking an exception, a sequence of branches overwrites the branch
+	  history, or branch history is invalidated.
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
index 9a07916af8dd..1b6e770bc1cd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
@@ -7,8 +7,36 @@
 #include <asm/cp15.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/proc-fns.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
 #include <asm/system_misc.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+#define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED	1
+static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
+{
+	struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+	arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+			     ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+
+	switch ((int)res.a0) {
+	case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
+		return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+
+	case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
+		return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
+
+	default:
+		return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+	}
+}
+#else
+static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
+{
+	return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
 
@@ -37,13 +65,61 @@ static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
 	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
 }
 
-static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
 {
 	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
 	if (per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu))
-		return;
+		return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+
+	switch (method) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+			harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
+		spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU:
+		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
+		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC:
+		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+			call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+		cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
+		spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC:
+		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+			call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+		cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
+		spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (spectre_v2_method)
+		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
+			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
+
+	return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+}
+#else
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
+{
+	pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n",
+		smp_processor_id());
+
+	return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void)
+{
+	unsigned int state, method = 0;
 
 	switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A8:
@@ -52,29 +128,32 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
-		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
-			harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
-		spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
+		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+		method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
 		break;
 
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
-		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
-			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
-		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
+		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+		method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU;
 		break;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
 	default:
 		/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
-		if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM)
+		if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) {
+			state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
 			break;
+		}
 		/* fallthrough */
-		/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
+	/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
 		struct arm_smccc_res res;
 
+		state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
+		if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+			break;
+
 		if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
 			break;
 
@@ -84,10 +163,7 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
 				break;
-			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
-				call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
-			cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
-			spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
+			method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC;
 			break;
 
 		case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
@@ -95,29 +171,97 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
 				break;
-			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
-				call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
-			cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
-			spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
+			method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC;
 			break;
 
 		default:
+			state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-#endif
 	}
 
-	if (spectre_v2_method)
-		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
-			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
+	if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+		state = spectre_v2_install_workaround(method);
+
+	spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+static int spectre_bhb_method;
+
+static const char *spectre_bhb_method_name(int method)
+{
+	switch (method) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
+		return "loop";
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+		return "BPIALL";
+
+	default:
+		return "unknown";
+	}
+}
+
+static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
+{
+	if (spectre_bhb_method != method) {
+		if (spectre_bhb_method) {
+			pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: method disagreement, system vulnerable\n",
+			       smp_processor_id());
+
+			return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+		}
+
+		if (spectre_bhb_update_vectors(method) == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
+			return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+
+		spectre_bhb_method = method;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n",
+		smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method));
+
+	return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
 }
 #else
-static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
+static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
 {
+	return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
 }
 #endif
 
+static void cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(void)
+{
+	unsigned int state, method = 0;
+
+	switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72:
+		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+		method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8;
+		break;
+
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
+		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+		method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+		state = spectre_bhb_install_workaround(method);
+
+	spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
+}
+
 static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
 						  u32 mask, const char *msg)
 {
@@ -146,16 +290,17 @@ static bool check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit)
 void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
 {
 	if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6)))
-		cpu_v7_spectre_init();
+		cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
 }
 
 void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
 {
 	if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0)))
-		cpu_v7_spectre_init();
+		cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
 }
 
 void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
 {
-	cpu_v7_spectre_init();
+	cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
+	cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init();
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index e08866cd2287..094b8f2d9821 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 270448b178a7..19829b00e4fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
 	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),	\
 		__stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,	\
-		__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+		__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
 #else
 	jmp	*\reg
 #endif
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
 	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg),	\
 		__stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
-		__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+		__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
 #else
 	call	*\reg
 #endif
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
 	"lfence;\n"						\
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
-	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
+	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
 
 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
 	"lfence;\n"						\
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
-	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
+	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
 
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
 #endif
@@ -223,9 +223,11 @@
 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
-	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
-	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
-	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
+	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
 };
 
 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index fcea3aa19c23..cf8d3f69ab30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
 
 #include "cpu.h"
 
@@ -607,6 +608,32 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
 static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
 #endif
 
+#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
+{
+	if (new_state)
+		return;
+
+	/* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
 {
 	int len = strlen(opt);
@@ -621,7 +648,10 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
-	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
 };
 
 enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -694,6 +724,13 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
 }
 
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+	return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+}
+
 static void __init
 spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 {
@@ -756,10 +793,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
+	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
 	 * required.
 	 */
-	if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+	    !smt_possible ||
+	    spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -771,12 +810,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
 
-	/*
-	 * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode.
-	 */
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-
 	spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
 
 set_mode:
@@ -785,9 +818,11 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 
 static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC]		= "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD]		= "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE]			= "Mitigation: Retpolines",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE]			= "Mitigation: LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
 };
 
 static const struct {
@@ -798,8 +833,12 @@ static const struct {
 	{ "off",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,		  false },
 	{ "on",			SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,		  true  },
 	{ "retpoline",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,	  false },
-	{ "retpoline,amd",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,	  false },
+	{ "retpoline,amd",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
+	{ "retpoline,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
 	{ "retpoline,generic",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+	{ "eibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,		  false },
+	{ "eibrs,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,	  false },
+	{ "eibrs,retpoline",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,	  false },
 	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,		  false },
 };
 
@@ -836,16 +875,30 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	}
 
 	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
-	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
-	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
 	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
-		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
+		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
-	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
-		pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
@@ -854,6 +907,16 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	return cmd;
 }
 
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+		return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+	}
+
+	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+}
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -874,48 +937,64 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
-			mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
-			/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
-			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-			goto specv2_set_mode;
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+			break;
 		}
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_auto;
+
+		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
 		break;
-	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_amd;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
+		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
 		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_generic;
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_auto;
+		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
 		break;
 	}
-	pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
-	return;
 
-retpoline_auto:
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
-	retpoline_amd:
-		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
-			pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
-			goto retpoline_generic;
-		}
-		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD;
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
-	} else {
-	retpoline_generic:
-		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
+	if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	}
+
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
+		/* fallthrough */
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+		break;
 	}
 
-specv2_set_mode:
 	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
@@ -941,7 +1020,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
 	 * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}
@@ -1011,6 +1090,10 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
 	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
+	if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+		pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+
 	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
 		break;
@@ -1255,7 +1338,6 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 			return 0;
-
 		/*
 		 * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
 		 * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
@@ -1600,7 +1682,7 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
-	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return "";
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
@@ -1630,6 +1712,27 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
 	return "";
 }
 
+static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");
+
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n");
+
+	if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+		       spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+		       ibpb_state(),
+		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+		       stibp_state(),
+		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+		       spectre_v2_module_string());
+}
+
 static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
@@ -1652,12 +1755,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
-		return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
-			       ibpb_state(),
-			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
-			       stibp_state(),
-			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
-			       spectre_v2_module_string());
+		return spectre_v2_show_state(buf);
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c
index 448753021724..a97a306c3850 100644
--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c
@@ -1278,17 +1278,16 @@ static void blkif_free_ring(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo)
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(persistent_gnt, n,
 					 &rinfo->grants, node) {
 			list_del(&persistent_gnt->node);
-			if (persistent_gnt->gref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
-				gnttab_end_foreign_access(persistent_gnt->gref,
-							  0, 0UL);
-				rinfo->persistent_gnts_c--;
-			}
+			if (persistent_gnt->gref == GRANT_INVALID_REF ||
+			    !gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(persistent_gnt->gref))
+				continue;
+
+			rinfo->persistent_gnts_c--;
 			if (info->feature_persistent)
 				__free_page(persistent_gnt->page);
 			kfree(persistent_gnt);
 		}
 	}
-	BUG_ON(rinfo->persistent_gnts_c != 0);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < BLK_RING_SIZE(info); i++) {
 		/*
@@ -1345,7 +1344,8 @@ static void blkif_free_ring(struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo)
 			rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
 		}
 	}
-	free_pages((unsigned long)rinfo->ring.sring, get_order(info->nr_ring_pages * XEN_PAGE_SIZE));
+	free_pages_exact(rinfo->ring.sring,
+			 info->nr_ring_pages * XEN_PAGE_SIZE);
 	rinfo->ring.sring = NULL;
 
 	if (rinfo->irq)
@@ -1429,9 +1429,15 @@ static int blkif_get_final_status(enum blk_req_status s1,
 	return BLKIF_RSP_OKAY;
 }
 
-static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id,
-			     struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo,
-			     struct blkif_response *bret)
+/*
+ * Return values:
+ *  1 response processed.
+ *  0 missing further responses.
+ * -1 error while processing.
+ */
+static int blkif_completion(unsigned long *id,
+			    struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo,
+			    struct blkif_response *bret)
 {
 	int i = 0;
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
@@ -1505,42 +1511,43 @@ static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id,
 	}
 	/* Add the persistent grant into the list of free grants */
 	for (i = 0; i < num_grant; i++) {
-		if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref)) {
+		if (!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref)) {
 			/*
 			 * If the grant is still mapped by the backend (the
 			 * backend has chosen to make this grant persistent)
 			 * we add it at the head of the list, so it will be
 			 * reused first.
 			 */
-			if (!info->feature_persistent)
-				pr_alert_ratelimited("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n",
-						     s->grants_used[i]->gref);
+			if (!info->feature_persistent) {
+				pr_alert("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n",
+					 s->grants_used[i]->gref);
+				return -1;
+			}
 			list_add(&s->grants_used[i]->node, &rinfo->grants);
 			rinfo->persistent_gnts_c++;
 		} else {
 			/*
-			 * If the grant is not mapped by the backend we end the
-			 * foreign access and add it to the tail of the list,
-			 * so it will not be picked again unless we run out of
-			 * persistent grants.
+			 * If the grant is not mapped by the backend we add it
+			 * to the tail of the list, so it will not be picked
+			 * again unless we run out of persistent grants.
 			 */
-			gnttab_end_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref, 0, 0UL);
 			s->grants_used[i]->gref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
 			list_add_tail(&s->grants_used[i]->node, &rinfo->grants);
 		}
 	}
 	if (s->req.operation == BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT) {
 		for (i = 0; i < INDIRECT_GREFS(num_grant); i++) {
-			if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref)) {
-				if (!info->feature_persistent)
-					pr_alert_ratelimited("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n",
-							     s->indirect_grants[i]->gref);
+			if (!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref)) {
+				if (!info->feature_persistent) {
+					pr_alert("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n",
+						 s->indirect_grants[i]->gref);
+					return -1;
+				}
 				list_add(&s->indirect_grants[i]->node, &rinfo->grants);
 				rinfo->persistent_gnts_c++;
 			} else {
 				struct page *indirect_page;
 
-				gnttab_end_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref, 0, 0UL);
 				/*
 				 * Add the used indirect page back to the list of
 				 * available pages for indirect grefs.
@@ -1621,12 +1628,17 @@ static irqreturn_t blkif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
 		}
 
 		if (bret.operation != BLKIF_OP_DISCARD) {
+			int ret;
+
 			/*
 			 * We may need to wait for an extra response if the
 			 * I/O request is split in 2
 			 */
-			if (!blkif_completion(&id, rinfo, &bret))
+			ret = blkif_completion(&id, rinfo, &bret);
+			if (!ret)
 				continue;
+			if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+				goto err;
 		}
 
 		if (add_id_to_freelist(rinfo, id)) {
@@ -1732,8 +1744,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 	for (i = 0; i < info->nr_ring_pages; i++)
 		rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
 
-	sring = (struct blkif_sring *)__get_free_pages(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH,
-						       get_order(ring_size));
+	sring = alloc_pages_exact(ring_size, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (!sring) {
 		xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, -ENOMEM, "allocating shared ring");
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1743,7 +1754,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 
 	err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rinfo->ring.sring, info->nr_ring_pages, gref);
 	if (err < 0) {
-		free_pages((unsigned long)sring, get_order(ring_size));
+		free_pages_exact(sring, ring_size);
 		rinfo->ring.sring = NULL;
 		goto fail;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/psci.c b/drivers/firmware/psci.c
index c80ec1d03274..d855c20de663 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/psci.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/psci.c
@@ -64,6 +64,21 @@ struct psci_operations psci_ops = {
 	.smccc_version = SMCCC_VERSION_1_0,
 };
 
+enum arm_smccc_conduit arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit(void)
+{
+	if (psci_ops.smccc_version < SMCCC_VERSION_1_1)
+		return SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE;
+
+	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+		return SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC;
+	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+		return SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC;
+	default:
+		return SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
 typedef unsigned long (psci_fn)(unsigned long, unsigned long,
 				unsigned long, unsigned long);
 static psci_fn *invoke_psci_fn;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index 56c7f2ebf573..430d7c223585 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -414,14 +414,12 @@ static bool xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue)
 			queue->tx_link[id] = TX_LINK_NONE;
 			skb = queue->tx_skbs[id];
 			queue->tx_skbs[id] = NULL;
-			if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access(
-				queue->grant_tx_ref[id]) != 0)) {
+			if (unlikely(!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(
+				queue->grant_tx_ref[id], GNTMAP_readonly))) {
 				dev_alert(dev,
 					  "Grant still in use by backend domain\n");
 				goto err;
 			}
-			gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(
-				queue->grant_tx_ref[id], GNTMAP_readonly);
 			gnttab_release_grant_reference(
 				&queue->gref_tx_head, queue->grant_tx_ref[id]);
 			queue->grant_tx_ref[id] = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
@@ -841,7 +839,6 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 	int max = XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN + (rx->status <= RX_COPY_THRESHOLD);
 	int slots = 1;
 	int err = 0;
-	unsigned long ret;
 
 	if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_extra_info) {
 		err = xennet_get_extras(queue, extras, rp);
@@ -872,8 +869,13 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 			goto next;
 		}
 
-		ret = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0);
-		BUG_ON(!ret);
+		if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0)) {
+			dev_alert(dev,
+				  "Grant still in use by backend domain\n");
+			queue->info->broken = true;
+			dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
 		gnttab_release_grant_reference(&queue->gref_rx_head, ref);
 
@@ -1077,6 +1079,10 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 		err = xennet_get_responses(queue, &rinfo, rp, &tmpq);
 
 		if (unlikely(err)) {
+			if (queue->info->broken) {
+				spin_unlock(&queue->rx_lock);
+				return 0;
+			}
 err:
 			while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&tmpq)))
 				__skb_queue_tail(&errq, skb);
@@ -1654,7 +1660,7 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 			struct netfront_queue *queue, unsigned int feature_split_evtchn)
 {
 	struct xen_netif_tx_sring *txs;
-	struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs;
+	struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs = NULL;
 	grant_ref_t gref;
 	int err;
 
@@ -1674,21 +1680,21 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 
 	err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, txs, 1, &gref);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto grant_tx_ring_fail;
+		goto fail;
 	queue->tx_ring_ref = gref;
 
 	rxs = (struct xen_netif_rx_sring *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
 	if (!rxs) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "allocating rx ring page");
-		goto alloc_rx_ring_fail;
+		goto fail;
 	}
 	SHARED_RING_INIT(rxs);
 	FRONT_RING_INIT(&queue->rx, rxs, XEN_PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rxs, 1, &gref);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto grant_rx_ring_fail;
+		goto fail;
 	queue->rx_ring_ref = gref;
 
 	if (feature_split_evtchn)
@@ -1701,22 +1707,28 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 		err = setup_netfront_single(queue);
 
 	if (err)
-		goto alloc_evtchn_fail;
+		goto fail;
 
 	return 0;
 
 	/* If we fail to setup netfront, it is safe to just revoke access to
 	 * granted pages because backend is not accessing it at this point.
 	 */
-alloc_evtchn_fail:
-	gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_rx_ring_fail:
-	free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
-alloc_rx_ring_fail:
-	gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_tx_ring_fail:
-	free_page((unsigned long)txs);
-fail:
+ fail:
+	if (queue->rx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+		gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0,
+					  (unsigned long)rxs);
+		queue->rx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+	} else {
+		free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
+	}
+	if (queue->tx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+		gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0,
+					  (unsigned long)txs);
+		queue->tx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+	} else {
+		free_page((unsigned long)txs);
+	}
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c b/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c
index 61389bdc7926..a1d822ae9fca 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c
@@ -233,12 +233,11 @@ static void scsifront_gnttab_done(struct vscsifrnt_info *info,
 		return;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < shadow->nr_grants; i++) {
-		if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i]))) {
+		if (unlikely(!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i]))) {
 			shost_printk(KERN_ALERT, info->host, KBUILD_MODNAME
 				     "grant still in use by backend\n");
 			BUG();
 		}
-		gnttab_end_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i], 0, 0UL);
 	}
 
 	kfree(shadow->sg);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c
index 3fa40c723e8e..edb0acd0b832 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c
@@ -169,20 +169,14 @@ static int add_grefs(struct ioctl_gntalloc_alloc_gref *op,
 		__del_gref(gref);
 	}
 
-	/* It's possible for the target domain to map the just-allocated grant
-	 * references by blindly guessing their IDs; if this is done, then
-	 * __del_gref will leave them in the queue_gref list. They need to be
-	 * added to the global list so that we can free them when they are no
-	 * longer referenced.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(!list_empty(&queue_gref)))
-		list_splice_tail(&queue_gref, &gref_list);
 	mutex_unlock(&gref_mutex);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 static void __del_gref(struct gntalloc_gref *gref)
 {
+	unsigned long addr;
+
 	if (gref->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE) {
 		uint8_t *tmp = kmap(gref->page);
 		tmp[gref->notify.pgoff] = 0;
@@ -196,21 +190,16 @@ static void __del_gref(struct gntalloc_gref *gref)
 	gref->notify.flags = 0;
 
 	if (gref->gref_id) {
-		if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(gref->gref_id))
-			return;
-
-		if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(gref->gref_id, 0))
-			return;
-
-		gnttab_free_grant_reference(gref->gref_id);
+		if (gref->page) {
+			addr = (unsigned long)page_to_virt(gref->page);
+			gnttab_end_foreign_access(gref->gref_id, 0, addr);
+		} else
+			gnttab_free_grant_reference(gref->gref_id);
 	}
 
 	gref_size--;
 	list_del(&gref->next_gref);
 
-	if (gref->page)
-		__free_page(gref->page);
-
 	kfree(gref);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c
index 1fb374466e84..2d203ba75e46 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c
@@ -115,12 +115,9 @@ struct gnttab_ops {
 	 */
 	unsigned long (*end_foreign_transfer_ref)(grant_ref_t ref);
 	/*
-	 * Query the status of a grant entry. Ref parameter is reference of
-	 * queried grant entry, return value is the status of queried entry.
-	 * Detailed status(writing/reading) can be gotten from the return value
-	 * by bit operations.
+	 * Read the frame number related to a given grant reference.
 	 */
-	int (*query_foreign_access)(grant_ref_t ref);
+	unsigned long (*read_frame)(grant_ref_t ref);
 };
 
 struct unmap_refs_callback_data {
@@ -255,17 +252,6 @@ int gnttab_grant_foreign_access(domid_t domid, unsigned long frame,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_grant_foreign_access);
 
-static int gnttab_query_foreign_access_v1(grant_ref_t ref)
-{
-	return gnttab_shared.v1[ref].flags & (GTF_reading|GTF_writing);
-}
-
-int gnttab_query_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref)
-{
-	return gnttab_interface->query_foreign_access(ref);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_query_foreign_access);
-
 static int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly)
 {
 	u16 flags, nflags;
@@ -296,6 +282,11 @@ int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref);
 
+static unsigned long gnttab_read_frame_v1(grant_ref_t ref)
+{
+	return gnttab_shared.v1[ref].frame;
+}
+
 struct deferred_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	grant_ref_t ref;
@@ -325,12 +316,9 @@ static void gnttab_handle_deferred(unsigned long unused)
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gnttab_list_lock, flags);
 		if (_gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(entry->ref, entry->ro)) {
 			put_free_entry(entry->ref);
-			if (entry->page) {
-				pr_debug("freeing g.e. %#x (pfn %#lx)\n",
-					 entry->ref, page_to_pfn(entry->page));
-				put_page(entry->page);
-			} else
-				pr_info("freeing g.e. %#x\n", entry->ref);
+			pr_debug("freeing g.e. %#x (pfn %#lx)\n",
+				 entry->ref, page_to_pfn(entry->page));
+			put_page(entry->page);
 			kfree(entry);
 			entry = NULL;
 		} else {
@@ -355,9 +343,18 @@ static void gnttab_handle_deferred(unsigned long unused)
 static void gnttab_add_deferred(grant_ref_t ref, bool readonly,
 				struct page *page)
 {
-	struct deferred_entry *entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	struct deferred_entry *entry;
+	gfp_t gfp = (in_atomic() || irqs_disabled()) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL;
 	const char *what = KERN_WARNING "leaking";
 
+	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), gfp);
+	if (!page) {
+		unsigned long gfn = gnttab_interface->read_frame(ref);
+
+		page = pfn_to_page(gfn_to_pfn(gfn));
+		get_page(page);
+	}
+
 	if (entry) {
 		unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -378,11 +375,21 @@ static void gnttab_add_deferred(grant_ref_t ref, bool readonly,
 	       what, ref, page ? page_to_pfn(page) : -1);
 }
 
+int gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref)
+{
+	int ret = _gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0);
+
+	if (ret)
+		put_free_entry(ref);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_try_end_foreign_access);
+
 void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly,
 			       unsigned long page)
 {
-	if (gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, readonly)) {
-		put_free_entry(ref);
+	if (gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(ref)) {
 		if (page != 0)
 			put_page(virt_to_page(page));
 	} else
@@ -1019,7 +1026,7 @@ static const struct gnttab_ops gnttab_v1_ops = {
 	.update_entry			= gnttab_update_entry_v1,
 	.end_foreign_access_ref		= gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1,
 	.end_foreign_transfer_ref	= gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref_v1,
-	.query_foreign_access		= gnttab_query_foreign_access_v1,
+	.read_frame			= gnttab_read_frame_v1,
 };
 
 static void gnttab_request_version(void)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c
index e35bb6b87449..6dde323dabd4 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c
@@ -368,7 +368,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr,
 		      unsigned int nr_pages, grant_ref_t *grefs)
 {
 	int err;
-	int i, j;
+	unsigned int i;
+	grant_ref_t gref_head;
+
+	err = gnttab_alloc_grant_references(nr_pages, &gref_head);
+	if (err) {
+		xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "granting access to ring page");
+		return err;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
 		unsigned long gfn;
@@ -378,23 +385,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr,
 		else
 			gfn = virt_to_gfn(vaddr);
 
-		err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, gfn, 0);
-		if (err < 0) {
-			xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err,
-					 "granting access to ring page");
-			goto fail;
-		}
-		grefs[i] = err;
+		grefs[i] = gnttab_claim_grant_reference(&gref_head);
+		gnttab_grant_foreign_access_ref(grefs[i], dev->otherend_id,
+						gfn, 0);
 
 		vaddr = vaddr + XEN_PAGE_SIZE;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-
-fail:
-	for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
-		gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grefs[j], 0);
-	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_grant_ring);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h
index 18863d56273c..6366b04c7d5f 100644
--- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h
+++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h
@@ -89,6 +89,22 @@
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+
+enum arm_smccc_conduit {
+	SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE,
+	SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC,
+	SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC,
+};
+
+/**
+ * arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()
+ *
+ * Returns the conduit to be used for SMCCCv1.1 or later.
+ *
+ * When SMCCCv1.1 is not present, returns SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE.
+ */
+enum arm_smccc_conduit arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit(void);
+
 /**
  * struct arm_smccc_res - Result from SMC/HVC call
  * @a0-a3 result values from registers 0 to 3
@@ -311,5 +327,63 @@ asmlinkage void __arm_smccc_hvc(unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
 #define SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED			-1
 #define SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED			-2
 
+/*
+ * Like arm_smccc_1_1* but always returns SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED.
+ * Used when the SMCCC conduit is not defined. The empty asm statement
+ * avoids compiler warnings about unused variables.
+ */
+#define __fail_smccc_1_1(...)						\
+	do {								\
+		__declare_args(__count_args(__VA_ARGS__), __VA_ARGS__);	\
+		asm ("" __constraints(__count_args(__VA_ARGS__)));	\
+		if (___res)						\
+			___res->a0 = SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED;		\
+	} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * arm_smccc_1_1_invoke() - make an SMCCC v1.1 compliant call
+ *
+ * This is a variadic macro taking one to eight source arguments, and
+ * an optional return structure.
+ *
+ * @a0-a7: arguments passed in registers 0 to 7
+ * @res: result values from registers 0 to 3
+ *
+ * This macro will make either an HVC call or an SMC call depending on the
+ * current SMCCC conduit. If no valid conduit is available then -1
+ * (SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) is returned in @res.a0 (if supplied).
+ *
+ * The return value also provides the conduit that was used.
+ */
+#define arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(...) ({					\
+		int method = arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit();		\
+		switch (method) {					\
+		case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:					\
+			arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(__VA_ARGS__);			\
+			break;						\
+		case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:					\
+			arm_smccc_1_1_smc(__VA_ARGS__);			\
+			break;						\
+		default:						\
+			__fail_smccc_1_1(__VA_ARGS__);			\
+			method = SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE;			\
+			break;						\
+		}							\
+		method;							\
+	})
+
+/* Paravirtualised time calls (defined by ARM DEN0057A) */
+#define ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_TIME_FEATURES				\
+	ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL,			\
+			   ARM_SMCCC_SMC_64,			\
+			   ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_STANDARD_HYP,	\
+			   0x20)
+
+#define ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_TIME_ST					\
+	ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL,			\
+			   ARM_SMCCC_SMC_64,			\
+			   ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_STANDARD_HYP,	\
+			   0x21)
+
 #endif /*__ASSEMBLY__*/
 #endif /*__LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_H*/
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index e9e87599338e..3aa05ea79ba1 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -337,6 +337,11 @@ static inline int bpf_map_attr_numa_node(const union bpf_attr *attr)
 		attr->numa_node : NUMA_NO_NODE;
 }
 
+static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
+{
+	return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
+}
+
 #else
 static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
 {
@@ -400,6 +405,12 @@ static inline void __dev_map_insert_ctx(struct bpf_map *map, u32 index)
 static inline void __dev_map_flush(struct bpf_map *map)
 {
 }
+
+static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER) && defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL)
diff --git a/include/xen/grant_table.h b/include/xen/grant_table.h
index f9d8aac170fb..c51ae64b6dcb 100644
--- a/include/xen/grant_table.h
+++ b/include/xen/grant_table.h
@@ -97,17 +97,32 @@ int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly);
  * access has been ended, free the given page too.  Access will be ended
  * immediately iff the grant entry is not in use, otherwise it will happen
  * some time later.  page may be 0, in which case no freeing will occur.
+ * Note that the granted page might still be accessed (read or write) by the
+ * other side after gnttab_end_foreign_access() returns, so even if page was
+ * specified as 0 it is not allowed to just reuse the page for other
+ * purposes immediately. gnttab_end_foreign_access() will take an additional
+ * reference to the granted page in this case, which is dropped only after
+ * the grant is no longer in use.
+ * This requires that multi page allocations for areas subject to
+ * gnttab_end_foreign_access() are done via alloc_pages_exact() (and freeing
+ * via free_pages_exact()) in order to avoid high order pages.
  */
 void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly,
 			       unsigned long page);
 
+/*
+ * End access through the given grant reference, iff the grant entry is
+ * no longer in use.  In case of success ending foreign access, the
+ * grant reference is deallocated.
+ * Return 1 if the grant entry was freed, 0 if it is still in use.
+ */
+int gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref);
+
 int gnttab_grant_foreign_transfer(domid_t domid, unsigned long pfn);
 
 unsigned long gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref(grant_ref_t ref);
 unsigned long gnttab_end_foreign_transfer(grant_ref_t ref);
 
-int gnttab_query_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref);
-
 /*
  * operations on reserved batches of grant references
  */
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index c9a3e61c88f8..4258db3a6470 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -243,6 +243,11 @@ static int sysrq_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+
+void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
+{
+}
+
 static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
                              void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -260,6 +265,9 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 			return -EPERM;
 		*(int *)table->data = unpriv_enable;
 	}
+
+	unpriv_ebpf_notify(unpriv_enable);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/net/9p/trans_xen.c b/net/9p/trans_xen.c
index da843b68cdeb..ac6a69f6c5e2 100644
--- a/net/9p/trans_xen.c
+++ b/net/9p/trans_xen.c
@@ -301,9 +301,9 @@ static void xen_9pfs_front_free(struct xen_9pfs_front_priv *priv)
 				ref = priv->rings[i].intf->ref[j];
 				gnttab_end_foreign_access(ref, 0, 0);
 			}
-			free_pages((unsigned long)priv->rings[i].data.in,
-				   XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER -
-				   (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT));
+			free_pages_exact(priv->rings[i].data.in,
+				   1UL << (XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER +
+					   XEN_PAGE_SHIFT));
 		}
 		gnttab_end_foreign_access(priv->rings[i].ref, 0, 0);
 		free_page((unsigned long)priv->rings[i].intf);
@@ -341,8 +341,8 @@ static int xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 	ring->ref = ret;
-	bytes = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,
-			XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER - (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT));
+	bytes = alloc_pages_exact(1UL << (XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT),
+				  GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 	if (!bytes) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
@@ -373,9 +373,7 @@ static int xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 	if (bytes) {
 		for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
 			gnttab_end_foreign_access(ring->intf->ref[i], 0, 0);
-		free_pages((unsigned long)bytes,
-			   XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER -
-			   (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT));
+		free_pages_exact(bytes, 1UL << (XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT));
 	}
 	gnttab_end_foreign_access(ring->ref, 0, 0);
 	free_page((unsigned long)ring->intf);
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 8418462298e7..bb5861adb5a0 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCEs for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */



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