The idea is to check: a) the owning user_ns of cgroup_ns, b)
capabilities in init_user_ns.
The commit 24f600856418 ("cgroup-v1: Require capabilities to set
release_agent") got this wrong in the write handler of release_agent
since it checked user_ns of the opener (may be different from the owning
user_ns of cgroup_ns).
Secondly, to avoid possibly confused deputy, the capability of the
opener must be checked.
Fixes: 24f600856418 ("cgroup-v1: Require capabilities to set release_agent")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20220216121142.GB30035@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@xxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
index 0e877dbcfeea..afc6c0e9c966 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
@@ -546,6 +546,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_release_agent_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
{
struct cgroup *cgrp;
+ struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(cgrp->root->release_agent_path) < PATH_MAX);
@@ -553,8 +554,9 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_release_agent_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
* Release agent gets called with all capabilities,
* require capabilities to set release agent.
*/
- if ((of->file->f_cred->user_ns != &init_user_ns) ||
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ ctx = of->priv;
+ if ((ctx->ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) ||
+ !file_ns_capable(of->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
cgrp = cgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn, false);
--
2.34.1
