Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algo

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 07:10:33PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > This seem incorrect too, as sig->pkey_algo could be NULL for direct
> > signature verification calls. For example, for keyctl pkey_verify.
> 
> We can make it optional if some callers aren't providing it.  Of course, such
> callers wouldn't be able to verify ECDSA signatures.

Sorry, I got that backwards.  ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but the
keys do (as I noted in a comment).  So ECDSA wouldn't require sig->pkey_algo.

Since it appears that KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY does in fact have no way to specify a
pkey_algo, I'll allow NULL pkey_algo in v2.

Note that SM2 isn't implemented correctly when sig->pkey_algo is NULL, as the
following code incorrectly uses the signature's pkey_algo rather than the key's:

        if (sig->pkey_algo && strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 &&
            sig->data_size) {
                ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
                if (ret)
                        goto error_free_key;
        }

I'm not sure whether I should even bother fixing that, given how broken the SM2
stuff is anyway.

- Eric



[Index of Archives]     [Linux Kernel]     [Kernel Development Newbies]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite Hiking]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux