Re: [PATCH] ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag (for 3.12 stable)

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On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 09:12:18AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
> file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
> occurs.
> 
> The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
> O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
> second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
> flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
> time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
> locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
> another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
> directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
> like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
> which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
> 
> Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
> measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
> with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
> access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
> 'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
> or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
> with the O_DIRECT flag set.
> 
> Changelog v1:
> - permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> (cherry picked from commit f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c)
> 
> Conflicts:
> 	security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> 	security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

I am queuing this backport for the 3.11 kernel as well.  Thanks a lot!

Cheers,
--
Luís


> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c     | 9 ++++++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c    | 5 ++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 6 +++++-
>  security/integrity/integrity.h       | 1 +
>  5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index f1c5cc9..4c3efe4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Description:
>  				 [fowner]]
>  			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
>  				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
> -			option:	[[appraise_type=]]
> +			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
>  
>  		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
>  			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 1c03e8f1..4e1529e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
>  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  			    struct file *file)
>  {
> +	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
>  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>  	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
>  	int result = 0;
> @@ -147,6 +148,11 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
>  		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
>  
> +		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
> +			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
> +			result = -EACCES;
> +			goto out;
> +		}
>  		iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
>  		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
>  		if (!result) {
> @@ -154,9 +160,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  			iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
>  		}
>  	}
> +out:
>  	if (result)
>  		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
> -				    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
> +				    filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
>  				    result, 0);
>  	return result;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index e9508d5..03fb126 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -186,8 +186,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
>  	}
>  
>  	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
> -	if (rc != 0)
> +	if (rc != 0) {
> +		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
> +			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
>  		goto out_digsig;
> +	}
>  
>  	pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename;
>  	if (!pathname)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index a9c3d3c..085c496 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ enum {
>  	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
>  	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
>  	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
> -	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
> +	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
>  };
>  
>  static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
>  	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
>  	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
>  	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
> +	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
>  	{Opt_err, NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -621,6 +622,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  			else
>  				result = -EINVAL;
>  			break;
> +		case Opt_permit_directio:
> +			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
> +			break;
>  		case Opt_err:
>  			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
>  			result = -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index c42fb7a..ecbb6f2 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>  #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
>  #define IMA_DIGSIG		0x01000000
>  #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x02000000
> +#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x04000000
>  
>  #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
>  				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
> -- 
> 1.8.1.4
> 
> 
> 
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