From: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@xxxxxx>
commit 2011fccfb61bbd1d7c8864b2b3ed7012342e9ba3 upstream.
Currently there is a difference in how verifier checks memory access for
helper arguments for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_STACK with regard to
variable part of offset.
check_map_access, that is used for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, can handle variable
offsets just fine, so that BPF program can call a helper like this:
some_helper(map_value_ptr + off, size);
, where offset is unknown at load time, but is checked by program to be
in a safe rage (off >= 0 && off + size < map_value_size).
But it's not the case for check_stack_boundary, that is used for
PTR_TO_STACK, and same code with pointer to stack is rejected by
verifier:
some_helper(stack_value_ptr + off, size);
For example:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0
1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
2: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)
3: (57) r2 &= 4
4: (17) r2 -= 16
5: (0f) r2 += r10
6: (18) r1 = 0xffff888111343a80
8: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
invalid variable stack read R2 var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4)
Add support for variable offset access to check_stack_boundary so that
if offset is checked by program to be in a safe range it's accepted by
verifier.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
[OP: replace reg_state(env, regno) helper with "cur_regs(env) + regno"]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index b6f008dcb30c..47395fa40219 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1755,6 +1755,29 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
}
+static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+ int off, int access_size,
+ bool zero_size_allowed)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno;
+
+ if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
+ access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
+ regno, off, access_size);
+ } else {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n",
+ regno, tn_buf, access_size);
+ }
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
* bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
* and all elements of stack are initialized.
@@ -1767,7 +1790,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno;
struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
- int off, i, slot, spi;
+ int err, min_off, max_off, i, slot, spi;
if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
@@ -1781,21 +1804,23 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
return -EACCES;
}
- /* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- char tn_buf[48];
-
- tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
- regno, tn_buf);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
- if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
- access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
- verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
- regno, off, access_size);
- return -EACCES;
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off;
+ err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ } else {
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off;
+ max_off = reg->umax_value + reg->off;
+ err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
@@ -1804,10 +1829,10 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
return 0;
}
- for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
+ for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
u8 *stype;
- slot = -(off + i) - 1;
+ slot = -i - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot)
goto err;
@@ -1820,8 +1845,16 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
goto mark;
}
err:
- verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
- off, i, access_size);
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+ min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
+ } else {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
+ tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
+ }
return -EACCES;
mark:
/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
@@ -1830,7 +1863,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent);
}
- return update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
+ return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off);
}
static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
--
2.25.1
