Patch "fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid" has been added to the 3.10-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid

to the 3.10-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     fs-userns-change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_uidgid.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.10 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.


>From 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 12:45:42 -0700
Subject: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 upstream.

The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces.  For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.

This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.

Fixes CVE-2014-4014.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 fs/attr.c                  |    8 ++++----
 fs/inode.c                 |   10 +++++++---
 fs/namei.c                 |   11 ++++++-----
 include/linux/capability.h |    2 +-
 kernel/capability.c        |   18 +++++++-----------
 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *
 	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
 	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
 	     !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
-	    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
 	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
 	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
 	    (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
-	    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *
 		/* Also check the setgid bit! */
 		if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
 				inode->i_gid) &&
-		    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	}
 
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, c
 		umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
 
 		if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
-		    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 		inode->i_mode = mode;
 	}
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1837,14 +1837,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
  * inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode
  * @inode: inode being checked
  *
- * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or
- * owns the file.
+ * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the
+ * inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file.
  */
 bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *ns;
+
 	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
 		return true;
-	if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
+
+	ns = current_user_ns();
+	if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -321,10 +321,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
 
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
 		/* DACs are overridable for directories */
-		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 		if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
-			if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+						     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 				return 0;
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -334,7 +335,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
 	 * at least one exec bit set.
 	 */
 	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
-		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -342,7 +343,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
 	 */
 	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
 	if (mask == MAY_READ)
-		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 			return 0;
 
 	return -EACCES;
@@ -2199,7 +2200,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct in
 		return 0;
 	if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
 		return 0;
-	return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+	return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
 }
 
 /*
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(st
 extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -445,22 +445,18 @@ bool nsown_capable(int cap)
 }
 
 /**
- * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
+ * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
  * @inode: The inode in question
  * @cap: The capability in question
  *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
- * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned
- * by the current user namespace or a child namespace.
- *
- * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current
- * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the
- * current user namespace.
- *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
+ * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
+ * mapped into the current user namespace.
  */
-bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
+bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 
-	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
+	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
+		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
 }


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx are

queue-3.10/fs-userns-change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_uidgid.patch
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