From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 upstream.
Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
[fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx: backport to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2911,6 +2911,41 @@ static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verif
return -EACCES;
}
+static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+
+ /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+ * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+ */
+ if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (dst_reg->type) {
+ case PTR_TO_STACK:
+ if (check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+ dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
* Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
* If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -3118,23 +3153,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
- /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
- * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
- */
- if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
- if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
- check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
- return -EACCES;
- } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
- check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
- dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- }
+ if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
+ return -EACCES;
return 0;
}
