[PATCH 5/8] bpf: Restrict bpf_trace_printk()'s %s usage and add %pks,, %pus specifier

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commit b2a5212fb634561bb734c6356904e37f6665b955 upstream

Usage of plain %s conversion specifier in bpf_trace_printk() suffers from the
very same issue as bpf_probe_read{,str}() helpers, that is, it is broken on
archs with overlapping address ranges.

While the helpers have been addressed through work in 6ae08ae3dea2 ("bpf: Add
probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers"), we need
an option for bpf_trace_printk() as well to fix it.

Similarly as with the helpers, force users to make an explicit choice by adding
%pks and %pus specifier to bpf_trace_printk() which will then pick the corresponding
strncpy_from_unsafe*() variant to perform the access under KERNEL_DS or USER_DS.
The %pk* (kernel specifier) and %pu* (user specifier) can later also be extended
for other objects aside strings that are probed and printed under tracing, and
reused out of other facilities like bpf_seq_printf() or BTF based type printing.

Existing behavior of %s for current users is still kept working for archs where it
is not broken and therefore gated through CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
For archs not having this property we fall-back to pick probing under KERNEL_DS as
a sensible default.

conflict resolution: in vsprintf.c, add the new options [u/k] without
other options added upstream

Fixes: 8d3b7dce8622 ("bpf: add support for %s specifier to bpf_trace_printk()")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@xxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200515101118.6508-4-daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # 5.4
Signed-off-by: Tsahi Zidenberg <tsahee@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst | 14 ++++
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c                  | 94 +++++++++++++++--------
 lib/vsprintf.c                            | 12 +++
 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
index ecbebf4ca8e7..cf8c2ad8abef 100644
--- a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
+++ b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
@@ -110,6 +110,20 @@ used when printing stack backtraces. The specifier takes into
 consideration the effect of compiler optimisations which may occur
 when tail-calls are used and marked with the noreturn GCC attribute.
 
+Probed Pointers from BPF / tracing
+----------------------------------
+
+::
+
+    %pks    kernel string
+    %pus    user string
+
+The ``k`` and ``u`` specifiers are used for printing prior probed memory from
+either kernel memory (k) or user memory (u). The subsequent ``s`` specifier
+results in printing a string. For direct use in regular vsnprintf() the (k)
+and (u) annotation is ignored, however, when used out of BPF's bpf_trace_printk(),
+for example, it reads the memory it is pointing to without faulting.
+
 Kernel Pointers
 ---------------
 
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 80f0072b31e0..396b91a9b669 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -325,17 +325,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void)
 
 /*
  * Only limited trace_printk() conversion specifiers allowed:
- * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %s
+ * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %pks %pus %s
  */
 BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
        u64, arg2, u64, arg3)
 {
+    int i, mod[3] = {}, fmt_cnt = 0;
+    char buf[64], fmt_ptype;
+    void *unsafe_ptr = NULL;
     bool str_seen = false;
-    int mod[3] = {};
-    int fmt_cnt = 0;
-    u64 unsafe_addr;
-    char buf[64];
-    int i;
 
     /*
      * bpf_check()->check_func_arg()->check_stack_boundary()
@@ -361,40 +359,71 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
         if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
             mod[fmt_cnt]++;
             i++;
-        } else if (fmt[i] == 'p' || fmt[i] == 's') {
+        } else if (fmt[i] == 'p') {
             mod[fmt_cnt]++;
+            if ((fmt[i + 1] == 'k' ||
+                 fmt[i + 1] == 'u') &&
+                fmt[i + 2] == 's') {
+                fmt_ptype = fmt[i + 1];
+                i += 2;
+                goto fmt_str;
+            }
+
             /* disallow any further format extensions */
             if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
                 !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
                 !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
                 return -EINVAL;
-            fmt_cnt++;
-            if (fmt[i] == 's') {
-                if (str_seen)
-                    /* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
-                    return -EINVAL;
-                str_seen = true;
-
-                switch (fmt_cnt) {
-                case 1:
-                    unsafe_addr = arg1;
-                    arg1 = (long) buf;
-                    break;
-                case 2:
-                    unsafe_addr = arg2;
-                    arg2 = (long) buf;
-                    break;
-                case 3:
-                    unsafe_addr = arg3;
-                    arg3 = (long) buf;
-                    break;
-                }
-                buf[0] = 0;
-                strncpy_from_unsafe(buf,
-                            (void *) (long) unsafe_addr,
+
+            goto fmt_next;
+        } else if (fmt[i] == 's') {
+            mod[fmt_cnt]++;
+            fmt_ptype = fmt[i];
+fmt_str:
+            if (str_seen)
+                /* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
+                return -EINVAL;
+            str_seen = true;
+
+            if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
+                !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
+                !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+            switch (fmt_cnt) {
+            case 0:
+                unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg1;
+                arg1 = (long)buf;
+                break;
+            case 1:
+                unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg2;
+                arg2 = (long)buf;
+                break;
+            case 2:
+                unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg3;
+                arg3 = (long)buf;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            buf[0] = 0;
+            switch (fmt_ptype) {
+            case 's':
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+                strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, unsafe_ptr,
                             sizeof(buf));
+                break;
+#endif
+            case 'k':
+                strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(buf, unsafe_ptr,
+                               sizeof(buf));
+                break;
+            case 'u':
+                strncpy_from_unsafe_user(buf,
+                    (__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr,
+                             sizeof(buf));
+                break;
             }
-            continue;
+            goto fmt_next;
         }
 
         if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
@@ -405,6 +434,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
         if (fmt[i] != 'i' && fmt[i] != 'd' &&
             fmt[i] != 'u' && fmt[i] != 'x')
             return -EINVAL;
+fmt_next:
         fmt_cnt++;
     }
 
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index fb4af73142b4..985ea5c87465 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -2116,6 +2116,10 @@ static char *kobject_string(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
  *                  c major compatible string
  *                  C full compatible string
  * - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx".
+ * - '[ku]s' For a BPF/tracing related format specifier, e.g. used out of
+ *           bpf_trace_printk() where [ku] prefix specifies either kernel (k)
+ *           or user (u) memory to probe, and:
+ *              s a string, equivalent to "%s" on direct vsnprintf() use
  *
  * ** When making changes please also update:
  *    Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
@@ -2194,6 +2198,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
         return kobject_string(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt);
     case 'x':
         return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+    case 'u':
+    case 'k':
+        switch (fmt[1]) {
+        case 's':
+            return string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+        default:
+            return error_string(buf, end, "(einval)", spec);
+        }
     }
 
     /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
-- 
2.25.1





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