From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 9601148392520e2e134936e76788fc2a6371e7be ]
We forbid adding unknown scalars with mixed signed bounds due to the
spectre v1 masking mitigation. Hence this also needs bypass_spec_v1
flag instead of allow_ptr_leaks.
Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 36b81975d9cd..b654174619e5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5578,7 +5578,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
- if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
+ if (!env->env->bypass_spec_v1 && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
return -EACCES;
--
2.30.2
