From: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 6:22 PM > > From: "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" <parri.andrea@xxxxxxxxx> > > [ Upstream commit 206ad34d52a2f1205c84d08c12fc116aad0eb407 ] > > Lack of validation could lead to out-of-bound reads and information > leaks (cf. usage of nvdev->chan_table[]). Check that the number of > allocated sub-channels fits into the expected range. > > Suggested-by: Saruhan Karademir <skarade@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@xxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Link: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hyperv/20201118153310.112404-1-parri.andrea@xxxxxxxxx/ > Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 5 +++++ > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) > Sasha -- This patch is one of an ongoing group of patches where a Linux guest running on Hyper-V will start assuming that hypervisor behavior might be malicious, and guards against such behavior. Because this is a new assumption, these patches are more properly treated as new functionality rather than as bug fixes. So I would propose that we *not* bring such patches back to stable branches. Michael
