答复: [PATCH AliOS 4.19 v3 11/15] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated

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-Shan

> -----邮件原件-----
> 发件人: Greg KH [mailto:gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> 发送时间: 2020年12月15日 17:24
> 收件人: Shan Chen <chenshan@xxxxxxxx>
> 抄送: alikernel-developer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Roberto Sassu
> <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>; Yuanchen Ma <mayuanchen@xxxxxxxx>; Hao
> Feng <fenghao@xxxxxxxx>; Zhiwei Ying <yingzhiwei@xxxxxxxx>;
> stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 主题: Re: [PATCH AliOS 4.19 v3 11/15] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM
> is inactive or deactivated
> 
> On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 04:29:18PM +0800, Shan wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > commit 2d6c25215ab26bb009de3575faab7b685f138e92 upstream.
> >
> > Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize
> > w/o a
> > TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even if a TPM is not
> > found, to avoid module dependency problems.
> >
> > However, trusted module initialization can still fail if the TPM is
> > inactive or deactivated. tpm_get_random() returns an error.
> >
> > This patch removes the call to tpm_get_random() and instead extends
> > the PCR specified by the user with zeros. The security of this
> > alternative is equivalent to the previous one, as either option
> > prevents with a PCR update unsealing and misuse of sealed data by a user
> space process.
> >
> > Even if a PCR is extended with zeros, instead of random data, it is
> > still computationally infeasible to find a value as input for a new
> > PCR extend operation, to obtain again the PCR value that would allow
> unsealing.
> >
> > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip
> > structure...")
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: mayuanchen <mayuanchen@xxxxxxxx>
> > Change-Id: Iada0e052c2ab4a0fbc2db4ac2690da3115d985c6
> > Signed-off-by: Shan <chenshan@xxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  security/keys/trusted.c | 13 -------------
> >  1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)
> 
> Why is this being sent to the stable list?  Do you want this backported to
> 4.19.y?  If so, why, and what is the change-id stuff in there for?
> 
> confused,
> 
> greg k-h

Sorry for the disturbing, it's not meant for the kernel community. We're backporting this commit for some private usage, and carelessly sent out this mail as git send-email automatically cc'ed the sob listed addresses. Have had the cc suppressed. pls ignore. Thanks!

Shan





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