From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit e06f86e61d7a67fe6e826010f57aa39c674f4b1b upstream.
[This backport fixes a regression in 4.4-stable caused by commit
11a6e8f89521 ("f2fs: check memory boundary by insane namelen"), which
depended on this missing commit. This bad backport broke f2fs
encryption because it moved the incrementing of 'bit_pos' to earlier in
f2fs_fill_dentries() without accounting for it being used in the
encrypted dir case. This caused readdir() on encrypted directories to
start failing. Tested with 'kvm-xfstests -c f2fs -g encrypt'.]
When decrypting dirents in ->readdir, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr won't
change content of original encrypted dirent, we don't need to allocate
additional buffer for storing mirror of it, so get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/f2fs/dir.c | 7 -------
1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
index e2ff0eb16f89c..c1130914d6ed7 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
@@ -820,15 +820,8 @@ bool f2fs_fill_dentries(struct dir_context *ctx, struct f2fs_dentry_ptr *d,
int save_len = fstr->len;
int ret;
- de_name.name = kmalloc(de_name.len, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!de_name.name)
- return false;
-
- memcpy(de_name.name, d->filename[bit_pos], de_name.len);
-
ret = f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr(d->inode, &de->hash_code,
&de_name, fstr);
- kfree(de_name.name);
if (ret < 0)
return true;
--
2.29.1
