From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 662a0221893a3d58aa72719671844264306f6e4b upstream. The WARN added in commit 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks") unconditionally triggers on a IVB machine because it does not support SMAP. For !SMAP hardware the CLAC/STAC instructions are patched out and thus if userspace sets AC, it is still have set after entry. Fixes: 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902133200.666781610@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -55,8 +55,16 @@ static noinstr void check_user_regs(stru * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen. */ unsigned long flags = native_save_fl(); - WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & (X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_DF | - X86_EFLAGS_NT)); + unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT; + + /* + * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) || + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64_BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))) + mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & mask); /* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */ WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs));