From: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf ]
Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 94e10898126a..2d2631f9a519 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1232,11 +1232,14 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
return 0;
/*
* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
- * mode.
+ * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
+ * by a previous prctl call.
+
*/
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+ task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
task_update_spec_tif(task);
--
2.25.1
