On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 11:17:45AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 10:17:52AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 09:57:36AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 08:56:18AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > > > On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 10:28:48PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> > > > > From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > >
> > > > > Since there seem to be kernel modules floating around that set
> > > > > FSGSBASE incorrectly, prevent this in the CR4 pinning. Currently
> > > > > CR4 pinning just checks that bits are set, this also checks
> > > > > that the FSGSBASE bit is not set, and if it is clears it again.
> > > >
> > > > So we are trying to "protect" ourselves from broken out-of-tree kernel
> > > > modules now? Why stop with this type of check, why not just forbid them
> > > > entirely if we don't trust them? :)
> > >
> > > Oh, I have a bunch of patches pending for that :-)
> >
> > Ah, I thought I had seen something like that go by a while ago.
> >
> > It's sad that we have to write a "don't do stupid things" checker for
> > kernel modules now :(
>
> Because people... they get stuff from the interweb and run it :/ The
> days that admins actually knew what they're doing is long long gone.
{sigh}
> > > It will basically decode the module text and refuse to load the module
> > > for most CPL0 instruction.
> >
> > Ok, so why would Andi's patch even be needed then? Andi, why post this?
>
> Andi's patch cures a particularly bad module that floats around that
> people use, probably without being aware that it's an insta-root hole.
Ok, fair enough, thanks for the context.
greg k-h
