From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 06a9750edcffa808494d56da939085c35904e618 upstream.
The PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS macro zeroes each register immediately after
pushing it. If an NMI or exception hits after a register is cleared,
but before the UNWIND_HINT_REGS annotation, the ORC unwinder will
wrongly think the previous value of the register was zero. This can
confuse the unwinding process and cause it to exit early.
Because ORC is simpler than DWARF, there are a limited number of unwind
annotation states, so it's not possible to add an individual unwind hint
after each push/clear combination. Instead, the register clearing
instructions need to be consolidated and moved to after the
UNWIND_HINT_REGS annotation.
Fixes: 3f01daecd545 ("x86/entry/64: Introduce the PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS macro")
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Jones <dsj@xxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@xxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/68fd3d0bc92ae2d62ff7879d15d3684217d51f08.1587808742.git.jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -98,13 +98,6 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
#define SIZEOF_PTREGS 21*8
.macro PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=%rdx rax=%rax save_ret=0
- /*
- * Push registers and sanitize registers of values that a
- * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
- * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
- * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
- * Interleave XOR with PUSH for better uop scheduling:
- */
.if \save_ret
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
movq 8(%rsp), %rsi /* temporarily store the return address in %rsi */
@@ -114,34 +107,43 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
.endif
pushq \rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
- xorl %edx, %edx /* nospec dx */
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
- xorl %ecx, %ecx /* nospec cx */
pushq \rax /* pt_regs->ax */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
- xorl %r8d, %r8d /* nospec r8 */
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
- xorl %r9d, %r9d /* nospec r9 */
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
- xorl %r10d, %r10d /* nospec r10 */
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
- xorl %r11d, %r11d /* nospec r11*/
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
- xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx*/
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
- xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp*/
pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
- xorl %r12d, %r12d /* nospec r12*/
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
- xorl %r13d, %r13d /* nospec r13*/
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
- xorl %r14d, %r14d /* nospec r14*/
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
- xorl %r15d, %r15d /* nospec r15*/
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+
.if \save_ret
pushq %rsi /* return address on top of stack */
.endif
+
+ /*
+ * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack might
+ * otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are likely clobbered
+ * well before they could be put to use in a speculative execution
+ * gadget.
+ */
+ xorl %edx, %edx /* nospec dx */
+ xorl %ecx, %ecx /* nospec cx */
+ xorl %r8d, %r8d /* nospec r8 */
+ xorl %r9d, %r9d /* nospec r9 */
+ xorl %r10d, %r10d /* nospec r10 */
+ xorl %r11d, %r11d /* nospec r11 */
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
+ xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
+ xorl %r12d, %r12d /* nospec r12 */
+ xorl %r13d, %r13d /* nospec r13 */
+ xorl %r14d, %r14d /* nospec r14 */
+ xorl %r15d, %r15d /* nospec r15 */
+
.endm
.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0
