From: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@xxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 99e3a236dd43d06c65af0a2ef9cb44306aef6e02 ]
Add a check that the headroom cannot be larger than the available
space in the chunk. In the current code, a malicious user can set the
headroom to a value larger than the chunk size minus the fixed XDP
headroom. That way packets with a length larger than the supported
size in the umem could get accepted and result in an out-of-bounds
write.
Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt")
Reported-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207225
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1586849715-23490-1-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c
index 556a649512b60..706fad12f22cf 100644
--- a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c
+++ b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr)
u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom;
unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page;
u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len;
- int size_chk, err, i;
+ int err, i;
if (chunk_size < XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
/* Strictly speaking we could support this, if:
@@ -295,8 +295,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr)
headroom = ALIGN(headroom, 64);
- size_chk = chunk_size - headroom - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM;
- if (size_chk < 0)
+ if (headroom >= chunk_size - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM)
return -EINVAL;
umem->address = (unsigned long)addr;
--
2.20.1
