On 24. 03. 20, 12:31, gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote: > > This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled > > vt: fix use after free in function "vc_do_resize" I lost track about this one, but isn't this the patch which was withdrawn in favor of another patch really fixing the problem? > to my tty git tree which can be found at > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty.git > in the tty-testing branch. > > The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree > (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) > > The patch will be merged to the tty-next branch sometime soon, > after it passes testing, and the merge window is open. > > If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. > > > From 313a7425f23320844169046d83d8996c98fd8b1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Ye Bin <yebin10@xxxxxxxxxx> > Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 19:28:56 +0800 > Subject: vt: fix use after free in function "vc_do_resize" > > Fix CVE-2020-8647 (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8647), > detail description about this CVE is in bugzilla > "https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206359". > > error information: > BUG: KASan: use after free in vc_do_resize+0x49e/0xb30 at addr ffff88000016b9c0 > Read of size 2 by task syz-executor.3/24164 > page:ffffea0000005ac0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 > page flags: 0xfffff00000000() > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > CPU: 0 PID: 24164 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 3.10.0-862.14.2.1.x86_64+ #2 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), > BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 > Call Trace: > [<ffffffffb059f309>] dump_stack+0x1e/0x20 > [<ffffffffaf8af957>] kasan_report+0x577/0x950 > [<ffffffffaf8ae652>] __asan_load2+0x62/0x80 > [<ffffffffafe3728e>] vc_do_resize+0x49e/0xb30 > [<ffffffffafe3795c>] vc_resize+0x3c/0x60 > [<ffffffffafe1d80d>] vt_ioctl+0x16ed/0x2670 > [<ffffffffafe0089a>] tty_ioctl+0x46a/0x1a10 > [<ffffffffaf92db3d>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5bd/0xc40 > [<ffffffffaf92e2f2>] SyS_ioctl+0x132/0x170 > [<ffffffffb05c9b1b>] system_call_fastpath+0x22/0x27 > > In function vc_do_resize: > ...... > if (vc->vc_y > new_rows) { > ....... > old_origin += first_copied_row * old_row_size; > } else > first_copied_row = 0; > end = old_origin + old_row_size * min(old_rows, new_rows); > ...... > while (old_origin < end) { > scr_memcpyw((unsigned short *) new_origin, > (unsigned short *) old_origin, rlth); > if (rrem) > scr_memsetw((void *)(new_origin + rlth), > vc->vc_video_erase_char, rrem); > old_origin += old_row_size; > new_origin += new_row_size; > } > ...... > > We can see that before calculate variable "end" may update variable > "old_origin" with "old_origin += first_copied_row * old_row_size", > variable "end" is equal to "old_origin + (first_copied_row + > min(old_rows, new_rows))* old_row_size", it's possible that > "first_copied_row + min(old_rows, new_rows)" large than "old_rows". So > when call scr_memcpyw function cpoy data from origin buffer to new > buffer in "while" loop, which "old_origin" may large than real old > buffer end. Now, we calculate origin buffer end before update > "old_origin" to avoid illegal memory access. > > Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: stable <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@xxxxxxxxxx> > References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206359 > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200302112856.1101-1-yebin10@xxxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c > index bbc26d73209a..60e60611141a 100644 > --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c > +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c > @@ -1231,6 +1231,7 @@ static int vc_do_resize(struct tty_struct *tty, struct vc_data *vc, > old_origin = vc->vc_origin; > new_origin = (long) newscreen; > new_scr_end = new_origin + new_screen_size; > + end = old_origin + old_row_size * min(old_rows, new_rows); > > if (vc->vc_y > new_rows) { > if (old_rows - vc->vc_y < new_rows) { > @@ -1249,7 +1250,6 @@ static int vc_do_resize(struct tty_struct *tty, struct vc_data *vc, > old_origin += first_copied_row * old_row_size; > } else > first_copied_row = 0; > - end = old_origin + old_row_size * min(old_rows, new_rows); > > vc_uniscr_copy_area(new_uniscr, new_cols, new_rows, > get_vc_uniscr(vc), rlth/2, first_copied_row, > -- js suse labs