From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 98c8f125fd8a6240ea343c1aa50a1be9047791b8 upstream. Via u32_change(), TCA_U32_SEL has an unspecified type in the netlink policy, so max length isn't enforced, only minimum. This means nkeys (from userspace) was being trusted without checking the actual size of nla_len(), which could lead to a memory over-read, and ultimately an exposure via a call to u32_dump(). Reachability is CAP_NET_ADMIN within a namespace. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@xxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -734,6 +734,7 @@ static int u32_change(struct net *net, s struct nlattr *opt = tca[TCA_OPTIONS]; struct nlattr *tb[TCA_U32_MAX + 1]; u32 htid; + size_t sel_size; int err; #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF size_t size; @@ -827,8 +828,11 @@ static int u32_change(struct net *net, s return -EINVAL; s = nla_data(tb[TCA_U32_SEL]); + sel_size = sizeof(*s) + sizeof(*s->keys) * s->nkeys; + if (nla_len(tb[TCA_U32_SEL]) < sel_size) + return -EINVAL; - n = kzalloc(sizeof(*n) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key), GFP_KERNEL); + n = kzalloc(offsetof(typeof(*n), sel) + sel_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (n == NULL) return -ENOBUFS; @@ -841,7 +845,7 @@ static int u32_change(struct net *net, s } #endif - memcpy(&n->sel, s, sizeof(*s) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key)); + memcpy(&n->sel, s, sel_size); RCU_INIT_POINTER(n->ht_up, ht); n->handle = handle; n->fshift = s->hmask ? ffs(ntohl(s->hmask)) - 1 : 0;
