From: yongduan <yongduan@xxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 060423bfdee3f8bc6e2c1bac97de24d5415e2bc4 upstream.
The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as
in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However
this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor.
As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0,
it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This
bug can be triggered during the VM migration.
There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num
in this case.
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <lidongchen@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: ruippan <ruippan@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: yongduan <yongduan@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -1989,7 +1989,7 @@ static int get_indirect(struct vhost_vir
/* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */
if (access == VHOST_ACCESS_WO) {
*in_num += ret;
- if (unlikely(log)) {
+ if (unlikely(log && ret)) {
log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr);
log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len);
++*log_num;
@@ -2125,7 +2125,7 @@ int vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtq
/* If this is an input descriptor,
* increment that count. */
*in_num += ret;
- if (unlikely(log)) {
+ if (unlikely(log && ret)) {
log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr);
log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len);
++*log_num;
