On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 12:00:08AM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream.
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.
Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
I've also queued up fdadd04931c2d ("bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for
PAGE_SIZE >= 64K") on top.
--
Thanks,
Sasha
