From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Commit c74ba8b3480da6ddaea17df2263ec09b869ac496 upstream. One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the attack surface. Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro() which happens after all kernel __init code has finished. This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and adds some documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking. This improves the security of the Linux kernel by marking formerly read-write memory regions as read-only on a fully booted up system. Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: David Brown <david.brown@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@xxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455748879-21872-5-git-send-email-keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@xxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h | 3 +++ include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 1 + include/linux/cache.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h index 3d0e17bcc8e9..df0f52bd18b4 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h +++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ #define __read_mostly __attribute__((__section__(".data..read_mostly"))) +/* Read-only memory is marked before mark_rodata_ro() is called. */ +#define __ro_after_init __read_mostly + void parisc_cache_init(void); /* initializes cache-flushing */ void disable_sr_hashing_asm(int); /* low level support for above */ void disable_sr_hashing(void); /* turns off space register hashing */ diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h index a461b6604fd9..c63f92150eda 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h @@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ .rodata : AT(ADDR(.rodata) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \ VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start_rodata) = .; \ *(.rodata) *(.rodata.*) \ + *(.data..ro_after_init) /* Read only after init */ \ *(__vermagic) /* Kernel version magic */ \ . = ALIGN(8); \ VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start___tracepoints_ptrs) = .; \ diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h index 17e7e82d2aa7..1be04f8c563a 100644 --- a/include/linux/cache.h +++ b/include/linux/cache.h @@ -12,10 +12,24 @@ #define SMP_CACHE_BYTES L1_CACHE_BYTES #endif +/* + * __read_mostly is used to keep rarely changing variables out of frequently + * updated cachelines. If an architecture doesn't support it, ignore the + * hint. + */ #ifndef __read_mostly #define __read_mostly #endif +/* + * __ro_after_init is used to mark things that are read-only after init (i.e. + * after mark_rodata_ro() has been called). These are effectively read-only, + * but may get written to during init, so can't live in .rodata (via "const"). + */ +#ifndef __ro_after_init +#define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init"))) +#endif + #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES))) #endif -- 2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b