diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
index 7122d6264c49..c310db4ccbc2 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Contact: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@xxxxxxx>
Description:
Unsigned integer.
- Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to add a qmap mux
+ Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to add a qmap mux
based network device, supported by recent Qualcomm based
modems.
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ Contact: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@xxxxxxx>
Description:
Unsigned integer.
- Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to delete a previously
+ Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to delete a previously
created qmap mux based network device.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index ffc064c1ec68..49311f3da6f2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
+ spectre
l1tf
mds
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..25f3b2532198
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Spectre Side Channels
+=====================
+
+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
+
+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+ - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
+
+ - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
+
+ - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
+
+ - Higher end ARM processors
+
+ - Apple CPUs
+
+ - Higher end MIPS CPUs
+
+ - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
+
+ ============= ======================= =================
+ CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1
+ CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2
+ ============= ======================= =================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
+
+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
+:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
+---------------------------------------
+
+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
+leak information to the attacker.
+
+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+
+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`. The indirect
+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
+execution can be measured to infer data values.
+
+.. _poison_btb:
+
+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
+code with the same offset.
+
+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
+the attack revealing useful data.
+
+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget. An attacker's
+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
+return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
+
+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core. A malicious
+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
+victim's data.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
+not cover all possible attack vectors.
+
+1. A user process attacking the kernel
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
+ via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
+ be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
+ a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack. The index or pointer
+ is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
+ for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
+ accessed and leaked.
+
+ For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
+ potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
+ macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
+
+ Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+ target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
+ After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
+ target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
+ execution.
+
+ If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
+ speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
+ gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
+ the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
+
+ The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
+ target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
+ "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
+ indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
+ to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
+ x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
+ (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
+ mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
+ more efficient than retpoline.
+
+ There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
+ Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
+ attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
+ is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
+
+2. A user process attacking another user process
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
+ either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
+ sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
+ multi-threading (SMT) system.
+
+ Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
+ between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
+ as remote procedure calls (RPC). Those parameters are used in gadget
+ code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
+ the attacked process.
+
+ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
+ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer. This can
+ influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
+ runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
+ a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
+
+ A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
+ by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
+ for itself. An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
+ from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
+ indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
+ from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
+ target buffer. When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
+ indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
+ Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
+ sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer. In addition,
+ the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
+ branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
+
+ On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
+ This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
+ prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
+ a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
+ left by the previous process will also be cleared.
+
+ User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
+ more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
+
+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
+ kernel. The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
+ exit paths.
+
+ For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
+ (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
+ speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel. For places
+ where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
+ are used to stop speculative memory access.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
+ <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
+ the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
+
+ To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
+ for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
+ and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit. This prevents rogue
+ guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
+
+ To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
+ indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl(). The branch target
+ buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
+
+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
+ other guest.
+
+ Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
+ between guests. This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
+ or message passing. Such parameters could be used to derive data
+ pointers to privileged data in guest. The privileged data could be
+ accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
+
+ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
+ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
+ stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
+ speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
+
+ Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
+ CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
+ and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
+
+ If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
+ in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
+ by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
+ prctl(). A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
+ based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
+
+.. _spectre_sys_info:
+
+Spectre system information
+--------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ ======================================= =================================
+ 'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by
+ case base with explicit pointer
+ sanitation.
+ ======================================= =================================
+
+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
+variant 1 are covered.
+
+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
+
+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
+attack between user processes:
+
+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
+ isolation between processes of different users.
+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
+ isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
+
+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
+per process on a case-by-case base.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ - Kernel status:
+
+ ==================================== =================================
+ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
+ 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
+ ==================================== =================================
+
+ - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
+ used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
+
+ ========== =============================================================
+ 'IBRS_FW' Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
+ ========== =============================================================
+
+ - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
+ processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
+ prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
+ an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
+
+ =================== ========================================================
+ 'IBPB: disabled' IBPB unused
+ 'IBPB: always-on' Use IBPB on all tasks
+ 'IBPB: conditional' Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+ =================== ========================================================
+
+ - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
+ between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
+ prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
+ only feature. For more details see below.
+
+ ==================== ========================================================
+ 'STIBP: disabled' STIBP unused
+ 'STIBP: forced' Use STIBP on all tasks
+ 'STIBP: conditional' Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+ ==================== ========================================================
+
+ - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
+
+ ============= ===========================================
+ 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
+ ============= ===========================================
+
+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
+report vulnerability.
+
+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+1. Kernel mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
+ by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
+ basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
+ <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
+ not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
+ jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
+ :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
+ addresses. Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
+ in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
+ a gadget.
+
+ To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
+ needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
+ -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
+ If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
+ to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config
+ CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
+ the latest updated microcode.
+
+ On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
+ cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
+
+ On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
+ IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+ The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
+ CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
+ via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+ On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
+ before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
+ using the firmware.
+
+ Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+ and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
+ attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
+
+2. User program mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
+ clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
+ can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
+ This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
+ target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the
+ programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+ On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
+ sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
+ flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
+
+ Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
+ also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
+ on x86. All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
+ speculation restricted by default. Administrators can change
+ that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+ See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+ Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
+ more overhead and run slower.
+
+ User programs should use address space randomization
+ (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
+ difficult.
+
+3. VM mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
+ mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
+ uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
+ usable disclosure gadgets. However, this may not cover all variant
+ 1 attack vectors.
+
+ For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
+ Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
+ poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests. It also
+ flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
+ stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
+ or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
+
+ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
+ the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
+ to a new guest on a CPU.
+
+ The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
+
+ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
+ in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
+ its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
+
+ The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
+ they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
+
+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
+kernel command line.
+
+ nospectre_v2
+
+ [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+ allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+ to spectre_v2=off.
+
+
+ spectre_v2=
+
+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+ The default operation protects the kernel from
+ user space attacks.
+
+ on
+ unconditionally enable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=on
+ off
+ unconditionally disable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=off
+ auto
+ kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+ vulnerable
+
+ Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+ mitigation method at run time according to the
+ CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+ CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+ compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+ Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+ against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+ Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+ the user space protections.
+
+ Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+ retpoline
+ replace indirect branches
+ retpoline,generic
+ google's original retpoline
+ retpoline,amd
+ AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spectre_v2=auto.
+
+For user space mitigation:
+
+ spectre_v2_user=
+
+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+ user space tasks
+
+ on
+ Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+ off
+ Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+ prctl
+ Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+ but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+ per thread. The mitigation control state
+ is inherited on fork.
+
+ prctl,ibpb
+ Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different user
+ space processes.
+
+ seccomp
+ Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+ threads will enable the mitigation unless
+ they explicitly opt out.
+
+ seccomp,ibpb
+ Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different
+ user space processes.
+
+ auto
+ Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+ the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+ Default mitigation:
+ If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
+ In general the kernel by default selects
+ reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
+ disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
+ spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
+ cannot be disabled.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
+ execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
+ be disabled.
+
+2. Protect sensitive programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
+ keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
+ disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+
+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
+ off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
+ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+ This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
+ buffer. All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
+ branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
+ changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+3. High security mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
+ at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This will add
+ overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
+ restricted.
+
+ On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
+ to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
+ against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
+ sibling threads.
+
+ Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
+ whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
+ while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
+ program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
+ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This "ibpb" option
+ has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
+ on all the time.
+
+References on Spectre
+---------------------
+
+Intel white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref1:
+
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref2:
+
+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref3:
+
+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref4:
+
+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
+
+AMD white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref5:
+
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref6:
+
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+
+ARM white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref7:
+
+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref8:
+
+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
+
+Google white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref9:
+
+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
+
+MIPS white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref10:
+
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+
+Academic papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref11:
+
+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref12:
+
+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref13:
+
+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
index ee3723beb701..33b38716b77f 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Required properties:
- compatible: Should be one of the following:
- "microchip,mcp2510" for MCP2510.
- "microchip,mcp2515" for MCP2515.
+ - "microchip,mcp25625" for MCP25625.
- reg: SPI chip select.
- clocks: The clock feeding the CAN controller.
- interrupt-parent: The parent interrupt controller.
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index c4dbe6f7cdae..0fda8f614110 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-----------------------
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index c36e64bd9ae7..97c744513af0 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 133
+SUBLEVEL = 134
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Petit Gorille
diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c b/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c
index 333daab7def0..93453fa48193 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c
@@ -185,11 +185,6 @@ static void *__init unw_hdr_alloc_early(unsigned long sz)
MAX_DMA_ADDRESS);
}
-static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz)
-{
- return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
-}
-
static void init_unwind_table(struct unwind_table *table, const char *name,
const void *core_start, unsigned long core_size,
const void *init_start, unsigned long init_size,
@@ -370,6 +365,10 @@ static void init_unwind_hdr(struct unwind_table *table,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz)
+{
+ return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
static struct unwind_table *last_table;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi
index 1ec8e0d80191..572fbd254690 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
bus-width = <4>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&mmc1_pins>;
- cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+ cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
status = "okay";
};
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi
index 8ce541739b24..83e4fe595e37 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
bus-width = <4>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&mmc1_pins>;
- cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+ cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
status = "okay";
};
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi
index 036aeba4f02c..49f4bdc0d864 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@
pwm1: pwm@02080000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm";
reg = <0x02080000 0x4000>;
- interrupts = <GIC_SPI 115 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_SPI 83 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM1>,
<&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM1>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@
pwm2: pwm@02084000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm";
reg = <0x02084000 0x4000>;
- interrupts = <GIC_SPI 116 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_SPI 84 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM2>,
<&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM2>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@
pwm3: pwm@02088000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm";
reg = <0x02088000 0x4000>;
- interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM3>,
<&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM3>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@
pwm4: pwm@0208c000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm";
reg = <0x0208c000 0x4000>;
- interrupts = <GIC_SPI 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM4>,
<&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM4>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c
index 2f6ac1afa804..686e7e6f2eb3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c
@@ -1464,6 +1464,8 @@ static __init void da850_evm_init(void)
if (ret)
pr_warn("%s: dsp/rproc registration failed: %d\n",
__func__, ret);
+
+ regulator_has_full_constraints();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c
index 22440c05d66a..7120f93eab0b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c
@@ -699,6 +699,9 @@ static struct platform_device da8xx_lcdc_device = {
.id = 0,
.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(da8xx_lcdc_resources),
.resource = da8xx_lcdc_resources,
+ .dev = {
+ .coherent_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32),
+ }
};
int __init da8xx_register_lcdc(struct da8xx_lcdc_platform_data *pdata)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c
index a2dd13217c89..2819c43fe754 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static void omap3_prm_reconfigure_io_chain(void)
* registers, and omap3xxx_prm_reconfigure_io_chain() must be called.
* No return value.
*/
-static void __init omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup(void)
+static void omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup(void)
{
if (prm_features & PRM_HAS_IO_WAKEUP)
omap2_prm_set_mod_reg_bits(OMAP3430_EN_IO_MASK, WKUP_MOD,
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h
index 26143e3b7c26..69c3de90c536 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h
@@ -11,14 +11,6 @@
#ifndef __ASM_SGIDEFS_H
#define __ASM_SGIDEFS_H
-/*
- * Using a Linux compiler for building Linux seems logic but not to
- * everybody.
- */
-#ifndef __linux__
-#error Use a Linux compiler or give up.
-#endif
-
/*
* Definitions for the ISA levels
*
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h
index 2d58478c2745..9fee469d7130 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h
@@ -59,6 +59,18 @@ static inline int test_facility(unsigned long nr)
return __test_facility(nr, &S390_lowcore.stfle_fac_list);
}
+static inline unsigned long __stfle_asm(u64 *stfle_fac_list, int size)
+{
+ register unsigned long reg0 asm("0") = size - 1;
+
+ asm volatile(
+ ".insn s,0xb2b00000,0(%1)" /* stfle */
+ : "+d" (reg0)
+ : "a" (stfle_fac_list)
+ : "memory", "cc");
+ return reg0;
+}
+
/**
* stfle - Store facility list extended
* @stfle_fac_list: array where facility list can be stored
@@ -76,13 +88,8 @@ static inline void stfle(u64 *stfle_fac_list, int size)
memcpy(stfle_fac_list, &S390_lowcore.stfl_fac_list, 4);
if (S390_lowcore.stfl_fac_list & 0x01000000) {
/* More facility bits available with stfle */
- register unsigned long reg0 asm("0") = size - 1;
-
- asm volatile(".insn s,0xb2b00000,0(%1)" /* stfle */
- : "+d" (reg0)
- : "a" (stfle_fac_list)
- : "memory", "cc");
- nr = (reg0 + 1) * 8; /* # bytes stored by stfle */
+ nr = __stfle_asm(stfle_fac_list, size);
+ nr = min_t(unsigned long, (nr + 1) * 8, size * 8);
}
memset((char *) stfle_fac_list + nr, 0, size * 8 - nr);
preempt_enable();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 45b5c6c4a55e..7c67d8939f3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -117,26 +117,27 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
- i = (physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_P4D;
- p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
- p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ i = physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT;
+ p4d[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ p4d[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
} else {
i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD;
pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
}
- i = (physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PUD;
- pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
- pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
+ i = physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT;
+ pud[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
+ pud[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask();
pmd_entry += physaddr;
for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(_end - _text, PMD_SIZE); i++) {
- int idx = i + (physaddr >> PMD_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PMD;
- pmd[idx] = pmd_entry + i * PMD_SIZE;
+ int idx = i + (physaddr >> PMD_SHIFT);
+
+ pmd[idx % PTRS_PER_PMD] = pmd_entry + i * PMD_SIZE;
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index ed5c4cdf0a34..2a65ab291312 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -651,9 +652,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
{
struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
unsigned long val = 0;
+ int index = n;
if (n < HBP_NUM) {
- struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+ struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
+ index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
if (bp)
val = bp->hw.info.address;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index a5b802a12212..71d3fef1edc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/regset.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
struct user_desc __user *u_info)
{
struct user_desc info;
+ int index;
if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
- fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
- &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+ index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
+ index = array_index_nospec(index,
+ GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
+
+ fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c
index 7d45ac451745..e65b0da1007b 100644
--- a/block/bfq-iosched.c
+++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c
@@ -3760,6 +3760,7 @@ static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync)
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags);
+ bfqq->bic = NULL;
bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq);
bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, is_sync);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags);
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 96a0f940e54d..1af9f36f89cf 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3876,6 +3876,8 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE: {
binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
+ kfree(w);
+ binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
if (put_user(cmd, (uint32_t __user *)ptr))
return -EFAULT;
ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
@@ -3884,8 +3886,6 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE,
"%d:%d BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE\n",
proc->pid, thread->pid);
- kfree(w);
- binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
} break;
case BINDER_WORK_NODE: {
struct binder_node *node = container_of(w, struct binder_node, work);
diff --git a/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c b/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c
index 07532d83be0b..e405ea3ca8d8 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c
@@ -669,7 +669,8 @@ static int cacheinfo_cpu_pre_down(unsigned int cpu)
static int __init cacheinfo_sysfs_init(void)
{
- return cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "base/cacheinfo:online",
+ return cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
+ "base/cacheinfo:online",
cacheinfo_cpu_online, cacheinfo_cpu_pre_down);
}
device_initcall(cacheinfo_sysfs_init);
diff --git a/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c b/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c
index 82e4d5cccf84..2df8564f08a0 100644
--- a/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ static struct clk_hw *_ti_omap4_clkctrl_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *clkspec,
{
struct omap_clkctrl_provider *provider = data;
struct omap_clkctrl_clk *entry;
+ bool found = false;
if (clkspec->args_count != 2)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -224,11 +225,13 @@ static struct clk_hw *_ti_omap4_clkctrl_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *clkspec,
list_for_each_entry(entry, &provider->clocks, node) {
if (entry->reg_offset == clkspec->args[0] &&
- entry->bit_offset == clkspec->args[1])
+ entry->bit_offset == clkspec->args[1]) {
+ found = true;
break;
+ }
}
- if (!entry)
+ if (!found)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return entry->clk;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c
index 874ddf5e9087..dbf80b55c2a4 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("842-nx");
#define WORKMEM_ALIGN (CRB_ALIGN)
#define CSB_WAIT_MAX (5000) /* ms */
#define VAS_RETRIES (10)
-/* # of requests allowed per RxFIFO at a time. 0 for unlimited */
-#define MAX_CREDITS_PER_RXFIFO (1024)
struct nx842_workmem {
/* Below fields must be properly aligned */
@@ -801,7 +799,11 @@ static int __init vas_cfg_coproc_info(struct device_node *dn, int chip_id,
rxattr.lnotify_lpid = lpid;
rxattr.lnotify_pid = pid;
rxattr.lnotify_tid = tid;
- rxattr.wcreds_max = MAX_CREDITS_PER_RXFIFO;
+ /*
+ * Maximum RX window credits can not be more than #CRBs in
+ * RxFIFO. Otherwise, can get checkstop if RxFIFO overruns.
+ */
+ rxattr.wcreds_max = fifo_size / CRB_SIZE;
/*
* Open a VAS receice window which is used to configure RxFIFO
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
index 4388f4e3840c..1f8fe1795964 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -2185,7 +2185,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),"
"cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2271,7 +2271,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2315,7 +2315,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),"
"cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2357,7 +2357,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2401,7 +2401,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),"
"cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2527,7 +2527,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
- "cbc-aes-talitos",
+ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
@@ -2569,7 +2569,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
- "cbc-3des-talitos",
+ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
},
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c
index 50793fda7819..e3d86aa1ad5d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c
@@ -50,11 +50,6 @@ void __init efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table)
bgrt->version);
goto out;
}
- if (bgrt->status & 0xfe) {
- pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: reserved status bits are non-zero %u\n",
- bgrt->status);
- goto out;
- }
if (bgrt->image_type != 0) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid image type %u (expected 0)\n",
bgrt->image_type);
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c
index 0f05b8d8fefa..b829fde80f7b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c
@@ -1321,7 +1321,10 @@ static int copy_one_buf(void *data, int count, struct drm_buf_entry *from)
.size = from->buf_size,
.low_mark = from->low_mark,
.high_mark = from->high_mark};
- return copy_to_user(to, &v, offsetof(struct drm_buf_desc, flags));
+
+ if (copy_to_user(to, &v, offsetof(struct drm_buf_desc, flags)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
}
int drm_legacy_infobufs(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c
index f8e96e648acf..bfeeb6a56135 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c
@@ -372,7 +372,10 @@ static int copy_one_buf32(void *data, int count, struct drm_buf_entry *from)
.size = from->buf_size,
.low_mark = from->low_mark,
.high_mark = from->high_mark};
- return copy_to_user(to + count, &v, offsetof(drm_buf_desc32_t, flags));
+
+ if (copy_to_user(to + count, &v, offsetof(drm_buf_desc32_t, flags)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
}
static int drm_legacy_infobufs32(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c
index b45ac6bc8add..b428c3da7576 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c
@@ -43,10 +43,16 @@ static const struct file_operations udl_driver_fops = {
.llseek = noop_llseek,
};
+static void udl_driver_release(struct drm_device *dev)
+{
+ udl_fini(dev);
+ udl_modeset_cleanup(dev);
+ drm_dev_fini(dev);
+ kfree(dev);
+}
+
static struct drm_driver driver = {
.driver_features = DRIVER_MODESET | DRIVER_GEM | DRIVER_PRIME,
- .load = udl_driver_load,
- .unload = udl_driver_unload,
.release = udl_driver_release,
/* gem hooks */
@@ -70,28 +76,56 @@ static struct drm_driver driver = {
.patchlevel = DRIVER_PATCHLEVEL,
};
+static struct udl_device *udl_driver_create(struct usb_interface *interface)
+{
+ struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
+ struct udl_device *udl;
+ int r;
+
+ udl = kzalloc(sizeof(*udl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!udl)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ r = drm_dev_init(&udl->drm, &driver, &interface->dev);
+ if (r) {
+ kfree(udl);
+ return ERR_PTR(r);
+ }
+
+ udl->udev = udev;
+ udl->drm.dev_private = udl;
+
+ r = udl_init(udl);
+ if (r) {
+ drm_dev_fini(&udl->drm);
+ kfree(udl);
+ return ERR_PTR(r);
+ }
+
+ usb_set_intfdata(interface, udl);
+ return udl;
+}
+
static int udl_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
- struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
- struct drm_device *dev;
int r;
+ struct udl_device *udl;
- dev = drm_dev_alloc(&driver, &interface->dev);
- if (IS_ERR(dev))
- return PTR_ERR(dev);
+ udl = udl_driver_create(interface);
+ if (IS_ERR(udl))
+ return PTR_ERR(udl);
- r = drm_dev_register(dev, (unsigned long)udev);
+ r = drm_dev_register(&udl->drm, 0);
if (r)
goto err_free;
- usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev);
- DRM_INFO("Initialized udl on minor %d\n", dev->primary->index);
+ DRM_INFO("Initialized udl on minor %d\n", udl->drm.primary->index);
return 0;
err_free:
- drm_dev_unref(dev);
+ drm_dev_unref(&udl->drm);
return r;
}
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h
index 307455dd6526..d5a5dcd15dd8 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ struct urb_list {
struct udl_fbdev;
struct udl_device {
+ struct drm_device drm;
struct device *dev;
- struct drm_device *ddev;
struct usb_device *udev;
struct drm_crtc *crtc;
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ struct udl_device {
atomic_t cpu_kcycles_used; /* transpired during pixel processing */
};
+#define to_udl(x) container_of(x, struct udl_device, drm)
+
struct udl_gem_object {
struct drm_gem_object base;
struct page **pages;
@@ -99,9 +101,8 @@ struct urb *udl_get_urb(struct drm_device *dev);
int udl_submit_urb(struct drm_device *dev, struct urb *urb, size_t len);
void udl_urb_completion(struct urb *urb);
-int udl_driver_load(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long flags);
-void udl_driver_unload(struct drm_device *dev);
-void udl_driver_release(struct drm_device *dev);
+int udl_init(struct udl_device *udl);
+void udl_fini(struct drm_device *dev);
int udl_fbdev_init(struct drm_device *dev);
void udl_fbdev_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev);
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c
index 491f1892b50e..f41fd0684ce4 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int udl_handle_damage(struct udl_framebuffer *fb, int x, int y,
int width, int height)
{
struct drm_device *dev = fb->base.dev;
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
int i, ret;
char *cmd;
cycles_t start_cycles, end_cycles;
@@ -210,10 +210,10 @@ static int udl_fb_open(struct fb_info *info, int user)
{
struct udl_fbdev *ufbdev = info->par;
struct drm_device *dev = ufbdev->ufb.base.dev;
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
/* If the USB device is gone, we don't accept new opens */
- if (drm_dev_is_unplugged(udl->ddev))
+ if (drm_dev_is_unplugged(&udl->drm))
return -ENODEV;
ufbdev->fb_count++;
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static void udl_fbdev_destroy(struct drm_device *dev,
int udl_fbdev_init(struct drm_device *dev)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
int bpp_sel = fb_bpp;
struct udl_fbdev *ufbdev;
int ret;
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ int udl_fbdev_init(struct drm_device *dev)
void udl_fbdev_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
if (!udl->fbdev)
return;
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ void udl_fbdev_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev)
void udl_fbdev_unplug(struct drm_device *dev)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
struct udl_fbdev *ufbdev;
if (!udl->fbdev)
return;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c
index 60866b422f81..124428f33e1e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
static int udl_parse_vendor_descriptor(struct drm_device *dev,
struct usb_device *usbdev)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
char *desc;
char *buf;
char *desc_end;
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void udl_urb_completion(struct urb *urb)
static void udl_free_urb_list(struct drm_device *dev)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
int count = udl->urbs.count;
struct list_head *node;
struct urb_node *unode;
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void udl_free_urb_list(struct drm_device *dev)
static int udl_alloc_urb_list(struct drm_device *dev, int count, size_t size)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
struct urb *urb;
struct urb_node *unode;
char *buf;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int udl_alloc_urb_list(struct drm_device *dev, int count, size_t size)
struct urb *udl_get_urb(struct drm_device *dev)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
int ret = 0;
struct list_head *entry;
struct urb_node *unode;
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ struct urb *udl_get_urb(struct drm_device *dev)
int udl_submit_urb(struct drm_device *dev, struct urb *urb, size_t len)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
int ret;
BUG_ON(len > udl->urbs.size);
@@ -311,20 +311,12 @@ int udl_submit_urb(struct drm_device *dev, struct urb *urb, size_t len)
return ret;
}
-int udl_driver_load(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long flags)
+int udl_init(struct udl_device *udl)
{
- struct usb_device *udev = (void*)flags;
- struct udl_device *udl;
+ struct drm_device *dev = &udl->drm;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
DRM_DEBUG("\n");
- udl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct udl_device), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!udl)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- udl->udev = udev;
- udl->ddev = dev;
- dev->dev_private = udl;
if (!udl_parse_vendor_descriptor(dev, udl->udev)) {
ret = -ENODEV;
@@ -359,7 +351,6 @@ int udl_driver_load(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long flags)
err:
if (udl->urbs.count)
udl_free_urb_list(dev);
- kfree(udl);
DRM_ERROR("%d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -370,20 +361,12 @@ int udl_drop_usb(struct drm_device *dev)
return 0;
}
-void udl_driver_unload(struct drm_device *dev)
+void udl_fini(struct drm_device *dev)
{
- struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private;
+ struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev);
if (udl->urbs.count)
udl_free_urb_list(dev);
udl_fbdev_cleanup(dev);
- kfree(udl);
-}
-
-void udl_driver_release(struct drm_device *dev)
-{
- udl_modeset_cleanup(dev);
- drm_dev_fini(dev);
- kfree(dev);
}
diff --git a/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c b/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c
index 2165f3dd328b..842c0235471d 100644
--- a/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c
+++ b/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c
@@ -530,11 +530,12 @@ static int imx_keypad_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return 0;
}
-static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_suspend(struct device *dev)
+static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_noirq_suspend(struct device *dev)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
struct imx_keypad *kbd = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
struct input_dev *input_dev = kbd->input_dev;
+ unsigned short reg_val = readw(kbd->mmio_base + KPSR);
/* imx kbd can wake up system even clock is disabled */
mutex_lock(&input_dev->mutex);
@@ -544,13 +545,20 @@ static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_suspend(struct device *dev)
mutex_unlock(&input_dev->mutex);
- if (device_may_wakeup(&pdev->dev))
+ if (device_may_wakeup(&pdev->dev)) {
+ if (reg_val & KBD_STAT_KPKD)
+ reg_val |= KBD_STAT_KRIE;
+ if (reg_val & KBD_STAT_KPKR)
+ reg_val |= KBD_STAT_KDIE;
+ writew(reg_val, kbd->mmio_base + KPSR);
+
enable_irq_wake(kbd->irq);
+ }
return 0;
}
-static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_resume(struct device *dev)
+static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_noirq_resume(struct device *dev)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
struct imx_keypad *kbd = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
@@ -574,7 +582,9 @@ static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_resume(struct device *dev)
return ret;
}
-static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(imx_kbd_pm_ops, imx_kbd_suspend, imx_kbd_resume);
+static const struct dev_pm_ops imx_kbd_pm_ops = {
+ SET_NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(imx_kbd_noirq_suspend, imx_kbd_noirq_resume)
+};
static struct platform_driver imx_keypad_driver = {
.driver = {
diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c b/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c
index fda33fc3ffcc..ab4888d043f0 100644
--- a/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c
+++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c
@@ -1191,6 +1191,8 @@ static const char * const middle_button_pnp_ids[] = {
"LEN2132", /* ThinkPad P52 */
"LEN2133", /* ThinkPad P72 w/ NFC */
"LEN2134", /* ThinkPad P72 */
+ "LEN0407",
+ "LEN0408",
NULL
};
diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c
index a5f279da83a1..1a6a05c45ee7 100644
--- a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c
+++ b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static const char * const smbus_pnp_ids[] = {
"LEN0072", /* X1 Carbon Gen 5 (2017) - Elan/ALPS trackpoint */
"LEN0073", /* X1 Carbon G5 (Elantech) */
"LEN0092", /* X1 Carbon 6 */
+ "LEN0093", /* T480 */
"LEN0096", /* X280 */
"LEN0097", /* X280 -> ALPS trackpoint */
"LEN200f", /* T450s */
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
index 8573c70a1880..e705799976c2 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ static int verity_handle_err(struct dm_verity *v, enum verity_block_type type,
BUG();
}
- DMERR("%s: %s block %llu is corrupted", v->data_dev->name, type_str,
- block);
+ DMERR_LIMIT("%s: %s block %llu is corrupted", v->data_dev->name,
+ type_str, block);
if (v->corrupted_errs == DM_VERITY_MAX_CORRUPTED_ERRS)
DMERR("%s: reached maximum errors", v->data_dev->name);
diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c
index b27a69388dcd..764ed9c46629 100644
--- a/drivers/md/md.c
+++ b/drivers/md/md.c
@@ -7605,9 +7605,9 @@ static void status_unused(struct seq_file *seq)
static int status_resync(struct seq_file *seq, struct mddev *mddev)
{
sector_t max_sectors, resync, res;
- unsigned long dt, db;
- sector_t rt;
- int scale;
+ unsigned long dt, db = 0;
+ sector_t rt, curr_mark_cnt, resync_mark_cnt;
+ int scale, recovery_active;
unsigned int per_milli;
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery) ||
@@ -7677,22 +7677,30 @@ static int status_resync(struct seq_file *seq, struct mddev *mddev)
* db: blocks written from mark until now
* rt: remaining time
*
- * rt is a sector_t, so could be 32bit or 64bit.
- * So we divide before multiply in case it is 32bit and close
- * to the limit.
- * We scale the divisor (db) by 32 to avoid losing precision
- * near the end of resync when the number of remaining sectors
- * is close to 'db'.
- * We then divide rt by 32 after multiplying by db to compensate.
- * The '+1' avoids division by zero if db is very small.
+ * rt is a sector_t, which is always 64bit now. We are keeping
+ * the original algorithm, but it is not really necessary.
+ *
+ * Original algorithm:
+ * So we divide before multiply in case it is 32bit and close
+ * to the limit.
+ * We scale the divisor (db) by 32 to avoid losing precision
+ * near the end of resync when the number of remaining sectors
+ * is close to 'db'.
+ * We then divide rt by 32 after multiplying by db to compensate.
+ * The '+1' avoids division by zero if db is very small.
*/
dt = ((jiffies - mddev->resync_mark) / HZ);
if (!dt) dt++;
- db = (mddev->curr_mark_cnt - atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active))
- - mddev->resync_mark_cnt;
+
+ curr_mark_cnt = mddev->curr_mark_cnt;
+ recovery_active = atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active);
+ resync_mark_cnt = mddev->resync_mark_cnt;
+
+ if (curr_mark_cnt >= (recovery_active + resync_mark_cnt))
+ db = curr_mark_cnt - (recovery_active + resync_mark_cnt);
rt = max_sectors - resync; /* number of remaining sectors */
- sector_div(rt, db/32+1);
+ rt = div64_u64(rt, db/32+1);
rt *= dt;
rt >>= 5;
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
index 21d0fa592145..bc089e634a75 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
#include "vmci_driver.h"
#include "vmci_event.h"
+/* Use a wide upper bound for the maximum contexts. */
+#define VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS 2000
+
/*
* List of current VMCI contexts. Contexts can be added by
* vmci_ctx_create() and removed via vmci_ctx_destroy().
@@ -125,19 +128,22 @@ struct vmci_ctx *vmci_ctx_create(u32 cid, u32 priv_flags,
/* Initialize host-specific VMCI context. */
init_waitqueue_head(&context->host_context.wait_queue);
- context->queue_pair_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->queue_pair_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT);
if (!context->queue_pair_array) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_ctx;
}
- context->doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->doorbell_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
if (!context->doorbell_array) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_qp_array;
}
- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->pending_doorbell_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_db_array;
@@ -212,7 +218,7 @@ static int ctx_fire_notification(u32 context_id, u32 priv_flags)
* We create an array to hold the subscribers we find when
* scanning through all contexts.
*/
- subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS);
if (subscriber_array == NULL)
return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
@@ -631,20 +637,26 @@ int vmci_ctx_add_notification(u32 context_id, u32 remote_cid)
spin_lock(&context->lock);
- list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
- if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
- exists = true;
- break;
+ if (context->n_notifiers < VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS) {
+ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
+ if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
+ exists = true;
+ break;
+ }
}
- }
- if (exists) {
- kfree(notifier);
- result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
+ if (exists) {
+ kfree(notifier);
+ result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
+ } else {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node,
+ &context->notifier_list);
+ context->n_notifiers++;
+ result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
+ }
} else {
- list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node, &context->notifier_list);
- context->n_notifiers++;
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
+ kfree(notifier);
+ result = VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
}
spin_unlock(&context->lock);
@@ -729,8 +741,7 @@ static int vmci_ctx_get_chkpt_doorbells(struct vmci_ctx *context,
u32 *buf_size, void **pbuf)
{
struct dbell_cpt_state *dbells;
- size_t n_doorbells;
- int i;
+ u32 i, n_doorbells;
n_doorbells = vmci_handle_arr_get_size(context->doorbell_array);
if (n_doorbells > 0) {
@@ -868,7 +879,8 @@ int vmci_ctx_rcv_notifications_get(u32 context_id,
spin_lock(&context->lock);
*db_handle_array = context->pending_doorbell_array;
- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+ context->pending_doorbell_array =
+ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
context->pending_doorbell_array = *db_handle_array;
*db_handle_array = NULL;
@@ -950,12 +962,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_dbell_create(u32 context_id, struct vmci_handle handle)
return VMCI_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
spin_lock(&context->lock);
- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) {
- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, handle);
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
- } else {
+ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle))
+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array,
+ handle);
+ else
result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
- }
spin_unlock(&context->lock);
vmci_ctx_put(context);
@@ -1091,15 +1102,16 @@ int vmci_ctx_notify_dbell(u32 src_cid,
if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(
dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
handle)) {
- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
&dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
handle);
-
- ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
- wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
-
+ if (result == VMCI_SUCCESS) {
+ ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
+ wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
+ }
+ } else {
+ result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
}
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
}
spin_unlock(&dst_context->lock);
}
@@ -1126,13 +1138,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_qp_create(struct vmci_ctx *context, struct vmci_handle handle)
if (context == NULL || vmci_handle_is_invalid(handle))
return VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) {
- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->queue_pair_array,
- handle);
- result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
- } else {
+ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle))
+ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
+ &context->queue_pair_array, handle);
+ else
result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
- }
return result;
}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
index 344973a0fb0a..917e18a8af95 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
@@ -16,24 +16,29 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "vmci_handle_array.h"
-static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(size_t capacity)
+static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(u32 capacity)
{
- return sizeof(struct vmci_handle_arr) +
+ return VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE +
capacity * sizeof(struct vmci_handle);
}
-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity)
+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity)
{
struct vmci_handle_arr *array;
+ if (max_capacity == 0 || capacity > max_capacity)
+ return NULL;
+
if (capacity == 0)
- capacity = VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE;
+ capacity = min((u32)VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY,
+ max_capacity);
array = kmalloc(handle_arr_calc_size(capacity), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!array)
return NULL;
array->capacity = capacity;
+ array->max_capacity = max_capacity;
array->size = 0;
return array;
@@ -44,27 +49,34 @@ void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
kfree(array);
}
-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
- struct vmci_handle handle)
+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
+ struct vmci_handle handle)
{
struct vmci_handle_arr *array = *array_ptr;
if (unlikely(array->size >= array->capacity)) {
/* reallocate. */
struct vmci_handle_arr *new_array;
- size_t new_capacity = array->capacity * VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT;
- size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(new_capacity);
+ u32 capacity_bump = min(array->max_capacity - array->capacity,
+ array->capacity);
+ size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(array->capacity +
+ capacity_bump);
+
+ if (array->size >= array->max_capacity)
+ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
new_array = krealloc(array, new_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new_array)
- return;
+ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
- new_array->capacity = new_capacity;
+ new_array->capacity += capacity_bump;
*array_ptr = array = new_array;
}
array->entries[array->size] = handle;
array->size++;
+
+ return VMCI_SUCCESS;
}
/*
@@ -74,7 +86,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
{
struct vmci_handle handle = VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
- size_t i;
+ u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) {
if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) {
@@ -109,7 +121,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
* Handle at given index, VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE if invalid index.
*/
struct vmci_handle
-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index)
{
if (unlikely(index >= array->size))
return VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
@@ -120,7 +132,7 @@ vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
{
- size_t i;
+ u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++)
if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle))
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
index b5f3a7f98cf1..0fc58597820e 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
@@ -17,32 +17,41 @@
#define _VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_H_
#include <linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE 4
-#define VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT 2 /* Array capacity multiplier */
-
struct vmci_handle_arr {
- size_t capacity;
- size_t size;
+ u32 capacity;
+ u32 max_capacity;
+ u32 size;
+ u32 pad;
struct vmci_handle entries[];
};
-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity);
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE \
+ offsetof(struct vmci_handle_arr, entries)
+/* Select a default capacity that results in a 64 byte sized array */
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY 6
+/* Make sure that the max array size can be expressed by a u32 */
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_MAX_CAPACITY \
+ ((U32_MAX - VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE - 1) / \
+ sizeof(struct vmci_handle))
+
+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity);
void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
- struct vmci_handle handle);
+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
+ struct vmci_handle handle);
struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle
entry_handle);
struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
struct vmci_handle
-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index);
+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index);
bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
struct vmci_handle entry_handle);
struct vmci_handle *vmci_handle_arr_get_handles(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
-static inline size_t vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
+static inline u32 vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
const struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
{
return array->size;
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
index d3ce904e929e..ebad93ac8f11 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
@@ -818,6 +818,27 @@ static int m_can_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int quota)
if (!irqstatus)
goto end;
+ /* Errata workaround for issue "Needless activation of MRAF irq"
+ * During frame reception while the MCAN is in Error Passive state
+ * and the Receive Error Counter has the value MCAN_ECR.REC = 127,
+ * it may happen that MCAN_IR.MRAF is set although there was no
+ * Message RAM access failure.
+ * If MCAN_IR.MRAF is enabled, an interrupt to the Host CPU is generated
+ * The Message RAM Access Failure interrupt routine needs to check
+ * whether MCAN_ECR.RP = ’1’ and MCAN_ECR.REC = 127.
+ * In this case, reset MCAN_IR.MRAF. No further action is required.
+ */
+ if ((priv->version <= 31) && (irqstatus & IR_MRAF) &&
+ (m_can_read(priv, M_CAN_ECR) & ECR_RP)) {
+ struct can_berr_counter bec;
+
+ __m_can_get_berr_counter(dev, &bec);
+ if (bec.rxerr == 127) {
+ m_can_write(priv, M_CAN_IR, IR_MRAF);
+ irqstatus &= ~IR_MRAF;
+ }
+ }
+
psr = m_can_read(priv, M_CAN_PSR);
if (irqstatus & IR_ERR_STATE)
work_done += m_can_handle_state_errors(dev, psr);
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig b/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig
index 8f2e0dd7b756..792e9c6c4a2f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig
@@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ config CAN_HI311X
Driver for the Holt HI311x SPI CAN controllers.
config CAN_MCP251X
- tristate "Microchip MCP251x SPI CAN controllers"
+ tristate "Microchip MCP251x and MCP25625 SPI CAN controllers"
depends on HAS_DMA
---help---
- Driver for the Microchip MCP251x SPI CAN controllers.
+ Driver for the Microchip MCP251x and MCP25625 SPI CAN
+ controllers.
endmenu
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c
index f3f05fea8e1f..d8c448beab24 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * CAN bus driver for Microchip 251x CAN Controller with SPI Interface
+ * CAN bus driver for Microchip 251x/25625 CAN Controller with SPI Interface
*
* MCP2510 support and bug fixes by Christian Pellegrin
* <chripell@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
* static struct spi_board_info spi_board_info[] = {
* {
* .modalias = "mcp2510",
- * // or "mcp2515" depending on your controller
+ * // "mcp2515" or "mcp25625" depending on your controller
* .platform_data = &mcp251x_info,
* .irq = IRQ_EINT13,
* .max_speed_hz = 2*1000*1000,
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static const struct can_bittiming_const mcp251x_bittiming_const = {
enum mcp251x_model {
CAN_MCP251X_MCP2510 = 0x2510,
CAN_MCP251X_MCP2515 = 0x2515,
+ CAN_MCP251X_MCP25625 = 0x25625,
};
struct mcp251x_priv {
@@ -280,7 +281,6 @@ static inline int mcp251x_is_##_model(struct spi_device *spi) \
}
MCP251X_IS(2510);
-MCP251X_IS(2515);
static void mcp251x_clean(struct net_device *net)
{
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ static int mcp251x_hw_reset(struct spi_device *spi)
/* Wait for oscillator startup timer after reset */
mdelay(MCP251X_OST_DELAY_MS);
-
+
reg = mcp251x_read_reg(spi, CANSTAT);
if ((reg & CANCTRL_REQOP_MASK) != CANCTRL_REQOP_CONF)
return -ENODEV;
@@ -821,9 +821,8 @@ static irqreturn_t mcp251x_can_ist(int irq, void *dev_id)
/* receive buffer 0 */
if (intf & CANINTF_RX0IF) {
mcp251x_hw_rx(spi, 0);
- /*
- * Free one buffer ASAP
- * (The MCP2515 does this automatically.)
+ /* Free one buffer ASAP
+ * (The MCP2515/25625 does this automatically.)
*/
if (mcp251x_is_2510(spi))
mcp251x_write_bits(spi, CANINTF, CANINTF_RX0IF, 0x00);
@@ -832,7 +831,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mcp251x_can_ist(int irq, void *dev_id)
/* receive buffer 1 */
if (intf & CANINTF_RX1IF) {
mcp251x_hw_rx(spi, 1);
- /* the MCP2515 does this automatically */
+ /* The MCP2515/25625 does this automatically. */
if (mcp251x_is_2510(spi))
clear_intf |= CANINTF_RX1IF;
}
@@ -1007,6 +1006,10 @@ static const struct of_device_id mcp251x_of_match[] = {
.compatible = "microchip,mcp2515",
.data = (void *)CAN_MCP251X_MCP2515,
},
+ {
+ .compatible = "microchip,mcp25625",
+ .data = (void *)CAN_MCP251X_MCP25625,
+ },
{ }
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, mcp251x_of_match);
@@ -1020,6 +1023,10 @@ static const struct spi_device_id mcp251x_id_table[] = {
.name = "mcp2515",
.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)CAN_MCP251X_MCP2515,
},
+ {
+ .name = "mcp25625",
+ .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)CAN_MCP251X_MCP25625,
+ },
{ }
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(spi, mcp251x_id_table);
@@ -1260,5 +1267,5 @@ module_spi_driver(mcp251x_can_driver);
MODULE_AUTHOR("Chris Elston <celston@xxxxxxxxxxx>, "
"Christian Pellegrin <chripell@xxxxxxxxxxxx>");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Microchip 251x CAN driver");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Microchip 251x/25625 CAN driver");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c
index 8c8a0ec3d6e9..f260bd30c73a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ int mv88e6185_g1_vtu_loadpurge(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip,
* VTU DBNum[7:4] are located in VTU Operation 11:8
*/
op |= entry->fid & 0x000f;
- op |= (entry->fid & 0x00f0) << 8;
+ op |= (entry->fid & 0x00f0) << 4;
}
return mv88e6xxx_g1_vtu_op(chip, op);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c
index 3fd1085a093f..65bc1929d1a8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c
@@ -1581,7 +1581,8 @@ static int bnx2x_get_module_info(struct net_device *dev,
}
if (!sff8472_comp ||
- (diag_type & SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_ADDR_CHANGE_REQ)) {
+ (diag_type & SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_ADDR_CHANGE_REQ) ||
+ !(diag_type & SFP_EEPROM_DDM_IMPLEMENTED)) {
modinfo->type = ETH_MODULE_SFF_8079;
modinfo->eeprom_len = ETH_MODULE_SFF_8079_LEN;
} else {
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h
index b7d251108c19..7115f5025664 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
#define SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_TYPE_ADDR 0x5c
#define SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_TYPE_SIZE 1
#define SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_ADDR_CHANGE_REQ (1<<2)
+#define SFP_EEPROM_DDM_IMPLEMENTED (1<<6)
#define SFP_EEPROM_SFF_8472_COMP_ADDR 0x5e
#define SFP_EEPROM_SFF_8472_COMP_SIZE 1
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c
index 23f6b60030c5..8c16298a252d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c
@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static void liquidio_schedule_droq_pkt_handlers(struct octeon_device *oct)
if (droq->ops.poll_mode) {
droq->ops.napi_fn(droq);
- oct_priv->napi_mask |= (1 << oq_no);
+ oct_priv->napi_mask |= BIT_ULL(oq_no);
} else {
tasklet_schedule(&oct_priv->droq_tasklet);
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c
index 6ce7b8435ace..f66b246acaea 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static void be_self_test(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_test *test,
u64 *data)
{
struct be_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
- int status;
+ int status, cnt;
u8 link_status = 0;
if (adapter->function_caps & BE_FUNCTION_CAPS_SUPER_NIC) {
@@ -904,6 +904,9 @@ static void be_self_test(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_test *test,
memset(data, 0, sizeof(u64) * ETHTOOL_TESTS_NUM);
+ /* check link status before offline tests */
+ link_status = netif_carrier_ok(netdev);
+
if (test->flags & ETH_TEST_FL_OFFLINE) {
if (be_loopback_test(adapter, BE_MAC_LOOPBACK, &data[0]) != 0)
test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
@@ -924,13 +927,26 @@ static void be_self_test(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_test *test,
test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
}
- status = be_cmd_link_status_query(adapter, NULL, &link_status, 0);
- if (status) {
- test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
- data[4] = -1;
- } else if (!link_status) {
+ /* link status was down prior to test */
+ if (!link_status) {
test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
data[4] = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (cnt = 10; cnt; cnt--) {
+ status = be_cmd_link_status_query(adapter, NULL, &link_status,
+ 0);
+ if (status) {
+ test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
+ data[4] = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (link_status)
+ break;
+
+ msleep_interruptible(500);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
index c914b338691b..956fbb164e6f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
@@ -1489,6 +1489,9 @@ static int do_reset(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter,
return 0;
}
+ /* refresh device's multicast list */
+ ibmvnic_set_multi(netdev);
+
/* kick napi */
for (i = 0; i < adapter->req_rx_queues; i++)
napi_schedule(&adapter->napi[i]);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c
index 3c214a47c1c4..1ad345796e80 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c
@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ void e1000e_up(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
e1000_configure_msix(adapter);
e1000_irq_enable(adapter);
- netif_start_queue(adapter->netdev);
+ /* Tx queue started by watchdog timer when link is up */
e1000e_trigger_lsc(adapter);
}
@@ -4604,6 +4604,7 @@ int e1000e_open(struct net_device *netdev)
pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev);
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
+ netif_stop_queue(netdev);
/* allocate transmit descriptors */
err = e1000e_setup_tx_resources(adapter->tx_ring);
@@ -4664,7 +4665,6 @@ int e1000e_open(struct net_device *netdev)
e1000_irq_enable(adapter);
adapter->tx_hang_recheck = false;
- netif_start_queue(netdev);
hw->mac.get_link_status = true;
pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev);
@@ -5286,6 +5286,7 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work)
if (phy->ops.cfg_on_link_up)
phy->ops.cfg_on_link_up(hw);
+ netif_wake_queue(netdev);
netif_carrier_on(netdev);
if (!test_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->state))
@@ -5299,6 +5300,7 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work)
/* Link status message must follow this format */
pr_info("%s NIC Link is Down\n", adapter->netdev->name);
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
+ netif_stop_queue(netdev);
if (!test_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->state))
mod_timer(&adapter->phy_info_timer,
round_jiffies(jiffies + 2 * HZ));
@@ -5306,13 +5308,8 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work)
/* 8000ES2LAN requires a Rx packet buffer work-around
* on link down event; reset the controller to flush
* the Rx packet buffer.
- *
- * If the link is lost the controller stops DMA, but
- * if there is queued Tx work it cannot be done. So
- * reset the controller to flush the Tx packet buffers.
*/
- if ((adapter->flags & FLAG_RX_NEEDS_RESTART) ||
- e1000_desc_unused(tx_ring) + 1 < tx_ring->count)
+ if (adapter->flags & FLAG_RX_NEEDS_RESTART)
adapter->flags |= FLAG_RESTART_NOW;
else
pm_schedule_suspend(netdev->dev.parent,
@@ -5335,6 +5332,14 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work)
adapter->gotc_old = adapter->stats.gotc;
spin_unlock(&adapter->stats64_lock);
+ /* If the link is lost the controller stops DMA, but
+ * if there is queued Tx work it cannot be done. So
+ * reset the controller to flush the Tx packet buffers.
+ */
+ if (!netif_carrier_ok(netdev) &&
+ (e1000_desc_unused(tx_ring) + 1 < tx_ring->count))
+ adapter->flags |= FLAG_RESTART_NOW;
+
/* If reset is necessary, do it outside of interrupt context. */
if (adapter->flags & FLAG_RESTART_NOW) {
schedule_work(&adapter->reset_task);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h
index 5acfbe5b8b9d..8ab7a4f98a07 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static inline void mlxsw_reg_spaft_pack(char *payload, u8 local_port,
MLXSW_REG_ZERO(spaft, payload);
mlxsw_reg_spaft_local_port_set(payload, local_port);
mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_untagged_set(payload, allow_untagged);
- mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_prio_tagged_set(payload, true);
+ mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_prio_tagged_set(payload, allow_untagged);
mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_tagged_set(payload, true);
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c
index 40bd88362e3d..693f9582173b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ sis900_open(struct net_device *net_dev)
sis900_set_mode(sis_priv, HW_SPEED_10_MBPS, FDX_CAPABLE_HALF_SELECTED);
/* Enable all known interrupts by setting the interrupt mask. */
- sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE);
+ sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC);
sw32(cr, RxENA | sr32(cr));
sw32(ier, IE);
@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ static void sis900_tx_timeout(struct net_device *net_dev)
sw32(txdp, sis_priv->tx_ring_dma);
/* Enable all known interrupts by setting the interrupt mask. */
- sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE);
+ sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC);
}
/**
@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ sis900_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net_dev)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sis_priv->lock, flags);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
- sis_priv->tx_ring[entry].cmdsts = (OWN | skb->len);
+ sis_priv->tx_ring[entry].cmdsts = (OWN | INTR | skb->len);
sw32(cr, TxENA | sr32(cr));
sis_priv->cur_tx ++;
@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ static irqreturn_t sis900_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_instance)
do {
status = sr32(isr);
- if ((status & (HIBERR|TxURN|TxERR|TxIDLE|RxORN|RxERR|RxOK)) == 0)
+ if ((status & (HIBERR|TxURN|TxERR|TxIDLE|TxDESC|RxORN|RxERR|RxOK)) == 0)
/* nothing intresting happened */
break;
handled = 1;
@@ -1686,7 +1686,7 @@ static irqreturn_t sis900_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_instance)
/* Rx interrupt */
sis900_rx(net_dev);
- if (status & (TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE))
+ if (status & (TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC))
/* Tx interrupt */
sis900_finish_xmit(net_dev);
@@ -1898,8 +1898,8 @@ static void sis900_finish_xmit (struct net_device *net_dev)
if (tx_status & OWN) {
/* The packet is not transmitted yet (owned by hardware) !
- * Note: the interrupt is generated only when Tx Machine
- * is idle, so this is an almost impossible case */
+ * Note: this is an almost impossible condition
+ * in case of TxDESC ('descriptor interrupt') */
break;
}
@@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ static int sis900_resume(struct pci_dev *pci_dev)
sis900_set_mode(sis_priv, HW_SPEED_10_MBPS, FDX_CAPABLE_HALF_SELECTED);
/* Enable all known interrupts by setting the interrupt mask. */
- sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE);
+ sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC);
sw32(cr, RxENA | sr32(cr));
sw32(ier, IE);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
index 6c7fd98cb00a..d9eda7c217e9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Frank Cusack <fcusack@xxxxxxxxxxx>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Point-to-Point Protocol Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption support");
MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
MODULE_ALIAS("ppp-compress-" __stringify(CI_MPPE));
+MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: arc4");
MODULE_VERSION("1.0.2");
static unsigned int
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 063daa3435e4..4b0144b2a252 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static bool qmimux_has_slaves(struct usbnet *dev)
static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- unsigned int len, offset = 0;
+ unsigned int len, offset = 0, pad_len, pkt_len;
struct qmimux_hdr *hdr;
struct net_device *net;
struct sk_buff *skbn;
@@ -171,10 +171,16 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (hdr->pad & 0x80)
goto skip;
+ /* extract padding length and check for valid length info */
+ pad_len = hdr->pad & 0x3f;
+ if (len == 0 || pad_len >= len)
+ goto skip;
+ pkt_len = len - pad_len;
+
net = qmimux_find_dev(dev, hdr->mux_id);
if (!net)
goto skip;
- skbn = netdev_alloc_skb(net, len);
+ skbn = netdev_alloc_skb(net, pkt_len);
if (!skbn)
return 0;
skbn->dev = net;
@@ -191,7 +197,7 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
goto skip;
}
- skb_put_data(skbn, skb->data + offset + qmimux_hdr_sz, len);
+ skb_put_data(skbn, skb->data + offset + qmimux_hdr_sz, pkt_len);
if (netif_rx(skbn) != NET_RX_SUCCESS)
return 0;
@@ -241,13 +247,14 @@ static int qmimux_register_device(struct net_device *real_dev, u8 mux_id)
return err;
}
-static void qmimux_unregister_device(struct net_device *dev)
+static void qmimux_unregister_device(struct net_device *dev,
+ struct list_head *head)
{
struct qmimux_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_device *real_dev = priv->real_dev;
netdev_upper_dev_unlink(real_dev, dev);
- unregister_netdevice(dev);
+ unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head);
/* Get rid of the reference to real_dev */
dev_put(real_dev);
@@ -356,8 +363,8 @@ static ssize_t add_mux_store(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, c
if (kstrtou8(buf, 0, &mux_id))
return -EINVAL;
- /* mux_id [1 - 0x7f] range empirically found */
- if (mux_id < 1 || mux_id > 0x7f)
+ /* mux_id [1 - 254] for compatibility with ip(8) and the rmnet driver */
+ if (mux_id < 1 || mux_id > 254)
return -EINVAL;
if (!rtnl_trylock())
@@ -418,7 +425,7 @@ static ssize_t del_mux_store(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, c
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
- qmimux_unregister_device(del_dev);
+ qmimux_unregister_device(del_dev, NULL);
if (!qmimux_has_slaves(dev))
info->flags &= ~QMI_WWAN_FLAG_MUX;
@@ -1417,6 +1424,7 @@ static void qmi_wwan_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
struct qmi_wwan_state *info;
struct list_head *iter;
struct net_device *ldev;
+ LIST_HEAD(list);
/* called twice if separate control and data intf */
if (!dev)
@@ -1429,8 +1437,9 @@ static void qmi_wwan_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
}
rcu_read_lock();
netdev_for_each_upper_dev_rcu(dev->net, ldev, iter)
- qmimux_unregister_device(ldev);
+ qmimux_unregister_device(ldev, &list);
rcu_read_unlock();
+ unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
rtnl_unlock();
info->flags &= ~QMI_WWAN_FLAG_MUX;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
index e7c3f3b8457d..99f1897a775d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id carl9170_usb_ids[] = {
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, carl9170_usb_ids);
+static struct usb_driver carl9170_driver;
+
static void carl9170_usb_submit_data_urb(struct ar9170 *ar)
{
struct urb *urb;
@@ -966,32 +968,28 @@ static int carl9170_usb_init_device(struct ar9170 *ar)
static void carl9170_usb_firmware_failed(struct ar9170 *ar)
{
- struct device *parent = ar->udev->dev.parent;
- struct usb_device *udev;
-
- /*
- * Store a copy of the usb_device pointer locally.
- * This is because device_release_driver initiates
- * carl9170_usb_disconnect, which in turn frees our
- * driver context (ar).
+ /* Store a copies of the usb_interface and usb_device pointer locally.
+ * This is because release_driver initiates carl9170_usb_disconnect,
+ * which in turn frees our driver context (ar).
*/
- udev = ar->udev;
+ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
+ struct usb_device *udev = ar->udev;
complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
+ /* at this point 'ar' could be already freed. Don't use it anymore */
+ ar = NULL;
/* unbind anything failed */
- if (parent)
- device_lock(parent);
-
- device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
- if (parent)
- device_unlock(parent);
+ usb_lock_device(udev);
+ usb_driver_release_interface(&carl9170_driver, intf);
+ usb_unlock_device(udev);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
}
static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
{
+ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
int err;
err = carl9170_parse_firmware(ar);
@@ -1009,7 +1007,7 @@ static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
goto err_unrx;
complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
- usb_put_dev(ar->udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
return;
err_unrx:
@@ -1052,7 +1050,6 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
return PTR_ERR(ar);
udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
- usb_get_dev(udev);
ar->udev = udev;
ar->intf = intf;
ar->features = id->driver_info;
@@ -1094,15 +1091,14 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
atomic_set(&ar->rx_anch_urbs, 0);
atomic_set(&ar->rx_pool_urbs, 0);
- usb_get_dev(ar->udev);
+ usb_get_intf(intf);
carl9170_set_state(ar, CARL9170_STOPPED);
err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, CARL9170FW_NAME,
&ar->udev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, ar, carl9170_usb_firmware_step2);
if (err) {
- usb_put_dev(udev);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
carl9170_free(ar);
}
return err;
@@ -1131,7 +1127,6 @@ static void carl9170_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
carl9170_release_firmware(ar);
carl9170_free(ar);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c
index 99676d6c4713..6c10b8c4ddbe 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c
@@ -1509,7 +1509,6 @@ static void iwl_req_fw_callback(const struct firmware *ucode_raw, void *context)
goto free;
out_free_fw:
- iwl_dealloc_ucode(drv);
release_firmware(ucode_raw);
out_unbind:
complete(&drv->request_firmware_complete);
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
index b0b86f701061..15661da6eedc 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("prism54usb");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3886usb");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3887usb");
+static struct usb_driver p54u_driver;
+
/*
* Note:
*
@@ -921,9 +923,9 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
{
struct p54u_priv *priv = context;
struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev;
+ struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf;
int err;
- complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
if (firmware) {
priv->fw = firmware;
err = p54u_start_ops(priv);
@@ -932,26 +934,22 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
dev_err(&udev->dev, "Firmware not found.\n");
}
- if (err) {
- struct device *parent = priv->udev->dev.parent;
-
- dev_err(&udev->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
-
- if (parent)
- device_lock(parent);
+ complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
+ /*
+ * At this point p54u_disconnect may have already freed
+ * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
+ */
+ priv = NULL;
- device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
- /*
- * At this point p54u_disconnect has already freed
- * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
- */
- priv = NULL;
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(&intf->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
- if (parent)
- device_unlock(parent);
+ usb_lock_device(udev);
+ usb_driver_release_interface(&p54u_driver, intf);
+ usb_unlock_device(udev);
}
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
}
static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
@@ -972,14 +970,14 @@ static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
dev_info(&priv->udev->dev, "Loading firmware file %s\n",
p54u_fwlist[i].fw);
- usb_get_dev(udev);
+ usb_get_intf(intf);
err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, p54u_fwlist[i].fw,
device, GFP_KERNEL, priv,
p54u_load_firmware_cb);
if (err) {
dev_err(&priv->udev->dev, "(p54usb) cannot load firmware %s "
"(%d)!\n", p54u_fwlist[i].fw, err);
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ usb_put_intf(intf);
}
return err;
@@ -1011,8 +1009,6 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
skb_queue_head_init(&priv->rx_queue);
init_usb_anchor(&priv->submitted);
- usb_get_dev(udev);
-
/* really lazy and simple way of figuring out if we're a 3887 */
/* TODO: should just stick the identification in the device table */
i = intf->altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints;
@@ -1053,10 +1049,8 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
priv->upload_fw = p54u_upload_firmware_net2280;
}
err = p54u_load_firmware(dev, intf);
- if (err) {
- usb_put_dev(udev);
+ if (err)
p54_free_common(dev);
- }
return err;
}
@@ -1072,7 +1066,6 @@ static void p54u_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
wait_for_completion(&priv->fw_wait_load);
p54_unregister_common(dev);
- usb_put_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf));
release_firmware(priv->fw);
p54_free_common(dev);
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
index 9e75522d248a..342555ebafd7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
@@ -1744,9 +1744,10 @@ struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status {
struct ieee_types_vendor_header {
u8 element_id;
u8 len;
- u8 oui[4]; /* 0~2: oui, 3: oui_type */
- u8 oui_subtype;
- u8 version;
+ struct {
+ u8 oui[3];
+ u8 oui_type;
+ } __packed oui;
} __packed;
struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
@@ -1760,6 +1761,9 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
* Version [1]
*/
struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
+ u8 oui_subtype;
+ u8 version;
+
u8 qos_info_bitmap;
u8 reserved;
struct ieee_types_wmm_ac_parameters ac_params[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS];
@@ -1777,6 +1781,8 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_info {
* Version [1]
*/
struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
+ u8 oui_subtype;
+ u8 version;
u8 qos_info_bitmap;
} __packed;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c
index 922e3d69fd84..32853496fe8c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c
@@ -329,6 +329,8 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
struct ieee80211_vendor_ie *vendorhdr;
u16 gen_idx = MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK, ie_len = 0;
int left_len, parsed_len = 0;
+ unsigned int token_len;
+ int err = 0;
if (!info->tail || !info->tail_len)
return 0;
@@ -344,6 +346,12 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
*/
while (left_len > sizeof(struct ieee_types_header)) {
hdr = (void *)(info->tail + parsed_len);
+ token_len = hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header);
+ if (token_len > left_len) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
switch (hdr->element_id) {
case WLAN_EID_SSID:
case WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES:
@@ -357,13 +365,16 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:
break;
default:
- memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, hdr,
- hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header));
- ie_len += hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header);
+ if (ie_len + token_len > IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, hdr, token_len);
+ ie_len += token_len;
break;
}
- left_len -= hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header);
- parsed_len += hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header);
+ left_len -= token_len;
+ parsed_len += token_len;
}
/* parse only WPA vendor IE from tail, WMM IE is configured by
@@ -373,15 +384,17 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
WLAN_OUI_TYPE_MICROSOFT_WPA,
info->tail, info->tail_len);
if (vendorhdr) {
- memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, vendorhdr,
- vendorhdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header));
- ie_len += vendorhdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header);
+ token_len = vendorhdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header);
+ if (ie_len + token_len > IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, vendorhdr, token_len);
+ ie_len += token_len;
}
- if (!ie_len) {
- kfree(gen_ie);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!ie_len)
+ goto out;
gen_ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(gen_idx);
gen_ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(MGMT_MASK_BEACON |
@@ -391,13 +404,15 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
if (mwifiex_update_uap_custom_ie(priv, gen_ie, &gen_idx, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL)) {
- kfree(gen_ie);
- return -1;
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
priv->gen_idx = gen_idx;
+
+ out:
kfree(gen_ie);
- return 0;
+ return err;
}
/* This function parses different IEs-head & tail IEs, beacon IEs,
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
index c9d41ed77fc7..29284f9a0646 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
@@ -1244,6 +1244,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
}
switch (element_id) {
case WLAN_EID_SSID:
+ if (element_len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
bss_entry->ssid.ssid_len = element_len;
memcpy(bss_entry->ssid.ssid, (current_ptr + 2),
element_len);
@@ -1253,6 +1255,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
break;
case WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES:
+ if (element_len > MWIFIEX_SUPPORTED_RATES)
+ return -EINVAL;
memcpy(bss_entry->data_rates, current_ptr + 2,
element_len);
memcpy(bss_entry->supported_rates, current_ptr + 2,
@@ -1262,6 +1266,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
break;
case WLAN_EID_FH_PARAMS:
+ if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*fh_param_set))
+ return -EINVAL;
fh_param_set =
(struct ieee_types_fh_param_set *) current_ptr;
memcpy(&bss_entry->phy_param_set.fh_param_set,
@@ -1270,6 +1276,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
break;
case WLAN_EID_DS_PARAMS:
+ if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*ds_param_set))
+ return -EINVAL;
ds_param_set =
(struct ieee_types_ds_param_set *) current_ptr;
@@ -1281,6 +1289,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
break;
case WLAN_EID_CF_PARAMS:
+ if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*cf_param_set))
+ return -EINVAL;
cf_param_set =
(struct ieee_types_cf_param_set *) current_ptr;
memcpy(&bss_entry->ss_param_set.cf_param_set,
@@ -1289,6 +1299,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
break;
case WLAN_EID_IBSS_PARAMS:
+ if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*ibss_param_set))
+ return -EINVAL;
ibss_param_set =
(struct ieee_types_ibss_param_set *)
current_ptr;
@@ -1298,10 +1310,14 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
break;
case WLAN_EID_ERP_INFO:
+ if (!element_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
bss_entry->erp_flags = *(current_ptr + 2);
break;
case WLAN_EID_PWR_CONSTRAINT:
+ if (!element_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
bss_entry->local_constraint = *(current_ptr + 2);
bss_entry->sensed_11h = true;
break;
@@ -1344,15 +1360,22 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
current_ptr;
- if (!memcmp
- (vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
- sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
+ /* 802.11 requires at least 3-byte OUI. */
+ if (element_len < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui.oui))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Not long enough for a match? Skip it. */
+ if (element_len < sizeof(wpa_oui))
+ break;
+
+ if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
+ sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
bss_entry->bcn_wpa_ie =
(struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
current_ptr;
bss_entry->wpa_offset = (u16)
(current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
- } else if (!memcmp(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
+ } else if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
sizeof(wmm_oui))) {
if (total_ie_len ==
sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter) ||
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
index a6077ab3efc3..82828a207963 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
/* Test to see if it is a WPA IE, if not, then
* it is a gen IE
*/
- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
+ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
/* IE is a WPA/WPA2 IE so call set_wpa function
*/
@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
goto next_ie;
}
- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
+ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
sizeof(wps_oui))) {
/* Test to see if it is a WPS IE,
* if so, enable wps session flag
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
index 0edd26881321..7fba4d940131 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ mwifiex_wmm_setup_queue_priorities(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, INFO,
"info: WMM Parameter IE: version=%d,\t"
"qos_info Parameter Set Count=%d, Reserved=%#x\n",
- wmm_ie->vend_hdr.version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
+ wmm_ie->version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK,
wmm_ie->reserved);
diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
index 35286907c636..d0090c5c88e7 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ static int __qdio_allocate_qs(struct qdio_q **irq_ptr_qs, int nr_queues)
return -ENOMEM;
}
irq_ptr_qs[i] = q;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->entry);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -178,6 +179,7 @@ static void setup_queues_misc(struct qdio_q *q, struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr,
q->mask = 1 << (31 - i);
q->nr = i;
q->handler = handler;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->entry);
}
static void setup_storage_lists(struct qdio_q *q, struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr,
diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c
index a739bdf9630e..831a3a0a2837 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ void tiqdio_add_input_queues(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr)
mutex_lock(&tiq_list_lock);
list_add_rcu(&irq_ptr->input_qs[0]->entry, &tiq_list);
mutex_unlock(&tiq_list_lock);
- xchg(irq_ptr->dsci, 1 << 7);
}
void tiqdio_remove_input_queues(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr)
@@ -91,14 +90,14 @@ void tiqdio_remove_input_queues(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr)
struct qdio_q *q;
q = irq_ptr->input_qs[0];
- /* if establish triggered an error */
- if (!q || !q->entry.prev || !q->entry.next)
+ if (!q)
return;
mutex_lock(&tiq_list_lock);
list_del_rcu(&q->entry);
mutex_unlock(&tiq_list_lock);
synchronize_rcu();
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->entry);
}
static inline int has_multiple_inq_on_dsci(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
index 48c7890c3007..2b0b757dc626 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
@@ -2339,7 +2339,8 @@ static irqreturn_t pci230_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
devpriv->intr_running = false;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devpriv->isr_spinlock, irqflags);
- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
+ if (s_ao)
+ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ai);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
index d5295bbdd28c..37133d54dda1 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
@@ -566,7 +566,8 @@ static irqreturn_t dt282x_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
}
#endif
comedi_handle_events(dev, s);
- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
+ if (s_ao)
+ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
return IRQ_RETVAL(handled);
}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c b/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c
index a6f249e9c1e1..4d218d554878 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
* Licensed under the GPL-2 or later.
*/
+#include <linux/bitfield.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ static int ad7150_read_event_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
{
int ret;
u8 threshtype;
- bool adaptive;
+ bool thrfixed;
struct ad7150_chip_info *chip = iio_priv(indio_dev);
ret = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(chip->client, AD7150_CFG);
@@ -137,21 +138,23 @@ static int ad7150_read_event_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
return ret;
threshtype = (ret >> 5) & 0x03;
- adaptive = !!(ret & 0x80);
+
+ /*check if threshold mode is fixed or adaptive*/
+ thrfixed = FIELD_GET(AD7150_CFG_FIX, ret);
switch (type) {
case IIO_EV_TYPE_MAG_ADAPTIVE:
if (dir == IIO_EV_DIR_RISING)
- return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x1);
- return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x0);
+ return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x1);
+ return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x0);
case IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH_ADAPTIVE:
if (dir == IIO_EV_DIR_RISING)
- return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x3);
- return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x2);
+ return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x3);
+ return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x2);
case IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH:
if (dir == IIO_EV_DIR_RISING)
- return !adaptive && (threshtype == 0x1);
- return !adaptive && (threshtype == 0x0);
+ return thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x1);
+ return thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x0);
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
index ecf3d631bc09..ab0796d14ac1 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
@@ -1873,8 +1873,7 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir)
status = serial_port_in(port, UART_LSR);
- if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) &&
- iir & UART_IIR_RDI) {
+ if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI)) {
if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir))
status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status);
}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
index 3a0e4f5d7b83..81d84e0c3c6c 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
@@ -190,11 +190,12 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
out = dev->port_usb->out_ep;
else
out = NULL;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
if (!out)
+ {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return -ENOTCONN;
-
+ }
/* Padding up to RX_EXTRA handles minor disagreements with host.
* Normally we use the USB "terminate on short read" convention;
@@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
if (dev->port_usb->is_fixed)
size = max_t(size_t, size, dev->port_usb->fixed_out_len);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(dev->net, size + NET_IP_ALIGN, gfp_flags);
if (skb == NULL) {
diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
index 5d369b38868a..b6d9308d43ba 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
@@ -818,9 +818,8 @@ static int __usbhsf_dma_map_ctrl(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int map)
}
static void usbhsf_dma_complete(void *arg);
-static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
+static void usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt)
{
- struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
struct usbhs_fifo *fifo;
struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
@@ -828,12 +827,10 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct dma_chan *chan;
struct device *dev = usbhs_priv_to_dev(priv);
enum dma_transfer_direction dir;
- unsigned long flags;
- usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
fifo = usbhs_pipe_to_fifo(pipe);
if (!fifo)
- goto xfer_work_end;
+ return;
chan = usbhsf_dma_chan_get(fifo, pkt);
dir = usbhs_pipe_is_dir_in(pipe) ? DMA_DEV_TO_MEM : DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
@@ -842,7 +839,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
pkt->trans, dir,
DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
if (!desc)
- goto xfer_work_end;
+ return;
desc->callback = usbhsf_dma_complete;
desc->callback_param = pipe;
@@ -850,7 +847,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
pkt->cookie = dmaengine_submit(desc);
if (pkt->cookie < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to submit dma descriptor\n");
- goto xfer_work_end;
+ return;
}
dev_dbg(dev, " %s %d (%d/ %d)\n",
@@ -861,8 +858,17 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
dma_async_issue_pending(chan);
usbhsf_dma_start(pipe, fifo);
usbhs_pipe_enable(pipe);
+}
+
+static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
+ struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
+ struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
+ unsigned long flags;
-xfer_work_end:
+ usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
usbhs_unlock(priv, flags);
}
@@ -915,8 +921,13 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_push(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int *is_done)
pkt->trans = len;
usbhsf_tx_irq_ctrl(pipe, 0);
- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
- schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+ /* FIXME: Workaound for usb dmac that driver can be used in atomic */
+ if (usbhs_get_dparam(priv, has_usb_dmac)) {
+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
+ } else {
+ INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
+ schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+ }
return 0;
@@ -1022,8 +1033,7 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_pop_with_usb_dmac(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt,
pkt->trans = pkt->length;
- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
- schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
index e76395d7f17d..d2349c094767 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
@@ -1024,6 +1024,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(AIRBUS_DS_VID, AIRBUS_DS_P8GR) },
/* EZPrototypes devices */
{ USB_DEVICE(EZPROTOTYPES_VID, HJELMSLUND_USB485_ISO_PID) },
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER(UNJO_VID, UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID, 1) },
{ } /* Terminating entry */
};
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
index 5755f0df0025..f12d806220b4 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
@@ -1543,3 +1543,9 @@
#define CHETCO_SEASMART_DISPLAY_PID 0xA5AD /* SeaSmart NMEA2000 Display */
#define CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID 0xA5AE /* SeaSmart Lite USB Adapter */
#define CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID 0xA5AF /* SeaSmart Analog Adapter */
+
+/*
+ * Unjo AB
+ */
+#define UNJO_VID 0x22B7
+#define UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID 0x150D
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 3c8e4970876c..8b9e12ab1fe6 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -1346,6 +1346,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
.driver_info = RSVD(4) },
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0414, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0417, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0601, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (RNDIS mode) */
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0602, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (MBIM mode) */
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x1008, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff),
.driver_info = RSVD(4) },
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index a120649beeca..d13a154c8424 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
if (ret == -ENODATA) {
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
ret = -ENOTDIR;
+ else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
+ ret = -ENOENT;
else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
else
diff --git a/fs/quota/dquot.c b/fs/quota/dquot.c
index 4cd0c2336624..9c81fd973418 100644
--- a/fs/quota/dquot.c
+++ b/fs/quota/dquot.c
@@ -1989,8 +1989,8 @@ int __dquot_transfer(struct inode *inode, struct dquot **transfer_to)
&warn_to[cnt]);
if (ret)
goto over_quota;
- ret = dquot_add_space(transfer_to[cnt], cur_space, rsv_space, 0,
- &warn_to[cnt]);
+ ret = dquot_add_space(transfer_to[cnt], cur_space, rsv_space,
+ DQUOT_SPACE_WARN, &warn_to[cnt]);
if (ret) {
spin_lock(&transfer_to[cnt]->dq_dqb_lock);
dquot_decr_inodes(transfer_to[cnt], inode_usage);
diff --git a/fs/udf/inode.c b/fs/udf/inode.c
index 28b9d7cca29b..3c1b54091d6c 100644
--- a/fs/udf/inode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/inode.c
@@ -470,13 +470,15 @@ static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, long block,
return NULL;
}
-/* Extend the file by 'blocks' blocks, return the number of extents added */
+/* Extend the file with new blocks totaling 'new_block_bytes',
+ * return the number of extents added
+ */
static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
struct extent_position *last_pos,
struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
- sector_t blocks)
+ loff_t new_block_bytes)
{
- sector_t add;
+ uint32_t add;
int count = 0, fake = !(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct kernel_lb_addr prealloc_loc = {};
@@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
/* The previous extent is fake and we should not extend by anything
* - there's nothing to do... */
- if (!blocks && fake)
+ if (!new_block_bytes && fake)
return 0;
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
@@ -517,13 +519,12 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
/* Can we merge with the previous extent? */
if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) ==
EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED) {
- add = ((1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
- (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK)) >>
- sb->s_blocksize_bits;
- if (add > blocks)
- add = blocks;
- blocks -= add;
- last_ext->extLength += add << sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
+ (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
+ if (add > new_block_bytes)
+ add = new_block_bytes;
+ new_block_bytes -= add;
+ last_ext->extLength += add;
}
if (fake) {
@@ -544,28 +545,27 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
}
/* Managed to do everything necessary? */
- if (!blocks)
+ if (!new_block_bytes)
goto out;
/* All further extents will be NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED */
last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0;
last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0;
- add = (1 << (30-sb->s_blocksize_bits)) - 1;
- last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
- (add << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize;
+ last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | add;
/* Create enough extents to cover the whole hole */
- while (blocks > add) {
- blocks -= add;
+ while (new_block_bytes > add) {
+ new_block_bytes -= add;
err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
if (err)
return err;
count++;
}
- if (blocks) {
+ if (new_block_bytes) {
last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
- (blocks << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+ new_block_bytes;
err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
if (err)
@@ -596,6 +596,24 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
return count;
}
+/* Extend the final block of the file to final_block_len bytes */
+static void udf_do_extend_final_block(struct inode *inode,
+ struct extent_position *last_pos,
+ struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
+ uint32_t final_block_len)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
+ uint32_t added_bytes;
+
+ added_bytes = final_block_len -
+ (last_ext->extLength & (sb->s_blocksize - 1));
+ last_ext->extLength += added_bytes;
+ UDF_I(inode)->i_lenExtents += added_bytes;
+
+ udf_write_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
+ last_ext->extLength, 1);
+}
+
static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
{
@@ -605,10 +623,12 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
int8_t etype;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
sector_t first_block = newsize >> sb->s_blocksize_bits, offset;
+ unsigned long partial_final_block;
int adsize;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
struct kernel_long_ad extent;
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
+ int within_final_block;
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad);
@@ -618,18 +638,8 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
BUG();
etype = inode_bmap(inode, first_block, &epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset);
+ within_final_block = (etype != -1);
- /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
- * inside a block)? */
- if (etype != -1)
- return 0;
- if (newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
- offset++;
- /* Extended file just to the boundary of the last file block? */
- if (offset == 0)
- return 0;
-
- /* Truncate is extending the file by 'offset' blocks */
if ((!epos.bh && epos.offset == udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode)) ||
(epos.bh && epos.offset == sizeof(struct allocExtDesc))) {
/* File has no extents at all or has empty last
@@ -643,7 +653,22 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
&extent.extLength, 0);
extent.extLength |= etype << 30;
}
- err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, offset);
+
+ partial_final_block = newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
+
+ /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
+ * inside a block)?
+ */
+ if (within_final_block) {
+ /* Extending file within the last file block */
+ udf_do_extend_final_block(inode, &epos, &extent,
+ partial_final_block);
+ } else {
+ loff_t add = ((loff_t)offset << sb->s_blocksize_bits) |
+ partial_final_block;
+ err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, add);
+ }
+
if (err < 0)
goto out;
err = 0;
@@ -745,6 +770,7 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
/* Are we beyond EOF? */
if (etype == -1) {
int ret;
+ loff_t hole_len;
isBeyondEOF = true;
if (count) {
if (c)
@@ -760,7 +786,8 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
startnum = (offset > 0);
}
/* Create extents for the hole between EOF and offset */
- ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, offset);
+ hole_len = (loff_t)offset << inode->i_blkbits;
+ ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, hole_len);
if (ret < 0) {
*err = ret;
newblock = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
index 6376e2dcb0b7..0c78ad0cc515 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_THREAD_IMC_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN_END = CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN + 30,
CPUHP_AP_X86_HPET_ONLINE,
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 1c5469adaa85..bb7baecef002 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@
#define DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL(ll, d) \
({ unsigned long long _tmp = (ll); do_div(_tmp, d); _tmp; })
-#define DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d) DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL((ll) + (d) - 1, (d))
+#define DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d) \
+ DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL((unsigned long long)(ll) + (d) - 1, (d))
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
# define DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T(ll,d) DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d)
diff --git a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
index b724ef7005de..53c5e40a2a8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
@@ -68,9 +68,18 @@ enum {
/*
* A single VMCI device has an upper limit of 128MB on the amount of
- * memory that can be used for queue pairs.
+ * memory that can be used for queue pairs. Since each queue pair
+ * consists of at least two pages, the memory limit also dictates the
+ * number of queue pairs a guest can create.
*/
#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY (128 * 1024 * 1024)
+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT (VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY / PAGE_SIZE / 2)
+
+/*
+ * There can be at most PAGE_SIZE doorbells since there is one doorbell
+ * per byte in the doorbell bitmap page.
+ */
+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT PAGE_SIZE
/*
* Queues with pre-mapped data pages must be small, so that we don't pin
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
index d66f70f63734..3b0e3cdee1c3 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
@@ -152,9 +152,12 @@ static inline void ip6tunnel_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(struct inet6_skb_parm));
pkt_len = skb->len - skb_inner_network_offset(skb);
err = ip6_local_out(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), sk, skb);
- if (unlikely(net_xmit_eval(err)))
- pkt_len = -1;
- iptunnel_xmit_stats(dev, pkt_len);
+
+ if (dev) {
+ if (unlikely(net_xmit_eval(err)))
+ pkt_len = -1;
+ iptunnel_xmit_stats(dev, pkt_len);
+ }
}
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h b/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h
index a7e66ab11d1d..c23f91ae5fe8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
-
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#define NILFS_INODE_BMAP_SIZE 7
@@ -533,19 +533,19 @@ enum {
static inline void \
nilfs_checkpoint_set_##name(struct nilfs_checkpoint *cp) \
{ \
- cp->cp_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) | \
- (1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \
+ cp->cp_flags = __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) | \
+ (1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \
} \
static inline void \
nilfs_checkpoint_clear_##name(struct nilfs_checkpoint *cp) \
{ \
- cp->cp_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \
+ cp->cp_flags = __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \
~(1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \
} \
static inline int \
nilfs_checkpoint_##name(const struct nilfs_checkpoint *cp) \
{ \
- return !!(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \
+ return !!(__le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \
(1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \
}
@@ -595,20 +595,20 @@ enum {
static inline void \
nilfs_segment_usage_set_##name(struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) \
{ \
- su->su_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) | \
+ su->su_flags = __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) | \
(1UL << NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_##flag));\
} \
static inline void \
nilfs_segment_usage_clear_##name(struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) \
{ \
su->su_flags = \
- cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \
+ __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \
~(1UL << NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_##flag)); \
} \
static inline int \
nilfs_segment_usage_##name(const struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) \
{ \
- return !!(le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \
+ return !!(__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \
(1UL << NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_##flag)); \
}
@@ -619,15 +619,15 @@ NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_FNS(ERROR, error)
static inline void
nilfs_segment_usage_set_clean(struct nilfs_segment_usage *su)
{
- su->su_lastmod = cpu_to_le64(0);
- su->su_nblocks = cpu_to_le32(0);
- su->su_flags = cpu_to_le32(0);
+ su->su_lastmod = __cpu_to_le64(0);
+ su->su_nblocks = __cpu_to_le32(0);
+ su->su_flags = __cpu_to_le32(0);
}
static inline int
nilfs_segment_usage_clean(const struct nilfs_segment_usage *su)
{
- return !le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags);
+ return !__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags);
}
/**
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index f370a0f43005..d768e15bef83 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -1944,6 +1944,9 @@ static ssize_t write_cpuhp_fail(struct device *dev,
if (ret)
return ret;
+ if (fail < CPUHP_OFFLINE || fail > CPUHP_ONLINE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/*
* Cannot fail STARTING/DYING callbacks.
*/
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 580616e6fcee..3d4eb6f840eb 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -5630,7 +5630,7 @@ static void perf_sample_regs_user(struct perf_regs *regs_user,
if (user_mode(regs)) {
regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current);
regs_user->regs = regs;
- } else if (current->mm) {
+ } else if (!(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
perf_get_regs_user(regs_user, regs, regs_user_copy);
} else {
regs_user->abi = PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE;
diff --git a/net/can/af_can.c b/net/can/af_can.c
index 9de9678fa7d0..46c85731d16f 100644
--- a/net/can/af_can.c
+++ b/net/can/af_can.c
@@ -959,6 +959,8 @@ static struct pernet_operations can_pernet_ops __read_mostly = {
static __init int can_init(void)
{
+ int err;
+
/* check for correct padding to be able to use the structs similarly */
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct can_frame, can_dlc) !=
offsetof(struct canfd_frame, len) ||
@@ -972,15 +974,31 @@ static __init int can_init(void)
if (!rcv_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
- register_pernet_subsys(&can_pernet_ops);
+ err = register_pernet_subsys(&can_pernet_ops);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_pernet;
/* protocol register */
- sock_register(&can_family_ops);
- register_netdevice_notifier(&can_netdev_notifier);
+ err = sock_register(&can_family_ops);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_sock;
+ err = register_netdevice_notifier(&can_netdev_notifier);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_notifier;
+
dev_add_pack(&can_packet);
dev_add_pack(&canfd_packet);
return 0;
+
+out_notifier:
+ sock_unregister(PF_CAN);
+out_sock:
+ unregister_pernet_subsys(&can_pernet_ops);
+out_pernet:
+ kmem_cache_destroy(rcv_cache);
+
+ return err;
}
static __exit void can_exit(void)
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 2b3b0307dd89..6d9fd7d4bdfa 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -2299,6 +2299,7 @@ int skb_send_sock_locked(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
kv.iov_base = skb->data + offset;
kv.iov_len = slen;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ msg.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT;
ret = kernel_sendmsg_locked(sk, &msg, &kv, 1, slen);
if (ret <= 0)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
index cb1b4772dac0..35d5a76867d0 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
@@ -265,8 +265,14 @@ static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb,
prev = fq->q.fragments_tail;
err = inet_frag_queue_insert(&fq->q, skb, offset, end);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == IPFRAG_DUP) {
+ /* No error for duplicates, pretend they got queued. */
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return -EINPROGRESS;
+ }
goto insert_error;
+ }
if (dev)
fq->iif = dev->ifindex;
@@ -293,15 +299,17 @@ static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb,
skb->_skb_refdst = 0UL;
err = nf_ct_frag6_reasm(fq, skb, prev, dev);
skb->_skb_refdst = orefdst;
- return err;
+
+ /* After queue has assumed skb ownership, only 0 or
+ * -EINPROGRESS must be returned.
+ */
+ return err ? -EINPROGRESS : 0;
}
skb_dst_drop(skb);
return -EINPROGRESS;
insert_error:
- if (err == IPFRAG_DUP)
- goto err;
inet_frag_kill(&fq->q);
err:
skb_dst_drop(skb);
@@ -481,12 +489,6 @@ int nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
ret = 0;
}
- /* after queue has assumed skb ownership, only 0 or -EINPROGRESS
- * must be returned.
- */
- if (ret)
- ret = -EINPROGRESS;
-
spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
inet_frag_put(&fq->q);
return ret;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index a133acb43eb1..0e209a88d88a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ ieee80211_get_sband(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
rcu_read_lock();
chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
- if (WARN_ON(!chanctx_conf)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!chanctx_conf)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
index 96e57d7c2872..c6edae051e9b 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
@@ -922,6 +922,7 @@ void ieee80211_stop_mesh(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
/* flush STAs and mpaths on this iface */
sta_info_flush(sdata);
+ ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, true);
mesh_path_flush_by_iface(sdata);
/* stop the beacon */
@@ -1209,7 +1210,8 @@ int ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
ifmsh->chsw_ttl = 0;
/* Remove the CSA and MCSP elements from the beacon */
- tmp_csa_settings = rcu_dereference(ifmsh->csa);
+ tmp_csa_settings = rcu_dereference_protected(ifmsh->csa,
+ lockdep_is_held(&sdata->wdev.mtx));
RCU_INIT_POINTER(ifmsh->csa, NULL);
if (tmp_csa_settings)
kfree_rcu(tmp_csa_settings, rcu_head);
@@ -1231,6 +1233,8 @@ int ieee80211_mesh_csa_beacon(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
struct mesh_csa_settings *tmp_csa_settings;
int ret = 0;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&sdata->wdev.mtx);
+
tmp_csa_settings = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp_csa_settings),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp_csa_settings)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c
index 6d118357d9dc..9259529e0412 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c
@@ -2706,6 +2706,7 @@ int rpc_clnt_add_xprt(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
xprt = xprt_iter_xprt(&clnt->cl_xpi);
if (xps == NULL || xprt == NULL) {
rcu_read_unlock();
+ xprt_switch_put(xps);
return -EAGAIN;
}
resvport = xprt->resvport;
diff --git a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c
index 2325d7ad76df..e8e8b756dc52 100644
--- a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c
+++ b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ void read_trace_pipe(void)
static char buf[4096];
ssize_t sz;
- sz = read(trace_fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ sz = read(trace_fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
if (sz > 0) {
buf[sz] = 0;
puts(buf);
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
index 3552b4b1f902..20914a33ca5d 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -3114,6 +3114,7 @@ static void alc256_init(struct hda_codec *codec)
alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */
alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Clear bit */
alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 0 << 15);
+ alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
}
static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec)
@@ -7218,7 +7219,6 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec)
spec->shutup = alc256_shutup;
spec->init_hook = alc256_init;
spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC256 does not have any loopback mixer path */
- alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
break;
case 0x10ec0257:
spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC257;
diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
index dc06f5e40041..526d808ecbbd 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
@@ -1677,6 +1677,7 @@ static void vgic_its_destroy(struct kvm_device *kvm_dev)
mutex_unlock(&its->its_lock);
kfree(its);
+ kfree(kvm_dev);/* alloc by kvm_ioctl_create_device, free by .destroy */
}
int vgic_its_has_attr_regs(struct kvm_device *dev,
