From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee upstream.
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -45,9 +45,7 @@ void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *c
*/
static void ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
{
- rcu_read_lock();
- __ptrace_link(child, new_parent, __task_cred(new_parent));
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ __ptrace_link(child, new_parent, current_cred());
}
/**
