3.16.66-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 79c9ce57eb2d5f1497546a3946b4ae21b6fdc438 upstream. Jann reported that the ptrace_may_access() check in find_lively_task_by_vpid() is racy against exec(). Specifically: perf_event_open() execve() ptrace_may_access() commit_creds() ... if (get_dumpable() != SUID_DUMP_USER) perf_event_exit_task(); perf_install_in_context() would result in installing a counter across the creds boundary. Fix this by wrapping lots of perf_event_open() in cred_guard_mutex. This should be fine as perf_event_exit_task() is already called with cred_guard_mutex held, so all perf locks already nest inside it. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Update another failure path in perf_event_open() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- kernel/events/core.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -936,6 +936,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_co * function. * * Lock order: + * cred_guard_mutex * task_struct::perf_event_mutex * perf_event_context::mutex * perf_event_context::lock @@ -3231,7 +3232,6 @@ static struct task_struct * find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid) { struct task_struct *task; - int err; rcu_read_lock(); if (!vpid) @@ -3245,16 +3245,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid) if (!task) return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - /* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */ - err = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) - goto errout; - return task; -errout: - put_task_struct(task); - return ERR_PTR(err); - } /* @@ -7491,18 +7482,36 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, get_online_cpus(); + if (task) { + err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + if (err) + goto err_cpus; + + /* + * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. + * + * We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential + * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to + * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the + * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). + */ + err = -EACCES; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + goto err_cred; + } + event = perf_event_alloc(&attr, cpu, task, group_leader, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(event)) { err = PTR_ERR(event); - goto err_cpus; + goto err_cred; } if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) { err = perf_cgroup_connect(pid, event, &attr, group_leader); if (err) { __free_event(event); - goto err_cpus; + goto err_cred; } } @@ -7552,11 +7561,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_alloc; } - if (task) { - put_task_struct(task); - task = NULL; - } - /* * Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it): */ @@ -7658,6 +7662,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx); + /* + * This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is + * where we start modifying current state. + */ + if (move_group) { /* * Wait for everybody to stop referencing the events through @@ -7683,6 +7692,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, } mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + if (task) { + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + put_task_struct(task); + } + put_online_cpus(); event->owner = current; @@ -7722,6 +7736,9 @@ err_alloc: */ if (!event_file) free_event(event); +err_cred: + if (task) + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); err_cpus: put_online_cpus(); err_task: @@ -7956,6 +7973,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context /* * When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events. + * + * Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from + * install_exec_creds(). */ void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child) {