3.16.65-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 5ae4f61f012a097df93de2285070ec8e34716d29 upstream. ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c +++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <sound/core.h> #include <sound/tlv.h> @@ -1001,6 +1002,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); if (ipcm->channels > 32) return -EINVAL; pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; @@ -1047,6 +1050,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; mutex_lock(&emu->fx8010.lock); spin_lock_irq(&emu->reg_lock);
