4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
commit 2d204ee9d671327915260071c19350d84344e096 upstream
The "le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputOffset) + *plen" addition can overflow and
wrap around to a smaller value which looks like it would lead to an
information leak.
Fixes: 4a72dafa19ba ("SMB2 FSCTL and IOCTL worker function")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Stable <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
index 69309538ffb8..1581e8668b09 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -2020,14 +2020,14 @@ SMB2_ioctl(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid,
/* We check for obvious errors in the output buffer length and offset */
if (*plen == 0)
goto ioctl_exit; /* server returned no data */
- else if (*plen > 0xFF00) {
+ else if (*plen > rsp_iov.iov_len || *plen > 0xFF00) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "srv returned invalid ioctl length: %d\n", *plen);
*plen = 0;
rc = -EIO;
goto ioctl_exit;
}
- if (get_rfc1002_length(rsp) < le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputOffset) + *plen) {
+ if (get_rfc1002_length(rsp) - *plen < le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputOffset)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Malformed ioctl resp: len %d offset %d\n", *plen,
le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputOffset));
*plen = 0;
--
2.19.1
