Hello,
Paul Burton wrote:
> Mapping the delay slot emulation page as both writeable & executable
> presents a security risk, in that if an exploit can write to & jump into
> the page then it can be used as an easy way to execute arbitrary code.
>
> Prevent this by mapping the page read-only for userland, and using
> access_process_vm() with the FOLL_FORCE flag to write to it from
> mips_dsemul().
>
> This will likely be less efficient due to copy_to_user_page() performing
> cache maintenance on a whole page, rather than a single line as in the
> previous use of flush_cache_sigtramp(). However this delay slot
> emulation code ought not to be running in any performance critical paths
> anyway so this isn't really a problem, and we can probably do better in
> copy_to_user_page() anyway in future.
>
> A major advantage of this approach is that the fix is small & simple to
> backport to stable kernels.
>
> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@xxxxxxxx>
> Fixes: 432c6bacbd0c ("MIPS: Use per-mm page to execute branch delay slot instructions")
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # v4.8+
Applied to mips-fixes.
Thanks,
Paul
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