On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 12:01 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. > > ------------------ > > commit cc255c76c70f7a87d97939621eae04b600d9f4a1 upstream. > > Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks) > instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out > data_crc entirely. > > This addresses CVE-2018-1129. > > Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837 > Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@xxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h | 7 +-- > net/ceph/auth_x.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- > 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h > index 59042d5ac520..70f42eef813b 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h > +++ b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h > @@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(58, 1, FS_FILE_LAYOUT_V2) // overlap > DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(59, 1, FS_BTIME) > DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(59, 1, FS_CHANGE_ATTR) // overlap > DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(59, 1, MSG_ADDR2) // overlap > -DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(60, 1, BLKIN_TRACING) // *do not share this bit* > +DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(60, 1, OSD_RECOVERY_DELETES) // *do not share this bit* > +DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(61, 1, CEPHX_V2) // *do not share this bit* > > -DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(61, 1, RESERVED2) // unused, but slow down! > DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE(62, 1, RESERVED) // do not use; used as a sentinal > DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE_DEPRECATED(63, 1, RESERVED_BROKEN, LUMINOUS) // client-facing > > @@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ DEFINE_CEPH_FEATURE_DEPRECATED(63, 1, RESERVED_BROKEN, LUMINOUS) // client-facin > CEPH_FEATURE_SERVER_JEWEL | \ > CEPH_FEATURE_MON_STATEFUL_SUB | \ > CEPH_FEATURE_CRUSH_TUNABLES5 | \ > - CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING) > + CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING | \ > + CEPH_FEATURE_CEPHX_V2) > > #define CEPH_FEATURES_REQUIRED_DEFAULT \ > (CEPH_FEATURE_NOSRCADDR | \ > diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c > index ce28bb07d8fd..10eb759bbcb4 100644 > --- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c > +++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > > #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> > #include <linux/ceph/auth.h> > +#include <linux/ceph/ceph_features.h> > #include <linux/ceph/libceph.h> > #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h> > > @@ -803,26 +804,64 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg, > __le64 *psig) > { > void *enc_buf = au->enc_buf; > - struct { > - __le32 len; > - __le32 header_crc; > - __le32 front_crc; > - __le32 middle_crc; > - __le32 data_crc; > - } __packed *sigblock = enc_buf + ceph_x_encrypt_offset(); > int ret; > > - sigblock->len = cpu_to_le32(4*sizeof(u32)); > - sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc; > - sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc; > - sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc; > - sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc; > - ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN, > - sizeof(*sigblock)); > - if (ret < 0) > - return ret; > + if (!CEPH_HAVE_FEATURE(msg->con->peer_features, CEPHX_V2)) { > + struct { > + __le32 len; > + __le32 header_crc; > + __le32 front_crc; > + __le32 middle_crc; > + __le32 data_crc; > + } __packed *sigblock = enc_buf + ceph_x_encrypt_offset(); > + > + sigblock->len = cpu_to_le32(4*sizeof(u32)); > + sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc; > + sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc; > + sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc; > + sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc; > + > + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, enc_buf, > + CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN, sizeof(*sigblock)); > + if (ret < 0) > + return ret; > + > + *psig = *(__le64 *)(enc_buf + sizeof(u32)); > + } else { > + struct { > + __le32 header_crc; > + __le32 front_crc; > + __le32 front_len; > + __le32 middle_crc; > + __le32 middle_len; > + __le32 data_crc; > + __le32 data_len; > + __le32 seq_lower_word; > + } __packed *sigblock = enc_buf; > + struct { > + __le64 a, b, c, d; > + } __packed *penc = enc_buf; > + int ciphertext_len; > + > + sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc; > + sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc; > + sigblock->front_len = msg->hdr.front_len; > + sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc; > + sigblock->middle_len = msg->hdr.middle_len; > + sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc; > + sigblock->data_len = msg->hdr.data_len; > + sigblock->seq_lower_word = *(__le32 *)&msg->hdr.seq; > + > + /* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */ > + ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, true, enc_buf, > + CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN, sizeof(*sigblock), > + &ciphertext_len); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + *psig = penc->a ^ penc->b ^ penc->c ^ penc->d; > + } > > - *psig = *(__le64 *)(enc_buf + sizeof(u32)); > return 0; > } Hi Greg, I thought this series (patches 13 - 18) was dropped from the 4.14 queue. If it wasn't, you also need to pick up the following: f1d10e046379 libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply() 130f52f2b203 libceph: check authorizer reply/challenge length before reading See our discussion with Sasha: https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg272462.html Thanks, Ilya
