4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx commit 7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15 upstream Now that all prerequisites are in place: - Add the prctl command line option - Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl' - When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch. - At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB evaluation on context switch. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@xxxxxxx> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4036,9 +4036,14 @@ off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is enforced by spectre_v2=off + prctl - Indirect branch speculation is enabled, + but mitigation can be enabled via prctl + per thread. The mitigation control state + is inherited on fork. + auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on the available CPU features and vulnerability. - Default is off. + Default is prctl. Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2_user=auto. --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -254,11 +254,13 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, }; static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection", + [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl", }; static const struct { @@ -269,6 +271,7 @@ static const struct { { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false }, { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false }, { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false }, }; static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) @@ -323,12 +326,15 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s smt_possible = false; switch (spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd)) { - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; break; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL; + break; } /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -339,6 +345,9 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb); break; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb); + break; default: break; } @@ -351,6 +360,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return; + /* + * If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIPB + * mode. + */ + if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; set_mode: spectre_v2_user = mode; /* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */ @@ -549,6 +564,15 @@ static void update_stibp_strict(void) on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); } +/* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */ +static void update_indir_branch_cond(void) +{ + if (sched_smt_active()) + static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp); + else + static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp); +} + void arch_smt_update(void) { /* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */ @@ -564,6 +588,7 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) update_stibp_strict(); break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + update_indir_branch_cond(); break; } @@ -1035,7 +1060,8 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: return ", STIBP: forced"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: - return ""; + if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) + return ", STIBP: conditional"; } return ""; } @@ -1043,14 +1069,11 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) static char *ibpb_state(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { - switch (spectre_v2_user) { - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: - return ", IBPB: disabled"; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) return ", IBPB: always-on"; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: - return ""; - } + if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) + return ", IBPB: conditional"; + return ", IBPB: disabled"; } return ""; }
