On 2018/11/27 10:16, David Long wrote:
> On 11/23/18 6:09 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> Hi Hanjun,
>>
>> On 23/11/2018 09:40, Hanjun Guo wrote:
>>> Hi Marc,
>>>
>>> On 2018/11/23 17:10, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>>>> On 23/11/2018 01:25, Hanjun Guo wrote:
>>>>> On 2018/10/31 22:04, David Long wrote:
>>>>>> From: "David A. Long" <dave.long@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> V4.4 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
>>>>>> Most KVM patches are excluded. Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.
>>>>>
>>>>> I tested this patch set on top of stable 4.4 kernel, running on boards with
>>>>> A9 and A15 based Hisilicon SoCs, didn't see boot regression and other function
>>>>> regressions in our CI system,
>>>>>
>>>>> Tested-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>
>>>>> Since this patch set didn't include PSCI based hardening for arm32, so
>>>>> bugfix 6282e916f774 ("ARM: 8809/1: proc-v7: fix Thumb annotation of
>>>>> cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm") is not needed for this patch set and this patch
>>>>> set is in a good shape I think. So what's the plan for this patch set?
>>>>
>>>> Well, not having these patches means that a 32bit kernel won't be get
>>>> any Spectre-v2 mitigation when run as a guest on an arm64 platform. It
>>>> turns out that this is a pretty common setup among people building large
>>>> pieces of SW, such as distributions.
>>>
>>> I almost miss this point, that makes sense to me :)
>>>
>
> I've been watching arm32 spectre patches appear since September and I have
> a work item to backport these too in the near future. I've been trying
> to focus on backporting 64-bit security patches to v4.4 in the shortterm though.
It's great, I'm happy to test your patches, please cc me for next version.
Thanks
Hanjun
